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ABSTRACT 
The classical view of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has typically been framed around 
dimensions of efficiency, productivity and administrative bureaucracy (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen 
& Musacchio, 2014). A number of theoretical perspectives, namely the property rights school, 
the public choice tradition, the neoclassical approach, the behavioural approach and the 
budget-maximising approach, have been used to model SOEs (Lawson, 1994). Despite a long 
theoretical interest in modelling SOEs, and their large impact on the global economy, 
challenges still exist to develop a comprehensive theory of SOEs (Peng, Bruton, Stan & Huang, 
2016). It is generally argued that SOEs have the potential for good governance, efficiency and 
better service delivery through enhanced performance. However, most SOEs do not reach 
these ideals. This situation justifies the need to study and carefully appraise options for injecting 
higher performance into SOEs if they are to play a meaningful role in achieving Vision 2030 – 
the vision of Namibia to become an industrialised country by 2030. 
The primary objective of this dissertation was to analyse the performance of SOEs in the 
transport sector and to identify factors that have contributed to the high or low performance of 
these SOEs. Several arguments have been made about the inefficiency and poor service 
delivery of SOEs. According to Steytler (2009:19), “[t]he poor financial performance of state 
owned enterprises have [sic] often been attributed to weak management practices of the CEOs 
of these institutions”. The ‘bureaucrats in business’ thesis by the World Bank (1995) advances 
a contrary view, i.e. that bureaucrats who run state-owned enterprises should not be blamed 
for all the ills of these companies since they are not necessarily incompetent but rather have to 
deal with contradictory goals and perverse incentives. 
Although the study confirmed most of the foregoing arguments, further analysis of the 
performance of SOEs in Namibia revealed that SOEs do not necessarily underperform simply 
because they are state-owned but because of the way that they are managed. With this 
revelation in mind, the study developed a model that could be helpful to address this situation, 
namely the performance of SOEs. Without going into the merits and demerits of the different 
methodologies, this study opted to use a mixed methods (pragmatic) approach. This allowed 
the researcher to adopt the best-suited approach to the research problem without getting 
caught up in the philosophical debates about which one is the best approach.  
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OPSOMMING 
Die klassieke siening van ondernemings in staatsbesit (SOE's) het tipies is opgestel om dimensies van 
doeltreffendheid, produktiwiteit en administratiewe burokrasie (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen & Musacchio, 
2014). '’n Aantal teoretiese perspektiewe, naamlik die eiendomsreg skool, die openbare keuse tradisie, 
die neo-klassieke benadering, die gedragsbenadering en die begroting maksimalisering benadering, is 
gebruik om ondernemings in staatsbesit (Lawson, 1994) se model. Ten spyte van 'n lang teoretiese 
belangstelling in modellering SOE's, en hul groot impak op die globale ekonomie, uitdagings bestaan 
steeds 'n omvattende teorie van SOE's (Peng, Bruton, Stan & Huang, 2016) ontwikkel. Dit is oor die 
algemeen aangevoer dat SOE's het die potensiaal vir goeie bestuur, doeltreffendheid en beter 
dienslewering deur verbeterde prestasie. Maar die meeste ondernemings in staatsbesit nie hierdie 
ideale te bereik. Hierdie situasie regverdig die behoefte om te studeer en versigtig beoordeel opsies vir 
die spuit van hoër prestasie in SOE's as hulle na 'n betekenisvolle rol in die bereiking van Visie 2030 te 
speel - die visie van Namibië na 'n geïndustrialiseerde land geword in 2030. 
Die primêre doel van hierdie verhandeling was om analiseer die prestasie van ondernemings in 
staatsbesit in die vervoersektor en om faktore wat bygedra het tot die hoë of lae prestasie van hierdie 
SOE's te identifiseer. Verskeie argumente gemaak oor die ondoeltreffendheid en swak dienslewering 
van SOE's. Volgens Steytler (2009: 19), "[t] hy swak finansiële prestasie van ondernemings in 
staatsbesit het [sic] dikwels toegeskryf aan swak bestuurspraktyke van die uitvoerende hoofde van 
hierdie instellings". Die "burokrate in besigheid 'n tesis deur die Wêreldbank (1995) bevorder 'n 
teenoorgestelde mening, naamlik dat burokrate wat ondernemings in staatsbesit loop nie moet die skuld 
vir al die euwels van hierdie maatskappye omdat hulle nie noodwendig onbevoeg maar eerder te doen 
het met teenstrydige doelwitte en verdraaide aansporings.   
 Alhoewel die studie bevestig die meeste van die voorafgaande argumente, verdere ontleding van die 
prestasie van ondernemings in staatsbesit in Namibië aan die lig gebring dat SOE's nie noodwendig net 
onderpresteer omdat hulle in staatsbesit, maar as gevolg van die manier waarop hulle bestuur word. Met 
hierdie openbaring in gedagte, die studie ontwikkel 'n model wat nuttig om hierdie situasie, naamlik die 
prestasie van ondernemings in staatsbesit aan te spreek kan wees. Sonder om in die meriete en nadele 
van die verskillende metodes, hierdie studie gekies om 'n gemengde metodes (pragmatiese) benadering 
gebruik. Dit het die navorser tot die beste geskik benadering tot die navorsingsprobleem aan te neem 
sonder om gevang in die filosofiese debatte oor watter een is die beste benadering. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
ORIENTATION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The goal of this study was to contribute to a better understanding of the performance of State-
owned Enterprises (SOEs)1. According to the literature, there is broad interest internationally 
in better performance measurement and management in the public sector that is linked to 
questions around corporate governance of SOEs and the continuing search for appropriate 
ways to effectively and efficiently deliver public services (Grossi, Papenfuss & Tremblay, 2015). 
To attain the goal of the study, the research was conducted on the performance of SOEs in 
Namibia, in terms of their governance, efficiency and productivity. This area was selected given 
the widespread concern about the subject of SOEs as reported in both public documents and 
the media. For example, on 10 July 2014, The Namibian newspaper reported that, “SOEs have 
been exposed to huge debts; poor leadership at both board and management levels; and that 
remuneration for executives was not linked to productivity and the ability to carry the 
expenditure burden” (2014:1). Such reports are not isolated, hence the need to conduct this 
study. 
The research was conducted through a systematic examination and assessment of key 
performance indicators attributable to service delivery by the transport sector SOEs in Namibia. 
Furthermore, as part of the qualitative section, expert interviews were undertaken with political 
heads and senior officials from both the government and the SOEs (see Annexure 1). Through 
this research, the study makes a significant contribution not only to improving the quality of 
services provided by SOEs in Namibia, but also to a clearer understanding of the factors that 
explain the level of performance in public sector organisations in Namibia. 
                                                 
1 The SOEs are known under other terms such as state-owned company, state-owned entity, state enterprises, publicly owned 
corporation, commercial government agency etc. In Namibia, however, they are usually referred to as State Owned Enterprises 
to denote their majority ownership structures and government deliberate attempts to venture into private (commercial) space. 
The term of course is still used even after the Public Enterprises Act, 2006 (Act No 2 of 2006) which was amended in 2016 
to make provision, for among others, the efficient governance of SOEs in the country.    
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Based on the analysis and findings reported in this study, an attempt is made to define, design 
and recommend models (see the discussions under 6.3), mechanisms, instruments and 
processes to improve public sector performance and management. The study appreciates the 
challenges of selecting performance indicators and looks at the mandate that these SOEs were 
created for and how well they are governed in order to fully appreciate their level of 
performance. 
With the above in mind, this introduction chapter begins by giving a general overview of the 
study, i.e. the background of the study, and goes on to present the research questions which 
provide the thrust of this study. The chapter further provides a brief legal framework, research 
problems and research objectives. It outlines the purpose and scope of the study and gives an 
overview of the chapters. 
 
1.2 Study Background 
Although Namibia’s economy has largely succeeded in generating positive economic growth 
since independence some more than 27 years ago, this growth has fallen far short of what is 
required to attain Vision 2030 (Sherbourne, 2017). Notable shortfalls include unemployment, 
long delays in the delivery of government services, lack of or limited critical skills and poor 
service delivery. 
Vision 2030 is a Namibian policy framework for long-term national development. In the foreword 
to Vision 2030, the founding father and President of the Republic of Namibia, Dr Sam Nujoma, 
had this to say about the document: “[…] it is a vision that will take Namibia from the present 
into the future; a vision that will guide us to make deliberate efforts to improve the quality of life 
of our people. It is designed as a broad, unifying vision which will serve to guide the country’s 
five-year development plans … and at the same time provide direction to government 
ministries, the private sector, NGOs, civil society, regional and local government authorities”. 
Therefore, Vision 2030 provides all government entities, including SOEs, the policy aims and 
objectives that they should effectively work towards. 
However, and despite having established SOEs to provide services to citizens in conformity 
with Vision 2030 and various national development plans, many have failed to deliver on their 
mandate and they have instead become a liability to the government. For example, in the 
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2017/2018 Budget Speech, the Minister of Finance stated that SOEs are expected to cost the 
tax payers around N$13,948,815,187 over the next three financial years. According to the 
Minister of Finance, SOEs will receive N$4,602,576,290 in 2017/18, N$4,615,054,579 in 
2018/19 and N$4,732,184,320 in 2019/20 (Republic of Namibia. Estimates of Expenditure for 
the Financial Year and Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2017/18-2019/20). Such 
subsidies show that the performance of some SOEs is contrary to the intention of their 
establishment. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
establishment of SOEs is often seen as the answer to the problem of slow and bureaucratic 
government processes and procedures. SOEs are viewed as having the potential to enhance 
better performance and good service delivery, thereby propelling rapid economic growth. It is 
believed that if SOEs adhere to sound business principles, the benefits will include, but not be 
limited to, good governance, efficiency, better service delivery and reduced administrative costs 
(OECD, 2005).  
Indeed, there is broad consensus that SOEs are meant to play an important role in the 
developmental agenda of any country. Some scholars (Abubaka, 2011; Nwoye, 2011) have 
argued that the debate on SOEs is no longer whether they have a role to play in national 
development, but rather which role and how best they should play it, since SOEs must perform 
efficiently and effectively to excel. 
 
1.3  Namibian SOEs 
SOEs have been exposed to huge debts, poor leadership at both board and management 
levels and that remuneration for executives was not linked to productivity and the ability to 
carry the expenditure burden.2 
(The Namibian, 10 July 2014:1) 
 
                                                 
2 Sentiments of the Namibian Prime Minister contributing to the debate on the Annual Report of SOEs in the National Assembly. 
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In Namibia, SOEs fulfil important functions, such as providing vital services to citizens (e.g. 
electricity and water), regulating several sectors of the economy (e.g. employment) and raising 
revenue for the government (Weylandt, 2016). Despite their importance in the national 
economy, Namibian SOEs are perceived as controversial due to their inefficient or inept service 
delivery. According to Weylandt (2016:2), “even the SOEs that were supposed to be 
commercially sustainable have too often relied on repeated government transfers to keep 
themselves afloat, while a long line of corruption, scandals and tales of dysfunctional 
management have tarnished the reputation of the sector”. Ironically, SOEs are regulated by 
legislation, albeit fragmented, with one major act being the Public Enterprises Governance Act 
2 of 2006 (as amended). This Act is considered in detail later in the chapter.  
Several arguments have been advanced with regards to inefficient and poor service delivery. 
According to Steytler (2009:19), “[t]he poor financial performance of state owned enterprises 
have [sic] often been attributed to weak management practices of the CEOs of these 
institutions.” The ‘Bureaucrats in Business’ thesis by the World Bank (1995) advances a 
contrary view, i.e. that bureaucrats who run state-owned enterprises should not be blamed for 
all the ills of these companies since they are not necessarily incompetent but rather have to 
deal with contradictory goals and perverse incentives. 
However, despite notable differences of opinion, it must be said that there is general agreement 
regarding the developmental agenda of SOEs, which goes well beyond the issues of rent 
extraction by policymakers, corruption or winning the vote of employees in some constituencies 
as in the public choice tradition (Florio & Fecher, 2011). One view is that SOEs are important 
policy instruments (Christiansen, 2011). States have used SOEs to foster research and 
innovation and for the implementation of industrial policy (Millward, 2011). 
As the Guide to the Namibian Economy 2017 notes, since independence in 1990, the 
government has devoted considerable policy attention to SOEs (or parastatals as they were 
then called). This resulted in a dramatic increase of SOEs from 12 in 1990 to 45 in 2003. 
According to The Namibian newspaper (10 July 2014:2), a total of 72 SOEs have been 
established to date. In addition, these public enterprises have been used as an important 
training ground for new black Namibian professionals (Sherbourne, 2017:419). 
At the same time, debate has been on-going on issues such as privatisation, commercialisation, 
and liberalisation and deregulation vis-à-vis continuing state ownership. This debate has partly 
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been a reflection of a broader discourse in mainstream neoclassical economics vis-à-vis new 
public management. Of course, neither of these approaches is comfortable with the idea that 
state-owned enterprises could perform well and thus prefer privatisation (Florio & Fecher, 
2011).  Critics of SOEs in Namibia take a similar position and have long argued for the 
privatisation of ailing enterprises to unburden the taxpayer and to force the entities to run 
profitably. Despite such calls for privatisation, the government seems to have taken a softer 
approach of ‘corporatisation without privatisation’ (Aivazian, Ge & Qiu, 2005).  
Concern for escalating fiscal burdens and several prominent cases of mismanagement and 
poor performance resulted in the Cabinet commissioning Deloitte and Touche to compile a 
report on the governance of SOEs in 2000 (Sherbourne, 2017; Weylandt, 2016). The Report 
on a Governance Policy Framework for State-Owned Enterprises in Namibia (Deloitte & 
Touche, 2001) raised serious concerns on the performance of SOEs in Namibia, citing a litany 
of issues. These issues include rapidly increasing public spending and lending to the sector; 
excessive financial returns due to monopoly pricing; increased capital intensity but decreasing 
productivity of capital; high levels of debt; low tax payments; inconsistencies in governance 
practices; undue political interference; uncertainty about SOEs’ development role; and 
unsatisfactory performance of board members (Sherbourne, 2017:420). 
The report recommended a new classification of SOEs and proposed a new governance 
structure, whereby a central governance agency in the Ministry of Finance would assume the 
pari passu fiscal responsibility to monitor SOEs’ performance while being overseen 
operationally by a State-Owned Enterprise Governance Council (SOEGC) at Cabinet level. This 
central governance agency existed under the Office of the Prime Minister between 2003 and 
2006, but was not supported by any enabling legislation and it was therefore rendered impotent 
(Weylandt, 2016:6). 
The SOEGC, which was in essence a cabinet committee that was chaired by the Prime Minister, 
was supposed to develop a framework for governance and determine how performance would 
be measured. It was envisaged that this council would, among other things, enter into 
governance agreements with SOE boards and determine the composition, number, eligibility 
and terms of office of board members, with the power residing with portfolio ministers to appoint 
and set the remuneration for board members. After a 2008 amendment to the SOEG Act, the 
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power of portfolio ministers to appoint SOE boards was withdrawn and assigned to the power 
to appoint board members back from the Council (Weylandt, 2016:6). 
Ambiguity in the above governance arrangements is confusing. Dual reporting, multi-ministerial 
supervision and co-shared responsibility thus remain a standing critique. In his contribution to 
the debate on the Annual Report of SOEs in the National Assembly, the Prime Minister argued 
that “the current dual governance model of SOEs has multiple layers of authority and 
communication which makes it difficult for the council to efficiently and effectively perform 
oversight functions stipulated in the Act” (The Namibian, 10 July 2014). This situation could 
therefore hamper the performance of these entities. 
With these observations in mind, the former Prime Minister, now the President of Republic of 
Namibia, Dr Hage Geingob, created a new Ministry of Public Enterprises to try to resolve the 
dual and multilevel supervision of SOEs, with the aim to provide policy and pathways for 
commercial SOEs’ efficiency and self-sufficiency.  
Figure 1.1 below (which will be discussed in detail later) stipulates the new framework. It 
suffices for now to indicate that, under the new system (Hybrid Governance Model), the Ministry 
of Public Enterprises would become the full shareholder of all commercial enterprises (having 
the potential to generate profit), and non-commercial ones (mostly dealing with regulatory 
aspects) would be under the respective line ministries while the financial enterprises would fall 
under the Ministry of Finance. It should be noted that, besides these categorisations, portfolio 
ministries still run the regulatory aspect of their respective sectors. 
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Figure 1.1: The Hybrid Governance Model 
 
 
   
Source: Jooste (2016) 
 
1.4 Research Problem 
Over the past couple of years, the Namibian government introduced a number of measures to 
boost the performance of SOEs in the country through the provision of substantive financial 
resources, amendments and enactments of new laws. The economic impact of these entities 
on the country’s economy has been a constant subject of public debate. With the poor 
performing SOEs, their continuing dependence and the debt level into which they have led the 
country into, the public has been questioning the SOEs’ efficiency. The study intended to 
investigate the fundamental factors impacting the performance of these various institutions by 
analysing the performance of specifically selected SOEs in the transport sector. 
Singling out only SOEs in the transport sector makes sense because of Namibia’s vast land 
surface and small population. Transport is consequently paramount to connect this population 
that is spread across a wide land surface. It should be understood that Namibia spans an area 
of approximately 825,000 km2 and it has a population of about 2,113,077 (Government of the 
Republic of Namibia, 2011:3). It is one of the world’s lowest populated countries, with a 
population density of approximately 4,600 hectares per person, which is more than five times 
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the world average. Delivery of services is therefore an ever-present constraint in most parts of 
the country. Furthermore, Namibia harbours ambitions of becoming a logistical hub for the 
SADC region. Most of these services and ambitions require the transport platform to be 
realised, hence the importance of the sector as a basic enabler for any economy. 
As a basic enabler for both domestic and international purposes, transportation is a very 
expensive commodity. Thus, the biggest challenge facing actors in Namibia’s transport sector 
is how to provide such services to the larger and geographically dispersed public in an efficient 
and effective manner. The establishment of SOEs was thought to be the answer to this problem, 
since government departments are often viewed as slow and bureaucratic, with cumbersome 
processes and procedures. 
It is generally believed that SOEs, if properly managed, have the potential to enhance 
performance and service delivery, thereby propelling rapid economic growth. However, the 
reality has been far from ideal in the case of Namibia if one considers the resource inputs to 
these institutions versus their performance and the general public outcry about their poor 
performance and limitations. In Namibia, SOEs are classified into three tiers based on their size 
and contribution to the economy.  
The three key indicators that are used to classify SOEs in categories are: total revenue, total 
asset, and total primary employment (Namibia State-Owned Enterprises Directive, 2010). In 
addition to the three tiers, SOEs are also divided into three groupings of enterprises, namely 
economic and productive, regulatory, and service-rendering enterprises. 
 
1.5 Research Aim 
The overall aim of this research was to develop a conceptual and detailed understanding of 
factors that influence the performance of SOEs in the transport sector with a view to contribute 
to improving the performance of SOEs in Namibia. 
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1.6 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this research was to analyse the performance of SOEs in the transport 
sector in terms of governance, efficiency and productivity by identifying the critical factors that 
have contributed to the high or low performance of these SOEs. In order to better understand 
factors that affect the performance of Namibian SOEs, the study set the following specific 
objectives: 
1. To assess and objectively determine the level of performance (in terms of governance, 
efficiency and productivity) of Namibian SOEs in the transport sector; 
2. To examine the empirical evidence of factors responsible for the observed performance 
of SOEs in the transport sector; 
3. To design interventions to improve the performance of SOEs; and  
4. To recommend a set of measures to the government, along with their associated 
implementation mechanisms to rationalise or optimise SOE performance. 
 
1.7 Research Questions  
To address the outlined topic and meet the objectives, the study was guided by the following 
research questions: 
1. How do Namibian SOEs in the transport sector perform? 
2. What factors explain the level of performance of SOEs? 
3. What are the right models, mechanisms, instruments and processes for enhancing 
performance of SOEs? 
 
1.8 Research Design and Methodology  
“The person who believes he/she knows everything reveals not only arrogance, but also a 
profound ignorance.” 
(Goddard & Melville, 2001:1) 
 
The above quotation amplifies the need to search, discover and create new knowledge, hence 
the importance of this research. There are many definitions of research available in the literature 
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but, according to Leedy (cited in Goddard & Melville, 2001), it is a systematic quest for 
discovering knowledge. The term “systematic” is very important as it distinguishes research 
from the mere collection or gathering of information or data. 
 
1.8.1 Research design 
This study opted for a descriptive research design, in particular the Case Study. It employed a 
case study approach by analysing the performance of five (5) SOEs from all four (4) transport 
modes. According to De Vausa (2001), a case study is an in-depth study of a particular research 
problem rather than a sweeping statistical survey. It is often used to narrow down a very broad 
field of research into one or a few easily researchable examples. In this case, the study narrows 
down the performance of SOEs in Namibia by considering specific SOEs in the transport sector. 
Furthermore, the study also employed a mixed method (pragmatic) approach. According to the 
Alzheimer Europe site (2013), the pragmatic approach allows the researcher to adopt the best-
suited approach to the research problem without getting caught up in philosophical debates 
about which is the single best approach. The pragmatic approach recognises that every method 
has its limitations and that the different approaches can be complementary. Furthermore, the 
choice of this research paradigm was informed by the assumption that using a mixed-method 
approach increases the likelihood that the sum of the data collected will be richer, more 
meaningful, and ultimately more useful in answering the research questions (Prestkill, 2009). 
Another important question that this research needed to consider was whether to adopt a pure 
or applied research approach. Pure research is undertaken for a single goal of gaining 
knowledge, while applied research is undertaken to solve a specific practical problem. 
Considering the topic under investigation, the research opted for both because of the huge 
interest this topic (SOEs) has attracted over the years. 
 
1.8.2 Population and sample 
The population is simply all members of the group that the researcher is interested in. According 
to Burns and Grove (1993), the population refers to all elements consisting of individuals, 
objects and or events which meet the sample criteria to be included in a study. For this study, 
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the sample criteria were classification and sector. For example, only those SOEs classified as 
Tier 3 (larger SOEs) and those in the transport sector were considered.  
A sample on the other hand is a set of the population that, according to Bynner and Stribley 
(1978), is usually chosen because to access all members of the population is prohibitive in time, 
money and other resources. Collins et al (2000:149) define the sample as a subset of 
measurements drawn from the population.  
It is important to note that the sampling for the study was done using the purposeful and 
opportunity sampling approach. A key issue in choosing the sample relates to whether the 
members you have are representative of the population. For this study, the answer was yes, 
as the selected members had the relevant background of the subject matter and occupied 
positions where they could appreciate the discussion under investigation. These were; 
 
a) Political Heads (Ministers) who were targeted using unstructured interviews. 
b)  Senior Government Officials (Line Directors in charge of the selected SOEs and 
those from the Public Enterprise responsible for governance issues) who were 
targeted using structured questionnaires.  
c)  Senior officials in charge of SOEs (Board Members, Chief Executive Officers and 
their respective Management members). 
 
1.8.3 Data and data collection 
The study utilised both primary and secondary data. The primary data were collected and 
analysed from 16 key informants. The eligible sample criteria were mainly expert knowledge on 
the subject matter, position (mostly management – as they are able to appreciate the 
problems/challenges under discussion) and willingness to participate. The key informants 
included managers from line directorates responsible for the different transport modes (aviation, 
railway, road and maritime) from both the Works and Transport and Public Enterprise ministries, 
with specific and expert knowledge on the subject matter. Furthermore, political heads 
(ministers) of both ministries (Works and Transport and Public Enterprises) were also 
interviewed. The political aspect was very important so as to appreciate the intent and 
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expectations behind the creation of these entities (SOEs) and to assess if these were being 
met. Secondary data were collected and analysed by evaluating previous audits, researches 
and review reports.   
 
All in all, the information was collected in a controlled manner to eliminate alternative 
explanations in a systematic way (Welman, 2001:5). This process eliminates non-scientific 
ways of gathering data, such as inclusion of authority, biased opinions, preconceived notions 
and peer pressure (Welman et al., 2005). The study employed a triangular method to eliminate 
biased opinions. It looked at theories, interviews and checked them against audited reports. 
 
1.8.4 Data analysis 
Finally, the data collected were processed and analysed. The analysis of data is a process of 
inspecting, cleaning, transforming and modelling data with the goal of discovering useful 
information, suggesting conclusions and supporting decision-making. According to Bogdan and 
Biken (1982:145), this process involves working with data by organising and breaking it down, 
synthesising it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important in it and determining what 
can be learnt. 
 
For this specific study, the researcher opted to use content analysis. Content analysis allows 
the researcher to create and arrange responses into themes based on research questions. 
Furthermore, SOEs were rated based on the outcomes of the different instruments and other 
secondary data, such as their audited financial reports, supported by the relevant theories 
introduced in the literature review. In cases of non-disclosure of certain information, the 
researcher improvised by making extrapolations from the available data, which could be a 
limitation of this study.   
 
It should be further noted that the information was analysed qualitatively and as such it is 
diverse and somewhat broad, especially given the general comments given by some 
respondents. However, the analysis ultimately enabled the information to be sieved and 
relevant issues to be grouped together to produce a composite whole. Below is a closer and 
graphic look (Figure 1.2) on how the study of the analysis of the performance of SOEs in the 
transport sector in Namibia was conducted. It describes the road of the dissertation to the logical 
conclusion in Chapter Seven. The study followed a scientific approach to reach the conclusion.  
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Figure 1.2: The Dissertation Process Flowchart of Study 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s construction 
 
 
1.9 Significance of the Study 
State-owned enterprises have the potential for good governance, efficiency and better service 
delivery through enhanced performance. However, most SOEs are exceptions to these ideals. 
This situation justifies the need to study and carefully appraise options for injecting higher 
performance into SOEs if they are to play a meaningful role in achieving Vision 2030. These 
are the critical policy questions that are addressed in this study. Chapter 7 contains the 
conclusions and recommendations that are, in turn, based on the research questions set above. 
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1.10 Scope of the Study 
Currently, Namibia has eight SOEs in the transport sector. The study investigated five SOEs, 
namely Air Namibia, Namibia Airports Company, Namport, Roads Authority and TransNamib, 
covering each transport mode, namely air, sea, road and rail, respectively. 
 
1.11 Outline of the Study 
The following chapter outlines were utilised in this study: 
Chapter 1: Orientation and Overview provides the general overview of the study. It shows 
the research problems, the research questions, the research aims and objectives. It goes on to 
show the significance of this study, thus showing its necessity, meaning and worth. This study 
was done within a determinable context and this chapter accordingly also shows its limitations 
and scope. All in all, this chapter introduces the dissertation to the reader. 
 
Chapter 2: State-Owned Enterprises in Namibia: Context and Challenges provides some 
of the major and salient issues relating to SOEs in Namibia. It gives a descriptive overview of 
the context and challenges faced by SOEs in the country. The context aspect covers the history 
and rationale of establishing SOEs in the country while the challenges aspect covers the 
performance issues and difficulties with which SOEs are faced. The chapter consciously 
discusses the two aspects (context and challenges) to set the stage for the succeeding 
chapters. It set questions pertaining to the where (context) and why (challenges) aspects with 
which SOEs deal with year in and year out. This chapter sets the trajectory of the dissertation 
and guides its thinking in a systematic and coherent way – from the general to the particular. 
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review provides a systematic identification, location and analysis of 
documents containing information related to the research problem. These documents include 
both primary and secondary data: legislation, policies, technical organisational documents, 
research or scholarly articles, abstracts, reviews, dissertations, books, other research reports 
and appropriate electronic media outputs. 
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This chapter ascertains what others have already done on what relates to this study and the 
topics it covers. This prevents unintentional duplication of other research, but it also provides 
an understanding and insight that is necessary to place a topic within a logical framework. 
Chapter 3 thus outlines the research strategies and specific data-collection approaches that 
have or have not been productive in investigations of SOEs and related topics. 
 
Chapter 4: Transport-Orientated State-Owned Enterprises in Namibia: A Policy, 
Legislative and Institutional Reality Perspective deals with one of the primary objectives of 
this research, namely to analyse the performance of SOEs in the transport sector. The chapter 
breaks down the policy and legal framework and several theoretical and practical aspects 
relevant to the governing of these SOEs in the country. Furthermore, the chapter delves into 
the gaps of these legal instruments. It thereafter covers the environment of SOEs and models 
governing SOEs. This is done while contextualising this environment and these models by 
showing where they are reflected in Namibian legislation or executive discretional formations. 
 
Chapter 5: The Performance of State-Owned Enterprises in Namibia presents the analysis 
of findings of the performance of the transport sector SOEs in Namibia. The chapter gathers 
data from interviews and desk research and analyses it following the research design and 
methodologies set out in Chapter 3. There is a strong concentration of the data acquired from 
field research, specifically the questionnaires that were distributed to the respondents. This 
data is also analysed in terms of scholarly research and other data revealed in Chapter 2. 
Previous research is accordingly presented and contextualised. The result is that Chapter 5 
reveals that the major causes of mal-performance of SOEs in Namibia have been financial 
management practices; a deficient management information system; absence of key 
performance indicators; incompetent management policies; and corruption. Corruption in 
particular is a common factor in all organisations with poor management, corporate governance 
ethics and, worse, poor salary structure and political interference. 
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Chapter 6: A New Approach to the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises in Namibia 
reviews some of the innovations and strategies that attempt to enhance the general 
performance of SOEs in Namibia. This chapter provides an innovative model that can be used 
to enhance the performance of SOEs in Namibia’s transport sector. It builds on the previous 
chapter by doing a gap analysis. The chapter concentrates mainly on the old framework and 
then moves to the new proposed one. The question that this chapter ends with is whether these 
approaches have helped improve the performance of SOEs in the country. By taking into 
account the gap between the desired ideal and the current reality, the author proposes a new 
model that can help to improve the performance of SOEs in the country. All in all, the chapter 
intended to compile a simple but useful innovative model to assist the performance of SOEs in 
the transport sector. The model contains sufficient details and it can easily be understood. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations identifies the core answers to the research 
questions set and makes appropriate recommendations based on these answers. The 
recommendations made in this chapter are based on conclusions reached from the analysis 
done in the previous chapters. The recommendations are meant to be pragmatic approaches 
to address the pressing challenges faced by the selected SOEs in the transport sector. It is 
important to mention that at the end of this concluding chapter there are also recommendations 
for further research. These recommendations show that there are still very close and related 
areas that should be researched. This part also illustrates the limitations of the study and the 
scope to which the study was confined and why other compelling questions were avoided. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN NAMIBIA – CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with some of the major and salient issues relating to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in Namibia. It gives a descriptive overview of the context and challenges faced by SOEs 
in the country, covering the history and rationale leading to the establishment of SOEs, as well 
as SOE performance and the difficulties they face. The chapter consciously discusses the two 
aspects of context and challenges to set the stage for subsequent chapters. It also sets 
questions pertaining to the where (context) and why (challenges) aspects that SOEs must deal 
with, year in and year out. This chapter sets the trajectory of the dissertation and guides the 
thinking of the dissertation in a systematic and coherent way – from the general to the particular. 
It should be taken into account that the situation of SOEs in Namibia has been met with mixed 
views. These entities operate in a different context and face different challenges. Some are 
performing well and some are not. However, the general feeling (as is demonstrated in Chapter 
5) is that, there is a need for some serious revisiting of how SOEs can operate better and be 
more effective and efficient as they strive towards greater productivity. 
Since this chapter covers the context and challenges of Namibian SOEs, it considers the 
historical context that informed the formation of SOEs in the country at independence, followed 
by the post-independence context, where several developmental strategies were adopted and 
the SOE sector was progressively reformed. It was during these reform processes that the 
government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) endeavoured to deal with many of the challenges 
that face SOEs in the country. 
These challenges are multiple and may differ from one SOE to another. It is within this 
understanding that the chapter considers these challenges from a general perspective, where 
necessary and relevant; however, specific challenges for specific SOEs are also mentioned. 
The chapter is broadly structured as follows: 
● Historical overview of SOEs in Namibia;  
● Challenges of SOEs; and 
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● Conclusion. 
 
A closer look is now taken pertaining to the historical overview of SOEs. 
 
2.2 A Historical Overview of SOEs in Namibia 
The history of SOEs in Namibia cannot be separated from the history of the struggle against 
foreign rule on the one hand and for socio-political and economic emancipation on the other. 
Many public enterprises were tied into the lives of state-run financial and economic institutions 
in South Africa and, therefore, did not have a life of their own in Namibia. Some of these South 
African organisations date back to the 20th century (IPPR, 2017; New Era Publications, 2015). 
Others were created in South Africa in the 21st century, indicating that they underwent some 
phases of transformation and restructuring that had an impact on their institutional culture and 
styles of operation. 
Similar to many countries in post-independence Africa, the first task for the Namibian 
government immediately after independence was to establish a public sector that is responsive 
to all inhabitants of the country. Although the private sector existed prior to independence, most 
services were provided or regulated by the government, which resulted in a huge civil service. 
This civil service was set to expand even more as the new government had to incorporate those 
citizens that were outside, fighting for the liberation of the country, and those that were simply 
previously left out for political and/or racial reasons. 
Taylor (2006) observes that there was hardly any distinction between Namibia’s civil service 
and Namibia’s public service, and that both operated under the same Public Service Act and 
were managed by the Public Service Commission, although they had different components and 
stakeholders.  Taylor’s (2006) depiction of their differences is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1: Public Service Reform in Namibia 
 
 
Source: Taylor (2006) 
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To address the above challenges, as well as the bloated civil service and its systemic 
inefficiencies, in 1995 the Wage and Salary Commission (WASCOM) recommended to Cabinet 
that some of the government functions be commercialised or privatised. This led to the 
establishment of many parastatals, such as Namibia Power (NamPower), Namibia Water 
Corporation (NamWater), Telecom Namibia, Namibia Post, Namibia Wildlife Resorts, Motor 
Vehicle Accident Fund (MVA), Namibia Airport Company (NAC), Namibia Ports Authority 
(Namport), Road Contractor Company (RCC), Roads Authority (RA) and TransNamib Holdings 
(TNH). With limited time, research and consultation, these parastatals were transformed into 
public and private liability entities with their own boards appointed by the respective portfolio 
ministers. 
As a means of reinforcing the government’s position, Namibia’s first National Development Plan 
(NDP1) made the government’s policy clear by indicating that the state would withdraw from 
activities that can be more effectively undertaken by the private sector and right-size those that 
would remain under government control. This policy position resulted in the establishment of 
more SOEs, with the number increasing from a mere 12 to 72 in 2014 (The Namibian, 10 July 
2014:2). To date, the number has increased to 90 SOEs (IPPR, 2016). 
Notwithstanding good intentioned actions, such as rightsizing, there are several factors that 
inform the establishment and subsequent growth of parastatals. According to Sherbourne 
(2017), some parastatals had to be established in the process of building the new state (Bank 
of Namibia is but one example), and the government was keen to move some of its non-core 
services towards commercialisation, taking functions that were being performed by the 
government and spinning them off into separate companies for improved efficiency and 
effectiveness. Already by the early 1990s, it was becoming clear that the Namibian government 
harboured intentions of withdrawing from non-core business activities. 
Against the above background, the need to commence and continue the restructuring of SOEs 
was inevitable. In addition to the monumental political change in the early 1990s in Namibia, 
the government’s focus on the transformation of the SOEs was also necessitated by other 
factors, namely:  
a) The arrival and on-going democratisation of the public space;  
b) The unprecedented modernisation and changes in technology;  
c) Changes in international economic conditions after the end of the Cold War;  
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d) The realities of a Namibia sandwiched between two strong economies – Angola in the 
north and South Africa in the south; 
e) The economic inequalities regarding race and gender factors that came about as a result 
of a deliberate white supremacist and male chauvinist planning paradigm;  
f) The need to manage expectations following the arrival of democracy and a human rights 
culture;  
g) Changes of political and socioeconomic development imperatives;  
h) The importance of making Namibia a competitive nation based upon its economic growth 
and prosperity; and  
i) The need to tackle rampant poverty through, inter alia, job creation and small- and 
medium-scale business interventions towards self-reliance. 
(New Era Publications, 2015) 
 
The transport reforms also followed the general pattern as indicated above. With significant 
assistance from Sweden, the transport sector underwent a fundamental transformation in the 
late 1990s under the auspices of the then Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication 
2000, (popularly called the MWTC2000 Project). According to Folwell (2008), the principal 
notion of this undertaking was to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the sector by 
concentrating on core functions and separating policy and regulations from implementation or 
operations. The policy and regulatory functions were to remain with the Ministry, while 
implementation was to be conducted by parastatals (SOEs).  
Furthermore, governance of these parastatals was to be the responsibility of the board. The 
operations and performance were to be monitored through formal annual performance 
agreements between the Ministry of Works and Transport and the relevant parastatals. In turn, 
the Ministry had to table these annual reports to parliament, covering the physical and financial 
performance of each parastatal for which it was responsible (Folwell, 2008:1). 
In the final analysis, it is noted that the on-going restructuring initiatives to be carried out by the 
Ministry of Public Enterprises occur in the context of a dynamic process of nation building, part 
of which is the on-going realignment of planning with the broader and medium- and long-term 
stratagems of the Namibian state to steward available resources towards the goals of 
development, peace, security and stability (New Era Publications, 2015; Jauch, 2012). 
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2.3 Challenges of SOEs in Namibia 
In Namibia, SOEs play, or should play, an important role in the developmental agenda of the 
country. All SOEs are regulated by legislation, which, for the most part, was fragmented until 
the Public Enterprises Governance Act 2 of 2006 (as amended) was enacted. This placing of 
SOEs under one major Act raised other governance and relational issues. This Act is 
considered in detail later on. For this chapter, however, it is important to appreciate the functions 
of SOEs before considering the challenges they face in fulfilling their mandates or functions. 
Section 4(1) of the Public Enterprises Governance Act outlines the functions and duties of the 
State-Owned Enterprises Council (now replaced by the Ministry of Public Enterprises), namely: 
● To establish generally accepted common principles of corporate governance and good 
practices for governing SOEs;  
● To develop common policy frameworks for the operations of SOEs, including policies on 
issues relating to human resources, assets and finance; 
● To determine criteria for the performance measurement and evaluation of SOEs and to 
develop appropriate means for monitoring SOEs’ performance;  
● To make determinations in relation to the number of members to be appointed to the 
boards of SOEs and to advise the portfolio ministers on the appointment of such 
members in accordance with sections to facilitate the provision of programmes for the 
training and development of members of the boards and management staff of SOEs in 
corporate governance and efficient management practices; and 
● To receive and consider for approval submissions made by SOEs to the annual 
distribution of profits and the declaration of dividends.  
 
It should be appreciated from the above functions of SOEs that the Namibian SOE design 
shows a strong developmental agenda. Thus, Murangi (2010) adds that SOEs play an 
important role in the national economy of Namibia in terms of economic growth and 
development, as well as poverty eradication. SOEs represent an extended arm of government 
by providing key public goods and services to the country that cannot be provided by private 
enterprises.  However, this agenda is met with challenges. Although better governance and 
improved efficiency improve the Government of the Republic of Namibia’s fiscal position, 
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enhance delivery of service and increase job creation, the reality in 2005 showed “poor 
performance, mismanagement and corruption in many SOE’s (Murangi, 2010). 
The SOE design in Namibia has been shown as not based on a centralised shareholder 
management model. Most SOEs are 100% government-owned with the voting shares held 
equally by two ‘shareholding ministers’, namely the Minister of Finance and the portfolio 
minister who is currently, as with the new government, under President Geingob and by 
convention the Minister of SOEs. The SOEs report to the government and the government 
appoints their boards. Furthermore, the legislative framework as shown below classifies SOEs 
into four categories. In terms of Section 4(2) of the Public Enterprises Governance Act 2 of 
2006, SOEs can be classified as: 
● Regulatory;  
● Service rendering;  
● Economic and productive; or  
● General enterprises. 
 
The South African Presidential SOE Review Committee (2012:15) calls the Namibian approach 
to SOE classification a progressive one, that is practical and uncomplicated not only for 
classifying SOEs but also for managing them effectively. The report states that the Namibian 
“manner of classifying SOEs is forward-looking, inclusive and sustainable” (South African 
Presidential SOE Review Committee, 2012:15). Despite this positive comment, SOEs in 
Namibia face some distinct governance challenges. The performance of SOEs in Namibia has 
been in the spotlight for many years, resulting in the government of the Republic of Namibia 
introducing interventions and strategies to address and improve their performance. 
Shifidi (2014: evaluated corporate governance in SOEs in Namibia, concluding that corporate 
governance in Namibia “is such a serious challenge, especially in the public sector. In addition, 
the author offers a generic outlook on this problem without concentrating on one sector, as in 
this study (Shifidi, 2014). However, it is obvious that the public sector that Shifidi (2014) alludes 
to includes SOEs. There are, however, a few companies, such as the Namibia Ports Authority 
(Namport) that are doing relatively well and are close to having an annual report that is almost 
an integrated report (Shifidi, 2014:iv). 
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Figure 2.2: Namport Corporate Governance 
 
Source: Shifidi (2014:46) 
 
The author focused on the disclosure aspects of good corporate governance (see Figure 2.2 
above), such as remuneration, reporting etc. Namport scores higher, about 76 % (from the 13, 
Tier 3 SOEs (those classified as larger SOEs in Namibia) selected by Shifindi, 2014) in most of 
those key governance aspects and this may explain its good performance as an SOE when 
compared to others in the country. From the above figure, it’s clear that Namport is committed 
to the principles of good corporate governance as contained in the King III Report. 
With regards to the sustainability aspects, it was observed that Namibia’s SOEs are relatively 
on par with both South Africa’s SOEs and the private sector when compared to the results of 
similar research studies in that country. This is depicted in the graph below. 
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Figure 2.3: Comparison between Namibian SOEs, South African SOEs and the South African 
Private Sector for Sustainability Indicators 
 
Source: Shifidi (2014:46) 
 
These kinds of results show that there is a strong correlation between Namibian SOEs and 
those from South Africa. These results remain relevant as they paint a general picture of the 
performance of SOEs that have similar problems. Furthermore, some comparative analysis 
help to identify common problems, lessons learnt and also best practices. This takes us directly 
into the important topic of this study, namely corporate governance.  
With the above general overview of the performance of SOEs, some of the notable challenges 
with which SOEs in Namibia are faced, are considered below. These challenges have led to 
the poor performance of SOEs, resulting in financial reliance on state subsidies and bailouts. 
 
2.3.1 Mismanagement 
As is often noted, board members and managers of SOEs know that if they fail, they can count 
on a bailout from the state, which can lead to either overly risky behaviour or shoddy 
performance. In addition, accountability is a problem as it is often unclear to whom SOEs should 
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ultimately report to, in a whole array of bodies and ministries tasked with oversight, while their 
shareholders (i.e. citizens) have only indirect ways of holding them accountable. According to 
Steytler (2009:19), “[t]he poor financial performance of state owned enterprises have [sic] often 
been attributed to weak management practices of the CEOs of these institutions.” Despite GRN 
introducing several measures to ensure that SOEs perform to the satisfaction and expectations 
of their stakeholders, the problem still persists. It has been suggested that such risky behaviour 
and associated adverse [performance] outcomes should not be blamed on the incompetence 
of CEOs of SOEs (World Bank, 1995). In a study, titled Bureaucrats in Business, the World 
Bank argues that focus should instead be on the contradictory goals and perverse incentives 
under which SOEs’ CEOs operate. This research interrogated both assumptions, i.e. level of 
competency of CEOs, as well as SOEs’ operating environment. 
The Namibian government introduced several measures to ensure the efficient governance and 
monitoring of state-owned enterprises and to ensure that these are performing to the 
satisfaction and expectations of stakeholders. These measures included the introduction of the 
State-Owned Enterprises Governance Act 2 of 2006, as well as governance structures to 
ensure that the performance of state-owned enterprises is properly maximised. 
The State-Owned Enterprises Governance Act of 2006 introduced what has been called the 
‘dual-governance model’. As described, this model proposed that oversight be shared between 
portfolio ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Works and Transport), who are the shareholders of 
SOEs, and the newly created State-Owned Enterprises Governance Council (SOEGC), a 
cabinet committee chaired by the prime minister. The SOEGC was supposed to develop a 
framework for the governance and determine how performance would be measured. Despite 
these efforts by the government to regulate state-owned enterprises with the intention to 
improve performance, to date the poor performance of state-owned enterprises is still a topical 
issue in Namibia. Almost a decade after the promulgation of the State-Owned Enterprises 
Governance Act of 2006, the government is still financially bailing out a number of state-owned 
enterprises. 
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2.3.2 Problems with bureaucracy 
Bloated bureaucracy and overstaffing could be other contributing factors to the poor 
performance of SOEs. For example, although the civil service consisted of about 42,563 civil 
servants in 1990, with management positions occupied mostly by white people and a few 
coloured people, the injection of about 15 000 new posts and the need to achieve racial and 
ethnic balance therein raised the civil service to a level that was not sustainable (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 1995). To address this problem, in 1995 the Wage and Salary Commission 
(WASCOM) recommended to the Cabinet that some of the government functions be 
commercialised or privatised. This exercise led to the establishment of many parastatals that 
absorbed these civil servants. The transfer to these new entities was largely done without 
proper training, a factor that could have further compounded inefficiency and ineffectiveness of 
transport sector SOEs in Namibia. For example, Mubwandarikwa (2013) concludes, the 
weaknesses in corporate governance are one of the primary problems which TransNamib is 
facing. This problem, however, is not limited to a single SOE. Instead, it seems to be chronic in 
the whole transport sector with Air Namibia, Namibian Airport Company and others included. 
 Mubwandarikwa’s (2013) study concentrates on investigating the impact of corporate 
governance on the performance of TransNamib, an SOE that is part of the transport sector and 
the study is thus very relevant to this research. Another perspective is provided by the Institute 
for Public Policy Research, who argue that [SOE] management is either unclear on how to 
conduct itself or make decisions based on self-interest rather than on what is best for the 
enterprise or the public at large.  
While it is true that many SOEs have experienced governance and performance problems, it is 
important to note that, they are not doomed by their inherent nature. There are ways of 
structuring incentives that ensure good performance and methods of accountability that work, 
and many examples from around the world demonstrate that SOEs can be world-class 
competitive businesses. For example, South Korea’s steel company became the most efficient 
in the world and state-owned Singapore Airlines is considered one of the best airlines 
worldwide.12 To address these challenges, the OECD published best practices for state-owned 
enterprises. 3 
                                                 
3 IPPR/Institute for Public Policy Research. 2016. Briefing Paper SOE Governance. In Namibia: Will A Hybrid System Work? Windhoek: Institute for 
Public Policy Research, Hans Siedel Foundation. 
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Furthermore, one may fairly state that, the problems with bureaucracy are historical. The young 
Namibian state suffered a deficit of intellectual prowess that would have seized the important 
and necessary function of theorising and scenario planning and, as a consequence, continued 
to fix the vehicle while it was moving (New Era Publications, 2015). In the absence of an 
alternative to capitalism, the new political elite in the country fell prey to the temptations of 
wealth accumulation and the banality of politics (Bayart, 1993). 
 
2.3.3 Lack of transparency 
There have been allegations of lack of transparency in some of the SOEs. For example, 
Kahiurika (2015) suggests that government in general has been lax in the way it treated SOEs 
in this respect. It is rather unfortunate that in the past few years, SOEs have failed spectacularly 
at providing the sort of transparency Namibian taxpayers deserve (Kahiurika, 2015). The 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (2016) notes: 
For a long time citizens did not even know how many parastatals they were supporting. For 
many years, various research publications relied on their own counts in the absence of 
official numbers (Links & Haimbodi, 2011). A Government Gazette from 2013 put the 
number at 72. In 2016, the official website of the Ministry of Public Enterprises seemed to 
take some time to clarify this, first saying there were “over 90” parastatals before changing 
the text to specify there were 98,” although it listed only 43 as of early November 2016. If 
citizens do not even know how many companies they own – let alone their names, 
functions, and details on their performance – it is impossible for them to know how SOEs 
are doing.  
(IPPR, 2016:11) 
 
In terms of Section 26 of the Public Enterprises Governance Act of 2006, SOEs must produce 
annual reports that include audited financial statements, information on their performance, as 
well as a statement detailing the extent to which they have met their targets 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). This annual report must then be tabled in the National 
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Assembly so that it becomes a public document. In the past, SOEs have failed almost entirely 
to follow these instructions. 
In late 2015 and early 2016, the IPPR attempted to track down SOEs’ most recent annual 
reports (IPPR, 2016:12). Out of the 70 SOEs investigated, 35 had no annual reports on their 
website. The culprits included some of the most prominent SOEs and several only had out-
dated reports online. According to the report, [d]irect requests to SOEs without reports on their 
websites yielded only a handful of positive results, often severely outdated. It should be noted 
that private researchers are not the only ones struggling to get information out of SOEs (IPPR, 
2016). In September 2015, Minister Leon Jooste addressed parliament to complain about “the 
serious non-compliance of public enterprises” after he had written to them requesting 
information on their remuneration practices. He indicates in the question and answer (Q&A) 
session that annual reports will be included in performance agreements and be subjected to 
sanctions (Kaira, 2015). 
 
2.3.4 Administrative and institutional arrangements 
The recently created Ministry of Public Enterprises (MPE) is mandated to ensure that Namibia’s 
SOEs play a meaningful role in the country’s development. This includes ensuring that SOEs 
are well managed and do not present a financial burden to the state. Whilst the SOEGC, which 
is mandated to provide efficient governance of SOEs on behalf of the government, is vested 
with powers and responsibilities for implementing an integrated governance policy framework 
against which to monitor compliance by SOEs, the MPE is not in denial about the challenges 
involved in executing its own mandate. 
In its Strategic Plan 2017/18 – 2021/22, MPE cites the dual governance model of the public 
enterprises sector, where ownership is shared between the line ministry and the MPE, as a key 
hindrance to SOE efficiency. It goes on to single out the dual model with its multiple owners 
(Cabinet; MPE; various portfolio ministries, transport included; board of directors and 
management/executives of SOEs) as constituting “too many layers of authority and 
communication”, making it difficult for the Ministry to efficiently and effectively perform its 
oversight functions as stipulated in the Act. “This multiple principal agency scenario blurs 
reporting and accountability lines due to the presence of different role players” (MPE, 2017:11). 
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The institutional architecture is also characterised as problematic. In particular, different pieces 
of legislation and policy documents of various SOEs “prescribe different governance structures 
which create overlaps when effecting provisions of the Act”. For example, the Companies Act 
28 of 2004 differs from the Public Enterprises Governance Act 2 of 2006 and from SOEs’ 
constituent acts (e.g. the Roads Authority Act 17 of 1999 and the Roads Contractor Company 
Act 14 of 1999) in terms of risk, liability and fiduciary responsibility. For example, the 
Competition Act (No. 2 of 2003) makes provision for SOEs to be subject to its provisions, as 
the Act binds the State insofar as the State engages in trade or business for the production, 
supply or distribution of goods or the provision of any service, but the State is not subject to any 
provision relating to criminal liability.  
Additionally, “the multiplicity of reporting lines and conflicting policy instruments lead to conflict 
between management, boards and ministers due to differing interpretations of the SOEs’ high 
level statements and strategic priorities” (ibid.). Finally, by its own admission, the MPE 
recognises that its institutional structure and competency requirements “need urgent scrutiny 
and capacitating to enable it to deliver on its core mandate”. The final nail in the coffin of the 
institutional architecture for SOEs is the admission by MPE that such a framework is 
“unsustainable, inadequate and unable to transform SOEs into agents of socio-economic 
development”. 
 
2.3.5 Problematic monopolies 
The natural monopolies that are infrastructure driven are in the areas of railways, roads, air, 
ports, finance, power, energy, industry and telecommunications, while some offer strategic 
goods and services in the areas of the post office and defence (Gaomab II, 2017:2). The 
Competition Act (No. 2 of 2003) binds the State insofar as the State engages in trade or 
business for the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of any service, but 
the State is not subject to any provision relating to criminal liability. The Competition Act further 
applies to the activities of statutory bodies, except insofar as those activities are authorised by 
any law.  
Therefore, SOEs are subject to the Competition Law in Namibia when they are engaged in 
productive enterprising and commercial services. However, it is an open question whether one 
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can challenge the government for holding many monopolies through SOEs, which clearly 
excludes other business entities. A good example is the monopoly status of TransNamib, 
relating to its sole running of the railways. There is worldwide concern about whether the 
involvement of the State through SOEs crowds out private businesses in the private sector 
within a marketplace. 
At present, the Competition Commission is not empowered to handle the issue of monopolies 
held by SOEs. However, the Competition Commission, after recognising that the Competition 
Act (No. 2 of 2003) applies to SOEs, has started to interrogate the importance of amending the 
law to further strengthen the legislation empowering it to attend to the conduct and behaviour 
of SOEs so that there is a level playing field for both the public and private sectors through 
competitive neutrality. 
The commission noted that, competitive neutrality describes the aim of a level playing field in 
mixed public and private markets, where state-owned or quasi-public bodies line up to compete 
with private sector companies. These markets tend to be distorted as a result of structural and 
behavioural advantages enjoyed by public providers and a failure of public buyers to ensure a 
fair competition process and engage the private sector. Instead, market failure and anti-
competitive behaviour ensues. 
 
2.3.6 Whether or not to privatise 
Having recognised the above-mentioned challenges facing SOEs in Namibia, one question 
lingers: is privatisation of these SOEs the answer? There is no official government programme 
to privatise part of, or all, SOEs, but debates have sprouted on this hot topic in the Namibian 
context. According to President Geingob (2009), privatisation in Namibia can be an advantage 
as it can lead to improved economic efficiency, cutting of waste and mobilisation of both foreign 
and domestic investment. There is a need to balance the participation of the private and the 
public sectors, thus the researcher’s view is that, it is the responsibility of government to 
promote the optimisation of benefits accruing to Namibians through building complementarities 
between the private sector and the public sector. 
An alternative argument suggests that, despite the apparent benefits offered by privatisation, 
experience from Africa has shown that privatisation is not a seamless process, at times, it has 
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brought problems, including increasing unemployment (Bank of Namibia, 2009:5; Geingob 
2009:13-14). This view again shows the advantages and disadvantages of privatisation in 
Namibia and sheds important light on the fact that there is a need for this to happen, albeit 
subject to good justifications. 
Using experiences, as well as evidence of privatisation efforts across the globe, Steytler (2009) 
shows historical background to privatisation of SOEs from a global perspective and notes that 
the major drivers of privatisation, especially in Britain and the USA, were:  
1. To address the numerous, inefficient and poorly managed SOEs that had begun to drain 
governments’ resources; and  
2. The growing dominance of the neo-liberalist ideology during the time where the free 
market was seen as the optimal driver of economic growth; hence, the role of the state 
was supposed to subside. 
 
Contrary to popular belief, empirical studies suggest that the impact of privatisation has been 
largely positive or neutral in most cases (Bank of Namibia, 2009:7; Steytler, 2009:21-29). 
Although there were job losses and price hikes following privatisation, the impact on income 
inequality and poverty reduction is less clear. Generally, there are no overwhelming arguments 
for or against privatisation. However, it seems most of the fears of privatisation might be 
unfounded and that, under certain circumstances, there might be modest or even big net gains, 
especially at firm level. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter described the context in which SOEs operate in Namibia. It traced some selected 
historical events that led to the government’s efforts to establish SOEs. This context was 
informed by both the politics and legislation of the time. Further developments that consider the 
SOE sector being revamped from time to time have emerged. These reforms have occurred at 
both legal and institutional levels.  
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The chapter further highlighted the major challenges facing SOEs. These challenges are 
multifarious and multidimensional. It is with this understanding that this chapter considered the 
challenges from a general standpoint. Specific SOEs may have specific problems but there are 
some that can be generalised. Thus, where necessary, specific problems for specific SOEs 
have also been considered. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
THE PERFORMANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AS GOVERNANCE AND 
SERVICE DELIVERY INSTRUMENTS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on the performance of state-owned enterprises as 
governance and service delivery instruments. The emphasis is on definitions, concepts, 
theories, models, frameworks and approaches. Accordingly, the chapter takes a conceptual 
and theoretical perspective. While there is an array of literature on SOEs (Amatori, 2017; Bance 
& Obermann, 2015; Florio & Fecher, 2011; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014; Hu, 2017; Mbo & 
Adjasi, 2017; Florio, 2014; Bernier, 2015), including on the performance of SOEs in Africa 
(MacDonald, 2014), this review mainly focuses on issues of ownership structures, managerial 
autonomy, and commercialisation and privatisation, as well as factors that drive good SOE 
performance (Mbo & Adjasi, 2017). A critical review of the rich available literature ensures a 
systematic analysis of themes and topics relevant to the current research. To this end, the 
chapter forms an important conceptual link with the rest of the chapters providing the basis for 
further analysis of Namibian SOEs within the economic, governance and legal framework in 
which they operate. 
 
3.2 SOEs: What are they and why do they exist? 
It is important to define what is meant by the term SOEs. One definition of SOEs distinguishes 
public enterprises from privately owned enterprises in terms of governance, attitude to risk and 
access to resources (Estrin, et al., 2016). The issue of ownership is fluid in the sense that the 
state owns or manages other organisations, such as courts. This has given rise to the notion of 
‘hybrid organisations’ (Bruton, et al., 2015), offering a nuanced view of SOEs in which the levels 
of ownership and control by the state can vary, for example in terms of the proportion of the 
firm’s total shares owned by the central or local government or authorities (Cui & Jiang, 2012; 
Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012). 
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It is the differences in definitions that led Kowalski, et al. (2013) to conclude that a greater 
understanding of issues and proper definitions of state ownership and control will affect 
research on SOEs positively, including helping countries to understand how such organisations’ 
performance might be influenced. 
When considering why SOEs exist from a transaction cost theory perspective, it can be 
understood that firms adapt to economic or transaction costs in a more efficient way than 
markets (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985). However, the emergence and 
persistence of SOEs are also associated with the existence of market failures (Peng, et al., 
2016). 
 
3.3 SOEs: Theoretical Perspectives 
The classical view of SOEs has typically been framed around dimensions of efficiency, 
productivity and administrative bureaucracy (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen & Musacchio, 2014). A 
number of theoretical perspectives, namely, the property rights school, the public choice 
tradition, the neoclassical approach, the behavioural approach and the budget-maximising 
approach, have been used to model SOEs (Lawson, 1994). Despite a long theoretical interest 
in modelling SOEs and their large impact on the global economy, challenges still remain and 
they require the development of a comprehensive theory of SOEs (Peng, et al., 2016). 
Amongst property rights theorists who argue that ownership matters (Cheung, 1983; Grossman 
& Hart, 1986; North, 1990; Hart, 1995), the ownership of SOEs by the state is regarded as 
having explanatory power on the question of efficiency. Accordingly, it is argued that by virtue 
of their ownership and control, SOEs are relatively inefficient when compared to privately 
owned and managed firms. The argument advanced from the property rights perspective is that 
managers in SOEs have little or no incentive to reduce waste and maximise profit because they 
do not suffer the economic consequences of their decisions. From this perspective, 
privatisation, i.e. turning SOEs into private firms, would increase their efficiency – a belief not 
always supported by empirical evidence. 
A similar argument is advanced by agency theory as well as public choice theory. Agency theory 
links the poor performance of SOEs to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen & 
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Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Managers in SOEs have weaker incentives and they 
are relatively less motivated to monitor and eliminate waste in order to increase efficiency. In 
turn, public choice theory argues that politicians, bureaucrats and government officials, as self-
interested agents, pursue goals to maximise votes, power and prestige rather than broader 
goals, such as maximising the internal efficiency of SOEs for the public good.  
With regards to privatisation as the remedy for inefficient SOEs, the main argument put forward 
by advocates of privatisation is one for enhancing the efficiency of SOEs (Arocena & Oliveros, 
2012). As discussed, this argument is based on the belief that firms in private hands perform 
better than those under public ownership (Arocena & Oliveros, 2012: 458). Such transfers of 
ownership (i.e. privatisation) “go beyond selling of assets to include opening state monopolies 
to competition, contracting out, privatising the provision of public services, reducing subsidies, 
and increasing or introducing user charges” (Zahra, et al., cited in Kwon & Kim, 2017:187-8).  
It should be noted that while the neoliberal economic theory strongly holds the tenet that 
privatisation enhances economic efficiency, the hypothesis that privatising SOEs would result 
in reducing inefficiencies, such as wastefulness, political interference and irrational fee 
structures in parastatals, remains an open question (Kwon & Kim, 2017). Some have gone as 
far as to suggest that measures other than privatisation, e.g. price deregulation, market 
liberalisation and increased use of incentives, can equally improve the efficiency of SOEs 
(Peng, et al., 2016) 
 
3.4  Managerial Control vs Autonomy 
The boundary implied by the dichotomy between SOEs and privately owned and controlled 
firms has recently been questioned from the perspective that ownership boundaries may not 
be fixed. For example, following the managerial autonomy argument advanced by Lioukas, 
Bourantas and Papadakis (1993), recent work on the governance of SOEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
Inkpen & Musacchio, 2014; Jiang et al., 2015) suggests that as much as SOEs can be 
privatised, likewise private firms can be nationalised to become SOEs. The separation of 
ownership and control of SOEs can give rise to state-owned and manager-controlled or state-
owned and privately controlled entities. The consequence is characterised as the blurring of the 
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line between SOEs and non-SOEs on the one hand and among various kinds of SOEs on the 
other (Bruton et al., 2015; Peng et al., 2016). 
 
3.5 Recent Extensions to Theories on SOEs 
A number of extensions have recently been proposed to the dominant theories of SOEs. For 
example, Monteiro and Zylversztajn (2012) have proposed unbundling the concept of property 
rights into three elements: (1) rights to income generated from the property, (2) rights to control 
and use property, and (3) rights to transfer or sell property. Based on the first bundle of rights 
granting the state rights to income generated by SOEs, Peng et al. (2016) suggest four 
propositions linked to the economic performance of SOEs. These are summarised in Table 3.1. 
The first proposition states that SOEs will economically outperform private firms. The alternative 
proposition states that SOEs will economically underperform private firms. These two 
hypotheses can be tested by investigating under which conditions and according to which 
economic performance criteria SOEs are likely to either outperform or underperform privately 
owned firms. The relevant conditions and economic performance criteria include: (a) the 
presence and relative strength of innovation incentives, (b) the relative necessity to contain 
costs, and (c) the time applicable to performance criteria. This argument is central to the debate 
on whether to privatise Namibian SOEs or not. 
Based on Shleifer’s (1998) and Schumpeter’s (1942)arguments, and taking into account both 
ownership and institutional conditions, the above two propositions can further be refined into 
the following hypotheses: (i) when incentives to innovate are weak, imperatives to contain costs 
are moderate and performance criteria are more long term and non-economically oriented, thus 
SOEs will outperform private firms; and (ii) when incentives to innovate are strong, imperatives 
to contain costs are compelling, and performance criteria are more short term and economically 
oriented, thus SOEs will underperform private firms (Peng et al., 2016:303). 
The transaction cost theory has also been extended based firstly on the proposition that SOEs 
are likely to emerge in economies characterised by several market failures. Furthermore, the 
boundaries of SOEs are determined by the trade-offs between the transaction cost savings 
brought about by state control and the additional bureaucratic costs brought about by state 
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agencies and units involved in the management of SOEs (Peng et al., 2016:304-5). Similarly, 
deriving from its central tent of conflicts of interest between state owners (controlling 
shareholders) and SOE managers and employees (as agents), agency theory has been 
extended by proposing, first, that the latter are likely to experience incentive problems that do 
not sufficiently motivate them to strive for a high level of economic performance and, second, 
that principals (owners) of SOEs are likely to experience monitoring problems that lead to SOEs’ 
deviation from the goals of state owners. 
Recent research in agency theory also highlights the role that principal-principal conflict 
between the state and its employees as controlling shareholders, on the one hand, and citizens 
as minority shareholders, on the other hand, can serve to extend the interests of the former at 
the expense of the latter (Chen & Young, 2010; Young et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2016). This 
prompts a suggested extension of the agency theory by proposing: (a) that when conflicts arise 
between state owners and citizens, SOE managers and the SOEs themselves – are likely to 
make decisions to advance the interest of state at the expense of citizens, and (b) that the 
presence of multiple blockholders in SOEs may provide a constraint on the behaviour of the 
controlling shareholders and managers (Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001; Peng et al., 2016). 
Additionally, the resource-based theory, which has traditionally focused on market-based 
resources and capabilities, has been extended to include non-market-based, political resources 
and capabilities (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Political resources and capabilities are considered 
to play a significant role in SOEs’ performance (Li, Peng & Macaulay, 2013). 
The first propositions put forward to capture this perspective state that SOEs, buoyed by their 
interest to enhance the value, rarity, and inimitability of resources and capabilities are likely to 
develop and leverage non-market-based political ties – especially in industries with strong state 
influence. Another proposition is that the economic performance of SOEs is likely to improve 
when they leverage both market-based competitive capabilities and non-market-based political 
capabilities. Table 3.1 below summarises the four propositions linked to the economic 
performance of SOEs as suggested by Peng et al. (2016). 
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Table 3.1: Recent Extensions to Theories of SOEs 
Theory Extension Frontiers 
Property rights 
theory 
Proposition 1: SOEs will outperform 
privately owned firms 
Proposition 3: When incentives to innovate 
are weak, imperatives to contain costs are 
moderate and performance criteria are more 
long-term and non-economically oriented, 
SOEs will outperform private firms 
Proposition 2: SOEs will 
underperform privately owned firms 
Proposition 4: When incentives to innovate 
are strong, imperatives to contain costs are 
compelling, and performance criteria are 
more short-term and economically oriented, 
SOEs will underperform private firms 
Transaction 
cost theory 
Proposition 5: In underdeveloped 
economies infested by severe 
market failures, SOEs are likely to 
emerge 
Proposition 6: Boundaries of SOEs are 
determined by trade-offs between the 
transaction cost savings brought by state 
control, and additional bureaucratic costs 
brought by state agencies and units involved 
in the management of SOEs 
Agency theory Proposition 7: SOE managers and 
employees (as agents) are likely to 
experience incentive problems that 
do not sufficiently motivate them to 
strive for a high level of economic 
performance  
Proposition 9: When conflicts arise between 
state owners (controlling shareholders) and 
citizens (minority shareholders), SOE 
managers and SOEs themselves are likely to 
make decisions to advance the interest of 
state owners at the expense of citizens 
Proposition 8: State owners 
(principals) of SOEs are likely to 
experience monitoring problems that 
lead to SOEs’ deviation from the 
goal of state owners 
Proposition 10: The presence of additional 
blockholder(s) may provide a constraint on 
the behaviour of the controlling shareholders 
(which are state agencies) and SOE 
managers 
Resource-
based theory 
Proposition 11: Driven by their 
interest to enhance value, rarity, and 
inimitability of resources and 
capabilities, SOEs are likely to 
develop and leverage non-market-
based political ties – especially in 
industries with strong state influence 
Proposition 12: The economic performance 
of SOEs is likely to improve when they 
leverage both market-based, competitive 
capabilities and non-market-based, political 
capabilities 
Source: Peng et al. (2016:301) 
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3.6 The Concept of Corporate Governance in SOEs 
A number of authors have defined corporate governance from different perspectives. According 
to Turnbull and Prison (2012, Corporate governance describes all the influences affecting the 
institutional processes, including those for appointing the controllers and/or regulators involved 
in organizing the production and sale of goods and services. Described in this way, corporate 
governance includes all types of firms, whether or not they are incorporated under civil law. For 
Page (2009), corporate governance is about increasing both the percentage of independence 
of directors and the use of independent directors on board committees. However, in reference 
to Namibia’s SOEs, the explanation by Kefas (2014: 12) based on Du Plessis et al. (2011), 
defines corporate governance as: 
The system of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of balancing the interest 
of all internal stakeholders and other parties (external stakeholders, governments and local 
communities) who can be affected by the corporation’s conduct, in order to ensure 
responsible behaviour by corporations and to achieve the maximum level of efficiency and 
profitability for a corporation. 
 
At the same time, the phrase ‘corporate governance’ is often applied narrowly to questions 
about the structure and functioning of boards of directors (Blair, 1995:3). This view is shared 
by some business school scholars and management consultants. Donaldson (1990:376) 
defines corporate governance as “the structure whereby managers at the organizational apex 
are controlled through the board of directors, its associated structures, executive incentives, 
and other schemes of monitoring and bonding”. This view is also held by Hilmer (1993). 
Similarly, according to the King IV Report (2016), corporate governance is the exercise of 
ethical leadership by governing bodies towards the achievement of governance outcomes, such 
as ethical culture, good performance, ethical control and legitimacy (King IV, 2016:20). 
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that good corporate governance goes together with good 
and effective leadership. There should therefore be good ethics in the governance process of 
the SOE, which, as the King III Report (2001) shows, includes responsibility, accountability, 
fairness and transparency. 
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3.7  Principles of the Governance of SOEs 
The terms of governance and corporate governance have of late increasingly become central 
whenever talks of the management of SOEs emerge. However, it should be noted that these 
terms are not only confined to SOEs as their boundaries have been extended to include the 
general management of societies. For example, major donors and international financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are increasingly basing their aids 
and loans on the condition that the country undertakes reforms that ensure good governance. 
The reason for this condition is that bad governance is regarded as the root of many issues 
within a given society.  
Simply put, governance is about authority, decision-making and accountability. It refers to the 
system by which enterprises are directed and controlled. The governance structure specifies 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities amongst different participants in an enterprise. 
These participants include the board of directors, managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, 
regulators and other stakeholders. It also specifies the rules and procedures for making 
decisions in corporate affairs (Strikwerda, 2001:38). Accordingly, governance provides the 
structure through which enterprises set and pursue their objectives, while reflecting the context 
of the social, regulatory and market environment. 
It should be noted that the term governance is used in several contexts, such as corporate 
governance, public governance, private governance, international or global governance, 
national governance and local governance. The question that is often asked to appreciate the 
distinction is whether the organisation is a geopolitical entity (nation state), enterprise (an entity 
that is incorporated as a legal entity) or socio-political entity (tribe or family). Governance in the 
context of corporate governance is of interest to the current study. 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004), corporate 
governance is a mechanism for monitoring the actions, policies and decisions of enterprises. It 
involves the alignment of interests among stakeholders. The importance of governance has 
recently re-emerged, especially after the high-profile collapses of a number of large enterprises 
during 2001 and 2002, most of which involved accounting fraud. These events resulted in an 
emphasis on and renewed interest in corporate governance practices of modern enterprises, 
particularly in relation to accountability. 
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Since there are many, sometimes complex definitions of corporate governance, this study 
adopts the definition by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
which defines it as, “a set of relationships between an enterprise’s management, its board, 
shareholders and other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004:35). The OECD goes on to state that, 
“[c]orporate governance also provides the structure through which the objective and monitoring 
performance are determined”. The OECD’s definition is useful not just because it is very simple 
and straightforward, but because the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (which also 
defines the term corporate governance) were endorsed by OECD ministers in 1999 and they 
have since become an international benchmark for policymakers, investors, enterprises and 
other stakeholders worldwide.  
The OECD has advanced the corporate governance agenda and it provides specific guidance 
for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries. Following this 
understanding of corporate governance, it becomes imperative to also understand what good 
governance, public governance and global governance are. The section below also aims to 
establish the links, if any, between these three concepts.  
According to Surendra Munshi (cited in Committee of Experts of Public Administration, 2006:4) 
good governance “signifies a participative manner of governing that functions in a responsible, 
accountable and transparent manner based on the principles of efficiency, legitimacy and 
consensus for the purpose of promoting the rights of individual citizens and the public interest, 
thus indicating the exercise of political will for ensuring the material welfare of society and 
sustainable development with social justice”. The above definition is also supported by Hirst 
(2000) who propounds that it means creating an effective political framework conducive to 
private economic action: stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient State administration adapted 
to the roles that Governments can actually perform and a strong civil society independent of 
the State. 
Furthermore, Heritier and Silvestri (2012) describe good governance as the manner in which 
public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources. They define its main 
characteristics as accountability, transparency, the rule of law, responsiveness, equitability 
and inclusivity, effectiveness and efficiency, and participation (UNDP, 1997). Heritier and 
Silvestri (2012) further explain these characteristics in detail, but, for this study, the descriptions 
that follow are pertinent. 
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In this study, accountability entails an obligation to report, explain and be answerable for the 
consequences of decisions an organisation has made on behalf of the community it represents. 
Transparency in this study entails requirements that allow the public to be able to follow and 
understand the decision-making process. This means that they will be able to clearly see how 
and why a decision was made and what information, advice and consultation an organisation 
considered, and which legislative requirements (if relevant) were followed. 
According to Heritier and Silvestri (2012), good governance follows the rule of law, which means 
that decisions are consistent with relevant legislation or common law and they are within the 
powers of an institution. Responsiveness, on the other hand, considers how an institution or 
government tries to serve the needs of the entire community while balancing competing 
interests in a timely, appropriate and responsive manner. Equitability and inclusivity, as 
characteristics of good governance, refer to a community’s well-being and these occur when 
all of its members feel that their interests have been considered by an organisation or institution 
in the decision-making process. This means that all groups, particularly the most vulnerable, 
should have opportunities to participate in the process. 
The other important term is global governance. Thomas (2005) defines this as a collective effort 
to identify, understand and try to address global issues that are above the capacity of individual 
states. This is done through international institutions such as the United Nations, International 
Criminal Court, World Bank and IMF. However, global governance tends to have limited or 
demarcated power or authority to enforce compliance. It is for this reason that James Rosenau 
(1999) uses the term ‘global governance’ to denote the regulation of interdependent relations 
in the absence of an overarching political authority. 
Public governance, according to Bevir (2007), is an interdisciplinary field of study centring on 
relationships of power between government authorities, civil society and the market in the 
context of transformations of political communities to legitimately govern themselves and act 
effectively. Lukes (2005) argues that these relationships may vary from state authorities to 
markets through the enforcement of contractual arrangements. Public governance occurs in 
three ways, namely:  
1. Through networks involving public-private partnerships (PPP) or the collaboration of 
community organisations; 
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2. Through the use of market mechanisms, whereby market principles of competition serve 
to allocate resources while operating under government regulation; and 
3. Through top-down methods that primarily involve governments and the state 
bureaucracy.  
 
Participation means anyone affected by or interested in a decision should have the opportunity 
to participate in the process for making that decision. Finally, good governance refers to 
governance that is effective and efficient. This means that organisations or governments should 
implement decisions and follow processes that make the best use of the available people, 
resources and time to ensure the best possible results for their community. 
 
3.8 The Seven Pillars of Good Corporate Governance 
3.8.1 Discipline and shareholder activism 
This concept implies an enterprise’s awareness and commitment to the principles of good 
governance, particularly by senior management. Discipline is very important for the efficiency 
of SOEs. The success of an SOE will depend on the interplay between self-discipline, market 
discipline and regulatory discipline. Market discipline is perhaps the most essential of these. It 
is accordingly important to consider that in the governance of an SOE, there should be the 
empowerment of shareholders, which means providing the conditions under which 
shareholders have both incentives and the means to act in line with discipline management. 
According to Turnbull (1997a), self-regulation and discipline entail that those being regulated 
establish the standards of performance. It is accordingly discernible that there should be a 
system whereby the controllers of an enterprise are appointed by the governed. Within this 
system, as shall be seen in the discussion of the political theory below, self-governance is 
important and it involves a political process within enterprises to appoint controllers responsible 
for regulation.  
Self-governance in a political context invokes the well-known Abraham Lincoln saying: 
“Government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.” This 
basically describes democracy. The introduction of aspects of self-governance into institutions 
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concerned with industrial activities would enrich democracy. Indeed, Turnbull (1997a; 1991b:5) 
submits that there are arguments and evidence that self-governance produces operating 
advantages and, hence, better performance of SOEs. 
In the Namibian case however, shareholder activists are not as active as in other countries, 
especially western countries. A shareholder activist is: 
A person who attempts to use his or her rights as a shareholder of a publicly-traded 
corporation to bring about social change. Some of the issues most often addressed by 
shareholder activists are related to the environment, investments in politically sensitive 
parts of the world and workers’ rights (sweatshops). The term can also refer to investors 
who believe that a company’s management is doing a bad job and who attempt to gain 
control of the company and replace management for the good of the shareholders. 
(Investopedia, 2016) 
 
In shareholder activism, there is active pressure on and persuasion about the policies and 
practices of the enterprise through the use of ownership position (Sjöström, 2008). In this way, 
the shareholders discipline the management of the enterprise through the enforcement of their 
rights as found in Chapter 7 of the Companies Act (No. 28 of 2004). The exercise and 
enforcement of rights enables shareholders to enhance shareholder value in the long term 
(Low, 2004). Understood from this perspective, as Sjöström, (2008) submits, shareholder 
activism can be conducted via direct dialogue with corporate management or the board, during 
open sessions in corporate general meetings, writing open letters or by filing formal shareholder 
proposals (Logsdon & Buren, 2009; Logsdon & Van Buren III, 2008; Klein, & Zur, 2009). 
It has been noted that, “[m]ost evidence indicates that shareholder activism can prompt small 
changes in target enterprises’ governance structures, but has negligible impact on share values 
and earnings” (Karpoff, 2001). Activism can be ‘defensive’ or ‘offensive’ (Armour & Cheffins, 
2012). According to Cossin and Caballerro (2013:5): 
Defensive activism takes place when investors holding a stake in a company (e.g. pension 
funds and mutual funds) become dissatisfied with corporate performance or corporate 
governance practices and thus react by lobbying for relevant changes. This can be done 
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behind the scenes or publicly challenging management; for example, activists can propose 
the election of directors they support. This type is defensive in the sense that activists seek 
to protect pre-existing investments. In offensive activism investors lacking a substantial 
stake in a company build up their holdings offensively on the assumption that organizational 
changes will overcome failures and, thus, maximize shareholder returns. Investors will 
agitate for change if management does not react and take the initiative. 
 
Shareholder activism as a tool for discipline in corporate governance has, however, been met 
with controversy. Some authors take it to be a destructive method that causes losses to 
enterprises and some take it as describing a means to “take the money and go” (ECGI, 2016) 
or “voting with their feet” (Helwege, Intintoli & Zhang, 2012; Parrino, Sias & Starks, 2003), thus 
creating a threat to the job security of directors and other officers. This leads to a decline in 
trust in the enterprise by other potential investors. As noted already, in Namibia this is a practice 
seldom felt, let alone applied. In the USA, a small number of American institutional investors, 
largely those investing in public pension plans, spend little money on overt shareholder activism 
efforts. 
Black (1998) notes that shareholder activists do not conduct proxy fights and do not try to elect 
their own candidates to the board of directors. Legal rules, agency costs within the institutions, 
information costs, collective action problems and limited institutional competence are all 
plausible partial explanations for this relative lack of activity. The same explanation can also 
hold true for Namibian SOEs. Activism sometimes follows a sequence of events attached to a 
lack of transparency and accountability. It disciplines management and raises share value if 
done effectively and can thus lead to better performance of SOEs. 
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3.8.2 Transparency 
This concept refers to the ability of an enterprise to make the necessary information including 
annual reports and press releases that are available in an accurate and timely way. The OECD 
(2005) proffers that: 
A crucial condition for protecting minority and other shareholders is to ensure a high degree 
of transparency. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance support simultaneous 
reporting of information to all shareholders in order to ensure their equitable treatment. In 
maintaining close relations with investors and market participants, companies must be 
careful not to violate this fundamental principle of equitable treatment. 
 
The OECD goes on to say that for effective performance of an SOE, the minority and other 
shareholders should have access to all the necessary information to be able to make informed 
investment decisions. 
Considering the above, TransNamib, which has been making losses and has some allegations 
of corruption and lack of transparency levelled against it, has vowed to embark on a five-year 
turnaround plan to remedy their situation. TransNamib, therefore, reported in 2014 that: “Our 
aim is also to become an open, transparent and accessible company. We understand, and we 
have to help others understand, the issues in shaping the future of Namibia’s rail transport” 
(TransNamib, 2014:11). This is an indication of a wish to break from the past of being a failing 
SOE to become a more vibrant and profitable one. It is still uncertain whether this turnaround 
strategy from within will achieve the intended goals. This is where the controversial issue of 
privatisation, as discussed in Chapter 2, comes in. The question becomes whether 
transparency can be achieved by privatisation or commercialisation and hence lead to 
profitability or efficiency. 
As a vital principle in corporate governance, the OECD (2005: 44) states that significant 
shareholders, including the coordinating or ownership entity “should not make any abusive use 
of the information they might obtain as controlling shareholders or board members. For non-
listed SOEs, other shareholders are usually well identified and often have privileged access to 
information, through board seats for example.” To this end, the following information should be 
disclosed as per the guidelines of the OECD (2005:44-46): 
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1. A clear statement to the public of the enterprise objectives and their fulfilment; 
2. The ownership and voting structure of the enterprise; 
3. Any material risk factors and measures taken to manage such risks; 
4. Any financial assistance, including guarantees, received from the state and 
commitments made on behalf of the SOE; and 
5. Any material transactions with related entities. 
 
In addition, whatever the quality and completeness of the legal and regulatory framework 
concerning disclosure of information, the coordinating or ownership entity should ensure that 
all enterprises in which the state has shares have put mechanisms and procedures in place to 
guarantee easy and equitable access to information by all shareholders (OECD, 2005:34). 
 
3.8.3 Independence 
This concept entails the extent to which mechanisms have been put in place to avoid the 
dominance of individual or sectoral interests (Chata, 2010:17). The questions that arise from 
this relate to SOE autonomy: Are SOEs sufficiently autonomous? Do they have mechanisms 
to be self-governing? Is there a clear distinction between SOEs and their owners? For example, 
it was alleged that the previous Minister of Finance fired the Road Fund Administration (RFA) 
Board because they charged the CEO, who was close to the minister with misconduct (The 
Namibian, 2011). This is evidence that, at least in Namibia, ownership comes together with the 
control of SOEs. The OECD (2005: 46) notes with regards to state ownership of SOEs that: 
The potential for abuse is marked when the legal system allows, and the market accepts, 
controlling shareholders to exercise a level of control which does not correspond to the 
level of risk that they assume as owners through exploiting legal devices to separate 
ownership from control.  
 
Therefore, governments should, as far as possible, limit the use of golden shares and disclose 
shareholders’ agreements and capital structures that allow a shareholder to exercise a degree 
of control over the enterprise disproportionate to the shareholders’ equity ownership in the 
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enterprise. It has been submitted that the importance of performance by SOEs necessitates 
monitoring by the ownership entity (South African Presidential SOE Evaluation Committee, 
2014:42). OECD Guidelines (OECD, 2011:11-14) put forward an imperative that, a state has 
an obligation to review the performance of its SOEs. Considered closely, it is evident that the 
primary tasks comprise formulating reporting systems that allow regular monitoring and 
assessment of SOE performance. This has been the stance recommended for the improvement 
of SOE performance in South Africa. The South African Presidential SOE Evaluation 
Committee (2014:42), notes that the ownership entity must ensure that it has access to accurate 
and relevant information on a timely basis – this links to transparency and disclosure. 
The monitoring and evaluation of SOEs should be done on an on-going and annual basis and 
action should urgently be taken to address any faults that are identified. There is also a need 
for appropriate benchmarking of SOE performance, both locally and internationally. This, 
according to the OECD, is particularly important for SOEs in non-competitive sectors. The case 
of transport SOEs in Namibia comes into view as Air Namibia has been a burden to the nation 
as performance has been a problem and the above principles were not adhered to. 
 
3.8.4 Accountability 
The concept of accountability presupposes that effective mechanisms exist that will allow for 
the accountability of individuals and groups within an enterprise. However, there are situations 
where a leader in an SOE, such as the CEO, acts opportunistically. For example, the Road 
Construction Company’s (RCC) CEO was suspended and subsequently dismissed for 
purchasing a car for his wife and settling an overdue bond payment for one of his staff members 
using company funds (The Namibian, 2006). Accountability calls for such actions to cease. The 
CEO weighs the costs and benefits of opportunistic behaviour and, if no proper judgment 
ensues, the SOE can run into problems that hamper efficiency. The existence or assumption 
of opportunism features prominently in transaction cost theory and cheating is characteristic of 
the process (Williamson, 1975). 
[Opportunism] implies a fairly extreme representation of human behaviour which is 
supposedly characterized by a tendency to cheat and even transgress ethical standards in 
search of personal advantage. From a methodological perspective, opportunism is 
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interesting because it allows for parsimonious modelling. Hence, the implementation of 
governance mechanisms constraining the action of a potentially opportunistic CEO can be 
explained by a search for efficiency. 
(Wirtz, 2002) 
 
According to Wirtz (2002), countries that hold SOEs accountable when they submit reports 
have proven to have their well-performing economies. However, mere reporting does not in 
itself improve performance. Good and accurate reporting only helps in getting the information 
out to relevant users. In South Africa for example, SOEs are supposed to submit quarterly 
reports. Often the reports are not submitted and those who submit seem to do so as a matter 
of formality (South African Presidential SOE Evaluation Committee, 2014:35). When 
considering Holland, it was observed that the government imposes penalties when entities do 
not meet their targets. This level of accountability resulted in high-quality content in quarterly 
reports, timely reporting on performance, good governance oversight, and an accountable and 
resourced oversight function (South African Presidential SOE Evaluation Committee, 2014:35). 
 
3.8.5 Responsibility 
This concept touches on issues such as the board’s responsibility towards all stakeholders of 
the enterprise. Responsibility stems from the fact that the executives of an enterprise are 
entrusted with the management of an enterprise. The word ‘manage’ is often used to 
communicate the responsibility for executive action by, for example, a board of directors 
(Turnbull, 1997c). As shall be seen in the discussion on stewardship theory below, Donaldson 
and Davis (1994) note that managers are principally motivated by achievement and 
responsibility needs and given the needs of managers for responsible, self-directed work, 
organisations may be better served to free managers from subservience to non-executive 
director-dominated boards. This informs why in Namibian company law, directors and CEOs 
do not have to be shareholders of the enterprise they are serving. 
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3.8.6 Fairness 
This concept relates to acknowledgment of and respect for the rights of various groups that 
have an interest in the enterprise, including minority groups. This is akin to transparency. 
[W]hen the state is a majority shareholder or effectively controls the SOE, company 
objectives should be made clear to all other investors, the market and the general public. 
Such disclosure obligations will encourage company officials to clarify the objectives to 
themselves, and could also increase management’s commitment in pursuing these 
objectives. It will provide a reference point for all shareholders, the market and the general 
public for considering the strategy adopted and decisions taken by the management. 
(OECD, 2005) 
 
Further, the OECD states that it is essential and should be emphasised that all board members 
have the legal obligation to act in the best interests of the enterprise and to treat all shareholders 
equitably (OECD, 2005:47-48). Furthermore, there should not be any difference between the 
liabilities of different Board Members, whether they are nominated by the state or whether they 
are any other shareholders or stakeholders. 
 
3.8.7  Corporate social responsibility 
This concept refers to the non-discriminatory, non-exploitive behaviour of the enterprise and 
responsibility with regards to environmental and human rights issues (King Committee on 
Corporate Governance, 2001). According to the OECD (2010:11-14), SOE performance should 
be aligned to their mandates. The mandate of an SOE should not only target its industry or 
sector. Instead, an SOE is expected to help the community at large, apart from its core 
business. This invokes the concept of social responsibility. In its 2012/2013 Annual Report, the 
Roads Authority stated that: 
We worked to extend our social responsibility initiatives that are aimed at poverty 
alleviation, job creation, and entrepreneurial skills development. The Roads Authority 
strives to ensure transformation and black economic empowerment (BEE) is achieved 
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through targeted procurement. We entered into 133 (small and medium enterprise) SME 
contracts with a total number of 902 SME employees with our maintenance projects of 
which the majority are previously disadvantaged individuals. We offered pre-tender training 
to 394 SME contractors at various locations in Namibia, 204 Operators & Labourers from 
SME contractors were trained and assessed in the area of Bitumen Road Maintenance and 
70 SME contractors were trained on Financial Documentation, Basic Measurement and 
Resource Management. 
(Roads Authority of Namibia, 2013) 
 
The OECD reports how the SOE is achieving its objectives that relate to its main line of business 
and, in addition, going broader than its core business. In this sense, the performance of an SOE 
can also be measured by other broader achievements of the national developmental objectives, 
such as: 
1. Contribution by SOEs to job creation and addressing challenges such as unemployment; 
2. Skills development to address skills shortages based on the economic development 
trajectory of a country; 
3. The role of SOEs in addressing transformation and other economic imbalances; and 
 
4. Rural development. 
 
Therefore, the image and performance of an SOE should also be measured in the way it fulfils 
its broader mandate, namely, to develop the country. In Namibia, SOEs in the transport sector 
are expected under the Fourth National Develop Plan (NDP4) to contribute to two desired 
outcomes (DO), namely public infrastructure (DO 5) and logistics (DO 6.1). Similarly, in South 
Africa, as the Minister of Public Enterprises indicated: “Our challenge is … to ensure that the 
contribution of our SOEs to national economic and social development is optimised, quantifiable 
and affects the lives of socially-excluded South Africans” (Gigaba, 2012:2). 
Furthermore, SOE boards should, in principle, have the same responsibilities and liabilities as 
stipulated in the enterprise laws of the country. However, in practice and in terms of international 
best practices, board members may have a reduced liability, particularly the ones nominated 
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by the state. According to the OECD (2005), the responsibilities of SOE boards should be 
articulated in relevant legislation, regulations, the government ownership policy and the 
enterprise charters. Furthermore, it is submitted that to encourage board responsibility and in 
order for boards to function effectively, they should follow best practices adhered to in the 
private sector and they should be limited in size. Experience indicates that smaller boards allow 
for real strategic discussion and they are less prone to become rubber-stamping entities 
(OECD, 2005:48). 
Corporate social responsibility has been traced to the European philosophy of corporatism. Like 
natural entity theory, corporatism recognises the role of groups such as unions and enterprises. 
Corporatism also “emphasises cooperative relationships among groups and between the state 
and the different groups” (Joo, 2010:8; Bratton & Wachter, 2008:113) in the identification and 
realisation of the public interest. Bratton and Wachter (2008:113) also attribute Dodd’s similar 
characterisation to the influence of corporatism.  
 
3.9  Governance Principles, Models and Theories 
The section above has outlined the theories of corporate governance according to a relevant 
literature review. Below, these theories are put in the context of Namibia and comparative 
economies. This assists in measuring how Namibian SOEs are faring insofar as corporate 
governance is concerned. Corporate governance has increasingly become central whenever 
the issue of SOEs management is discussed. However, it should be noted that this term is not 
only confined to SOEs as its boundaries have been extended to the general management of 
societies, including major donors and international financial institutions. In the context of SOEs, 
one has to note that SOEs also carry the spirit of the nation, just as Air Namibia states as its 
slogan “caring the spirit of the nation”. Thus, the failure of Air Namibia can be attributed to 
Namibia as a nation because as the airline represents the country and the image of the national 
figures that represent the country, that image is also tarnished. The governance of such an 
institution is therefore not a matter of that SOE alone but it is also an issue of whom they 
represent and what population they serve. This explains the essence of corporate governance 
in the global context. Thus, as Abdullah and Valentines (2009:88-89) state:  
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… corporate governance has become an important factor in managing organizations in the 
current global and complex environment. In order to understand corporate governance, it 
is important to highlight its definition. Even though there is no single accepted definition of 
corporate governance, it can be defined as a set of processes and structures for controlling 
and directing an organization It constitutes a set of rules, which governs the relationships 
between management, shareholders and stakeholders. 
(See also Ching, et al., 2006) 
 
3.9.1 Artificial personality theory 
It is a well-known principle that an enterprise is a separate and distinct legal entity from its 
members and thus members are not directly liable for the acts of the enterprise, for example 
debts incurred. This separate corporate existence is limited in terms of the law (Wolf, 1989). 
However, in certain circumstances, a court will refuse to recognise the existence of a de jure 
enterprise from its shareholders in order to hold its members liable for contracts, debts or 
crimes. When this happens, the court is said to be ‘piercing the corporate veil’ associated with 
the separate corporate existence that shields these members from liability (Wolf, 1989). 
When an SOE has been incorporated under the relevant law, it exists as a legal person. Thus, 
it acquires a legal personality when the Registrar of Companies issues a certificate of 
incorporation. Just like with any enterprise, this is the birth certificate of an SOE (see, for 
example, Section 2 of the National Transport Services Holding Company Act 28 of 1998). A 
‘legal person’ would then refer to an entity capable of having legal rights and incurring legal 
obligations (Cilliers et al., 2000:597-599). Like any other enterprise, an SOE is regarded as a 
juristic person once the proper statutory procedure that must be followed in order for it to exist 
as a legal persona is completed.  
The SOE, as a separate legal persona, can enter into contracts and own property in its own 
name, unlike the partnership, business trust or sole proprietor. In the same vein, the 
shareholders of an SOE enjoy limited liability. Most SOEs in Namibia are regulated under the 
constitutive acts that created them, i.e. the Acts of Parliament. Their structures and internal 
functions may be regulated by such laws but this does not mean that they are not regulated by 
the general rules of company law under both the Companies Act, 2004 and common law. 
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The relevant enabling legislation determines SOEs’ powers, duties and shareholding. In all the 
transport SOEs examined in this thesis, the state is the shareholder. The government thus 
exercises state power in managing those SOEs as a separate legal person from the 
shareholder. Thus, the ‘artificial entity’ theory is often invoked to justify regulation outside some 
normal dealings or ordinary companies in certain circumstances (Coase, 1937; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). However, it must be noted that since a company, be it an SOE or not, has no 
physical existence, there are certain things it is inherently incapable of doing, for example 
marry, be appointed the guardian of a minor, occupy land, be physically present anywhere, 
appear on its own behalf and represent itself in court proceedings – it must be represented by 
an advocate and it cannot be imprisoned (Cilliers, 2000; Marcel & Kamar 2002). 
In terms of Section 38(1) of the Companies Act (2004), a company has the capacity and powers 
of a natural person of full capacity insofar as a juristic person is capable of having that capacity 
or of exercising those powers. The characteristics of such a body are that it is capable of owning 
property separate from its members and that it enjoys perpetual succession. It is important that 
its constitution explicitly states that it should have these characteristics in order for such entity 
to have the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name and to have perpetual succession. In 
the event that this is not the case, such entity will not have the same status as a person in the 
eyes of the law and will simply be an unincorporated body; that is to say, it will simply be 
regarded as an aggregation of natural persons who are acting in concert (Adams & Adams, 
2012). Since a company is a separate and distinct legal entity from its members, members are 
therefore not liable for the acts of the enterprise, for example debts incurred.  
Courts have developed what has come to be known as the rule or principle in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co. Ltd. In terms of this, a company is a person in law quite separate and distinct 
from its members, directors and anyone else and, accordingly, its assets and liabilities (and so 
also its profits and losses) are its own and not those of (say) its members. Nor is the situation 
any different in a company with only one or few members.The same principle was explained by 
JP Damaseb in the case of Oranjerivierwynkelders Koöperatief Bpk and Another v 
Professional Support Service cc and Others 2011 (1) NR 184 (HC). However, it must be 
noted that in some circumstances, a court will refuse to recognise the existence of a de jure 
enterprise in order to hold its member(s) liable for contracts or offences. As stated earlier, when 
this happens, the court is said to be ‘piercing the corporate veil’ associated with the separate 
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corporate existence that shields these members from liability (Wolf, 1989:21). This separate 
corporate existence is limited in terms of the law (Wolf, 1989). 
Furthermore, shareholders do not have the right to manage the company or enter into a contract 
on behalf of the company, as was held in the case of Francis George Hill Family Trust v 
South African Reserve Bank. Therefore, in such cases, the company contracts through a 
person who is duly authorised by it to contract on its behalf (1992 [1] 91 [A] 97). This was held 
in Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 404 (PC) 
423. 
Most, if not all, SOEs in Namibia have share capital, as the enabling legislation that creates 
them stipulates this and requires them to have it. Section 201 of the Companies Act (2004) 
stipulates that every member of an enterprise with a share capital has a right to vote at meetings 
of that company in respect of each share held by that member. In the case of SOEs, the 
president is enjoined to designate a minister or ministers as shareholding minister(s) who shall, 
on behalf of the State, exercise the rights attached to the shares of which the State is the holder 
and who shall perform the functions of the shareholding minister(s) in terms of any Act 
establishing the concerned SOE (see for example Section 3[2] of the Airports Company Act 25, 
1998; Namibian Ports Authority Act 2, 1994). 
There are, however, certain situations whereby the existence of an SOE as a separate legal 
entity ceases to exist. The Companies Act (No. 28 of 2004) provides for some exceptions to 
the rule of a legal personality. Specifically, directors and officers of the enterprise can be held 
personally liable for the actions done in the name of the enterprise. In other words, the limited 
liability is taken away by sections 429 to 432. Section 430 specifically states the liability of 
directors and others for fraudulent conduct of business: 
If it appears, whether it be in a winding-up, judicial management or otherwise, that any 
business of the company was or is being carried on recklessly or with intent to defraud 
creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent purpose, the 
Court may, on the application of the Master, the liquidator, the judicial manager, any creditor 
or member or contributory of the company, declare that any person who was knowingly a 
party to the carrying on of the business in that manner, is personally responsible, without 
any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the 
Court may direct. 
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Personal liability is also found in sections 168 read together with sections 169, 170 and 171, 
which deal with directors’ liability for untrue statements in the prospectus. This is the ‘piercing 
of the corporate veil’ as alluded to above. It must be noted that the liabilities of all directors, 
officers and members under the Act continue subsequent to deregistration and may be 
enforced as if the enterprise had not been deregistered (Davies, 1964). In South Africa, the 
Companies Act of 1973 has been repealed by the Companies Act (No. 71 of 2008). In Ex parte 
Gore and Others NNO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC), it was held (in paragraph 34) that the provision 
(the South African one is similar to the Namibian one) was supplemental to, rather than 
substitutive of, the common law. According to Blackmanm et al. (2002:42): 
Veil piercing takes at least two forms. Firstly, there are cases where the court disregards 
the company and treats the members as if they had been acting in partnership (or where 
the company has a single member, as if he had been acting on his own behalf), with the 
consequence that they are, for example, held to be the owners of property otherwise owned 
by the company, or to be personally liable for its debts and other liabilities. 
 
Furthermore, other examples of improper conduct on the basis of which Namibian courts 
have pierced the corporate veil are when a legal entity is found to be the ‘instrumentality’, ‘alter 
ego’, ‘agent’, ‘puppet’ or ‘mask’ of its shareholders. In this sense, the company does not, in 
truth, carry on its own business or affairs, but merely acts in the furtherance of the business or 
affairs of its shareholders as noted in Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd and Another 
1988 (3) SA 290 (A). 
Largely, however, as was held in the case of RP v DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), the 
point of departure is that, courts, when dealing with companies, should not lightly disregard an 
enterprise’s separate personality but should strive to give effect to and uphold it. That said, 
“where fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct … is found to be present, other 
considerations will come into play” (Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage [Pty] Ltd 2008 [6] 585 
[SCA] [{2009} 1 All SA 330] par. 22). The same principle was explained in the case of Sylvie 
McTeer Properties v Kuhn and Others 2005 NR 519 (HC). 
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3.9.2 The agency theory 
Agency theory has its roots in economic theory. It was developed by Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) and further expanded by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency theory is defined as “the 
relationship between the principals, such as shareholders, and agents, such as the company 
executives and managers” (Abdullah & Valentines, 2009:91). This theory postulates that the 
shareholder(s) who are the owners or principals of the enterprise hire(s) the agents to perform 
work. Principals delegate the running of the business to the directors or managers, who are the 
shareholder’s agents (Clarke, 2004). 
Therefore, in the context of SOEs in Namibia, the State as the shareholder and principal hires 
the directors to perform the work of the enterprise. The directors are thus the agents of the 
state. An example of this can be found in Section 3 of all the Acts forming the transport SOEs 
in the country, which shows the government exercising state power through the shareholding 
minister who appoints directors. These directors will oversee the work of the SOE with the CEO 
in charge of the day-to-day running of the SOE. Diagrammatically, the relationship looks as 
follows: 
 
Figure 3.1: Hire and Delegate 
 
 
 
Self-interest         Self-interest  
     Perform  
Source: Adopted from Abdullah & Valentines (2009:90) 
 
The model (theory) above, which is also reflected in Namibian SOE governance instruments, 
has problems which impact on the performance of SOEs in the country. According to Daily et 
al. (2003), two major factors can influence the performance of an enterprise under this model. 
Agents Principal 
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First, the theory is conceptually simple and reduces the corporation to two participants: 
managers and shareholders. Second, agency theory suggests that employees or managers in 
organisations can be self-interested. In agency theory, shareholders expect agents to act and 
make decisions in the principal’s interest, though the agent may not necessarily do this (Padilla, 
2000). 
Such a problem was first highlighted by Adam Smith in the 18th century and subsequently 
explored by Ross (1973). The first detailed description of agency theory was presented by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). The notion of problems arising from the separation of ownership 
and control in agency theory has been confirmed by Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997). 
 
3.9.3 The stewardship theory 
The stewardship theory developed from social sciences. According to this theory, a steward, 
such as an enterprise executive, should act in such a way that they manage in the interest of 
the shareholders. As Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) state, “a steward protects and 
maximises shareholders’ wealth through enterprise performance, because by so doing, the 
steward’s utility functions are maximized.” Therefore, SOE executives and managers are 
officers of the enterprise and they are workers for the enterprise working for the shareholders. 
They are therefore enjoined to protect and make profits for the shareholders. Diagrammatically, 
this can be shown as follows: 
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Figure 3.2: Empower and Trust 
 
Shareholders’           Intrinsic and  
profits and           extrinsic  
returns                    motivation 
 
Protect and maximise 
shareholders’ wealth 
 
Source: Adopted from Abdullah & Valentines (2009:91) 
 
As depicted in the diagram, those running the affairs of the SOE are, in the words of Donaldson 
and Davis (1994), “good stewards of the enterprises and diligently work to attain high levels of 
corporate profit and shareholders returns”. Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory does not 
stress the perspective of individualism (Davi,1994), but rather the role of top management being 
stewards for and amalgamating their goals as part of the enterprise. As a result, the stewardship 
perspective suggests that stewards are satisfied and motivated when organisational success 
is attained (Abdullah & Valentines, 2009:90). 
Stewardship theory recognises the importance of structures that empower the steward and 
offer maximum autonomy built on trust (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). It stresses that employees 
or executives should act more autonomously so that shareholders’ returns are maximised. 
Indeed, this can minimise the costs aimed at monitoring and controlling behaviours (Davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). This is, for example, provided for in Section 6 of the Airports 
Companies Act (No. 25 of 1998), which provides for performance agreements and stipulates 
that the Airports Company should, after a specified period, submit a performance agreement to 
the shareholding minister. This performance agreement should, amongst others things, contain 
expectations of the government in respect of the enterprise’s scope of business, efficiency and 
performance measures by which the performance of the enterprise can be assessed, and 
Stewards  Shareholders  
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including such measures as may relate to its financial, operational and service level 
performance and management of human resources. 
Furthermore, the performance agreement should contain the principles to be followed by the 
enterprise for the purposes of business planning, the company’s dividend policy and the 
company’s pricing structure policy. In other words, the principles should contain such measures 
which are, in the opinion of the shareholding minister, necessary to protect the financial 
soundness of the company, including full particulars relating to the company’s investment 
policy, indemnity insurance, a declaration of the loans made by the company and the 
company’s cover against exchange rate risks. This shows that, in order to protect their 
reputations as decision makers in organisations, executives and directors are inclined to 
operate the enterprise to maximise financial performance as well as shareholders’ profits. In 
this sense, as research has shown, it is believed that the enterprise’s performance can directly 
impact perceptions of their individual performance (Daly et al., 2003). 
Moreover, stewardship theory suggests unifying the role of the CEO and the chairman so as to 
reduce agency costs and to increase their role as stewards in the organisation. It was evident 
that there would be better safeguarding of the interest of the shareholders. It was also 
empirically found that returns have been improved by having both these theories combined 
rather than separated (Donaldson & Davis, 1994). 
It must be noted, however, that this theory is not as it appears on paper or as expounded on by 
scholars. In practice, the inclination of individuals to act as stewards or self-seeking agents may 
be contingent upon the institutional context. The high-standard performance of an SOE may 
not be based on the stewardship of its officials towards the enterprise but on other factors 
external to it and to the whole country. In addition, individuals running the affairs of the SOE 
may not have the same individual agenda in this diverse world. As Waring (1973) notes, 
differences between individuals are significant and important because the need for money and 
approval, among other things, is determined and limited by the necessity for maintaining the 
organism in a state of dynamic equilibrium, i.e. people stand in an interactive cybernetic 
relationship to their community and environment. Furthermore, the need for money and 
approval, amongst other things, is changed as a result of any interaction and individuals are 
sometimes competitive and sometimes collaborative, but usually both. 
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Turnbull (1997a) concludes that the inclination of individuals to act as selfless stewards may be 
culturally contingent. The ‘company man’ in Japan may place his employer before family. 
Understood contextually, the voluntary resignation or dismissal of executives is not uncommon 
in the Namibian transport sector SOEs when an SOE is disgraced and in other countries 
instances of suicide are reported (Turnbull (1997a). 
 
3.9.4 The stakeholder theory 
The 1970s found the development of the stakeholder theory through studies in management 
sciences. This theory is based on the concept of accountability to stakeholders as Freeman 
(1984) postulates. The theory holds that “any group or individual […] can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Abdullah & Valentines, 2009:91; Wheeler 
et al., 2002). 
There is a network of stakeholders who affect management and the board. For instance, a 
board of directors has to have a holistic view of an idea on the table for them to arrive at a 
decision beneficial to the target, the enterprise itself or one or more of the stakeholders. In this 
way, boards need to obtain information from strategic stakeholders, as well as from 
management to avoid bias, distortion or errors, as discussed by Turnbull (1993a; 1997a, b, c). 
Furthermore, errors and distortions in management hierarchies have been reported by Downs 
(1967:116-118), Williamson (1975:122) and Demb and Neubauer (1992) and have been shown 
to affect enterprise efficiency and other concomitant virtues. TransNamib, for example, has 
been accused of losses and other ills due to bad corporate governance, and then vowed to 
implement a five-year turnaround plan and said: 
A big part of our forward-looking approach is to become a customer-focused company. We 
have to structure our company in such a way that it will give clearer accountability to our 
employees that understand the needs of our customers, and enable them to satisfy those 
needs. In that way TransNamib will become a more flexible and collaborative company – 
which is what we strive to be. 
(TransNamib, 2016:11) 
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It must be noted that in the context of stakeholder theory, management has to make correct 
decisions and structure itself in a transparent and efficient manner. TransNamib has vowed to 
do this in order to improve efficiency and profitability (TransNamib, 2016:11). Unlike agency 
theory, in which the managers are working for and serving the shareholders, stakeholder 
theorists suggest that managers in enterprises have a network of relationships to serve. This 
network includes suppliers, employees and business partners. The consequent relationships 
and interconnections are shown in Figure 3.3, below. 
 
Figure 3.3: Stakeholder Theory Network 
 
  
 
 
Enterprise  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Abdullah and Valentines (2009:91) 
 
As the diagram above shows how the enterprise (SOE) is seen as a system or network of 
stakeholders operating within the larger system of the host society that provides the necessary 
legal and market infrastructure for the enterprise’s activities (Abullah & Valentines, 2009; 
Taylor, 2006). Therefore, an enterprise should have a mandate to create wealth or value for its 
stakeholders by converting their stakes into goods and services. Scholars (e.g. Blair, 1995) 
Trade Unions 
Investors 
Communities 
Political 
Customers Suppliers 
Employees 
Government 
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have noted this important aspect, which is crucial in the evaluation of the performance of SOEs. 
According to Blair (1995:203): 
 
… the goal of directors and management should be maximizing total wealth creation by the 
firm. The key to achieving this is to enhance the voice of and provide ownership-like 
incentives to those participants in the firm who contribute or control critical, specialized 
inputs (firm specific human capital) and to align the interests of these critical stakeholders 
with the interests of outside, passive shareholders. 
 
Figure 3.3 above shows a network of players relating to a firm and who can, in any direction, 
affect the performance of an SOE. This kind of network is more important than other owner-
manager-employee relationships as in agency theory (Freeman, 1999). However, the theories 
are not completely divorced from each other. Hill and Jones (1992) built on the work of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) to recognise both the implicit and explicit contractual relationships in a firm 
to develop stakeholder-agency theory. The interdependence between an enterprise and its 
strategic stakeholders is recognised by the American Law Institute (1992), which states that the 
modern enterprise by its nature creates interdependences with a variety of groups with whom 
the enterprise has a legitimate concern, such as employees, customers, suppliers and 
members of the communities in which the enterprise operates (Turnbull, 1997c).  
The basic point, however, remains, as Clarkson (1995) submits, that an enterprise is a system, 
within which there are stakeholders and the purpose of the organisation is to create wealth for 
its stakeholders. It is noted that the network of relationships with many groups can affect 
decision-making processes. Stakeholder theory is concerned with the nature of these 
relationships in terms of both processes and outcomes for the enterprise and its stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1984). 
Critics of stakeholder theory (e.g. Sternberg, 1996, Turnbull, 1997b; Pound, 1993) argue that 
stakeholder theory is both misguided and mistaken. In their view, the theory’s claim of 
accountability is unjustified since it undermines private property, agency and wealth, and is 
incompatible with business, as well as corporate governance. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Transport Advisory Board, for example, was established 
with a view of the various stakeholders in the whole transport sector. For example, Section 5 of 
the Namibian Transport Advisory Board Act (No. 23 of 1991) provides that the board shall 
consist of 19 members who come from various sectors, such as the public service, municipal 
councils, broader transport industry (i.e. persons with vested interest in the industry), tourist 
industry, agriculture, industrial sector, trade sector and mining industry. In addition, the 
chairperson of such a board is required to have the stakeholders’ model in mind as they are 
supposed to have wide knowledge and experience of, and ability in relation to, transport, 
aviation or industrial, commercial or financial matters. This shows the permeation of the 
stakeholder theory through the Namibian transport sector and the imperatives of this theory are 
crucial in analysing the performance of SOEs in Namibia. 
 
3.9.5 Political theory 
Political theory concentrates on voting power. A person who has voting power in an enterprise 
may direct the policy and practice of that enterprise. Where all SOEs in Namibia are owned by 
the state, the state has 100% voting power, meaning it has absolute power to control the SOEs 
through allocation of corporate power, profits and privileges Moreover, the government has 
political influence in all transport sector SOEs (Abdullah & Valentines, 2009:93; Hawley & 
Williams, 1996), meaning all leadership positions can be filled to further a political agenda – 
whether negative or not. According to Pound (1993), this impacts on the performance of SOEs. 
Turnbull (1997c) notes that the political model is also concerned with the related issue of trading 
off investor voice to investment exit and institutional agents monitoring corporate agents, i.e. 
watching the watchers (Monks & Minow, 1996). All these issues are influenced by government 
laws and regulations and are therefore the subject of public policy debate for change and 
reform. This may enhance enterprise performance, as all efforts will be geared towards 
improving all aspects of such an enterprise. Hawley and Williams (1996) hold a similar 
perspective: 
The political model of corporate governance (whether Pound’s or Gundfest’s version) 
places severe limits on the traditional economic analysis of the corporate governance 
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problem, and locates the performance-governance issue squarely in a broader political 
context. Political does not necessarily imply a government role, merely that it is non-market. 
Hawley and Williams (1996:32) 
 
In the American context, it has been noted that the government as the sole investor often seeks 
to change corporate policy by controlling all aspects of the enterprise. This has been met with 
mixed feelings as the discussion on privatisation/commercialisation in Chapter 2 above has 
shown. Pound (1992:83), arguing from the American experience, however, notes that “this new 
form of governance based on politics rather than finance will provide a means of oversight that 
is both far more effective and far less expensive than the takeovers of the 1980s (see also 
Gundfest, 1990).  
 
3.9.6 Resource dependency theory 
Daily et al. (2003) argue that the allocation of resources improves organisational functioning, 
the firm’s performance and the firm’s survival. This is a point that emanates from the resource 
dependency theory which was developed by Pfeffer (1972), Pfeffer and Leong (1977) and 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). In contrast to the stakeholder theory which focuses on 
relationships with many groups for individual benefits, the “resource dependency theory 
concentrates on the role of board directors in providing access to resources needed by the 
enterprise” (Abdullah, & Valentines, 2009:93). However, the resource dependency theory is 
similar to the stakeholder theory in that directors are influenced by external forces with regard 
to the securing of resources for and allocation of resources to the enterprise. According to 
Johnson et al. (1996), the theory provides a focus on the appointment of representatives of 
independent organisations as a means of gaining access to resources critical to firm success. 
According to Hillman, Canella and Paetzold (2000), directors bring resources to the firm, such 
as information, skills, access to key constituents, such as suppliers, buyers, public 
policymakers, social groups, and legitimacy. Furthermore, directors can be classified into four 
categories: insiders, business experts, support specialists and community influential (Abdullah 
& Valentines, 2009). 
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First, the insiders are current and former executives of the firm and they provide expertise in 
specific areas, such as finance and law on the firm itself, as well as general strategy and 
direction. Second, the business experts are current, former senior executives and directors of 
other large for-profit firms and they provide expertise on business strategy, decision making 
and problem solving. Third, the support specialists are the lawyers, bankers, insurance 
company representatives and public relations experts and these specialists provide support in 
their individual specialised field. Finally, the community ‘influentials’ are the political leaders, 
university faculty, members of clergy, and leaders of social or community organisations 
(Abdullah & Valentines, 2009:93). 
However, this theory is highly affected by the environment and culture in which the enterprise 
operates. According to Schmitter and Streeck (1994:6), transactions leading to the securing or 
allocation of resources are conducted on the basis of mutual trust and confidence sustained by 
stable, preferential, particularistic, mutually obligated, and legally unenforceable relationships. 
They may be kept together by value consensus or resource dependency – that is, through 
‘culture’ and ‘community’ – or through dominant units imposing dependence on others. 
 
3.9.7 Transaction cost theory 
According to Coarse (1937) and Cyert and March (1963), who are some of the earliest 
proponents of the transaction cost theory, an enterprise is an organisation comprising of people 
with different views and objectives affected by divergent factors. In this way, the enterprise and 
its structure can determine price and production. While accepting the neoclassical economic 
premise that market exchange is in theory the most efficient method of allocating resources, 
Coarse (1937) notes that concluding business deals can in practice be foiled by ‘transaction 
costs’, such as shopping for and bargaining on deals. Coarse (1937) maintains that business 
enterprises are usually organised as firms since carrying out large-scale production by multiple 
discrete market transactions would entail excessively high transaction costs. Thus, he argues, 
entrepreneurs brought production under the single roof of a ‘firm’ where production tasks were 
governed not by contract but by the ‘fiat’ of the entrepreneur (Coarse, 1937). 
The unit of analysis in transaction cost theory is the transaction. Therefore, the combination of 
people with transactions suggests that managers of transaction cost theory are opportunists 
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and arrange firms’ transactions to their interests (Williamson, 1996). As Black (1990) submits, 
the transaction theory as informed by the contractarian theory postulates clearly, that the role 
of corporate governance law is to provide a kind of form contract that mimics the efficient 
governance terms that most enterprises would reach through market contracting anyway, while 
relieving parties of the transaction costs of actually conducting bargaining. “As transaction-cost 
theory and the related incomplete and relational contracting perspectives suggest, however, 
consenting to fiat may be an efficient way to assign corporate governance powers. Explicitly 
defining all rights and duties would entail prohibitive transaction costs” (Joo, 2010). 
Furthermore, it has to be noted that diversified investors lack the time and expertise to 
participate actively in governance. 
 
3.10 The Overarching Responsibility of the Board of Directors 
The concern of corporate governance has been with both accountability of the board of 
directors and board effectiveness (Cadbury, 2002). To ensure board effectiveness, there should 
be an inclusion of a sufficient number of the non-executive directors who would bring objectivity 
to the board’s judgment. Thus, non-executive directors should make up the majority of 
independent directors (Cadbury, 2000; Cadbury, 2002). 
According to Masawi (2001), private and public companies in Namibia are yet to make 
significant improvements in corporate governance and reach correlation between management 
and boards of directors, amidst growing calls for improved governance This is the position as 
one notes that most Namibian companies do not have enough representation of qualified board 
members, while public institutions are dominated by political appointments, a situation that is 
compromising efficiency; and this is corroborated by Masawi (2001:2) who argues that: “The 
worst institutions in terms of adopting sound and well-crafted corporate governance policies in 
Namibia are the state-owned enterprises (SOEs)  … [T]hey lack clear demarcation between 
the duties of the appointing officer, the management and the Board. 
It is reported that most companies from both the private and public sectors have adopted the 
King Code III as the benchmark for implementing good corporate governance policies and have 
also moved in line with the international monitoring trends. King Code III is the latest corporate 
governance policy introduced by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in a bid to enhance 
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management and operational structures for both public and private companies in the country 
and has been taken up by about 60% of companies operating in the country (Masawi, 2001). 
It has been concluded that in Namibia there is a need for extensive education for board 
members and senior managers for companies to align their operations with good corporate 
governance policies (Masawi, 2001). The majority of the respondents interviewed still doubt the 
ability of their management and boards to operate independently while the other 45% have 
mixed feelings about the performances of the different bodies running their operations. It was 
noted that there is a need for companies to start positioning themselves in a way that also 
embraces voluntary empowerment of the previously disadvantaged majority in their structures. 
The OECD (2005) lists the responsibilities of the boards of state-owned enterprises. The 
organisation notes that the boards of state-owned enterprises should have the necessary 
authority, competencies and objectivity to carry out their function of strategic guidance and 
monitoring of management. They should act with integrity and be held accountable for their 
actions. It is subsequently worth considering, in particular, the OECD’s guidelines: 
● The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate be responsibility 
for the enterprise’s performance. The board should be fully accountable to the owners, 
act in the best interest of the enterprise and treat all shareholders equitably. 
● SOE boards should carry out their functions of monitoring management and of strategic 
guidance, subject to the objectives set by the government and the ownership entity. They 
should have the power to appoint and remove the CEO. 
● The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and 
independent judgment. Good practice calls for the Chair to be separate from the CEO. 
● If employee representation on the board is mandated, mechanisms should be developed 
to guarantee that this representation is exercised effectively and contributes to the 
enhancement of the board skills, information and independence. 
● When necessary, SOE boards should set up specialised committees to support the full 
board in performing its functions, particularly with regard to audits, risk management and 
remuneration. 
SOE boards should carry out an annual evaluation to appraise their performance. 
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Furthermore, it must be noted that directors of companies, including SOEs, are thus bound by 
their fiduciary duties to the enterprise and shareholders or stakeholders. These duties are sui 
generis in that they are based neither in contract nor in delict. They find application primarily 
with reference to the relationship between directors and their companies as was held by the 
court in Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 242. The 
same was argued by the court in Cohen NO v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (W) at 706B–F and in 
Du Plessis NO v Phelps 1995 (4) SA 165 (C) at 171. 
The principle in the Robinson case can be applied in the SOE-director relationship in that where 
directors are in a position of confidence involving a duty to protect the interests of the SOE, a 
director is not allowed to make a secret profit at the SOE’s expense or place themselves in a 
position where their interests conflict with their duty. The Robinson case demonstrated that the 
concept of fiduciary duty underlies an extensive field of legal relationships in all companies, 
including SOEs. 
All in all, directors may not: (a) exceed their powers; (b) exercise their powers for an improper 
or collateral purpose; (c) fetter their discretion; or (d) place themselves in a position in which 
their personal interests conflict, or may possibly conflict, with their duties to the SOE.  
Whether a fiduciary relationship is established will depend upon the circumstances of each 
case … But, so far as I am aware, it is nowhere laid down that in these transactions there can 
be no fiduciary relationship to let in the remedy without agency. And it seems hardly possible 
on principle to confine the relationship to agency cases (Robinson v Randfontein Estates 
Gold Mining Co Ltd, supra, at 177-180) 
The principles so stated remain true to Namibia and beyond. It should be mentioned that the 
rule is a strict one that allows little room for exceptions. It extends not only to actual conflicts of 
interest but also to those that are real, sensible possibilities. The defences open to a fiduciary 
that breaches their trust are very limited:  only the free consent of the principal after full 
disclosure will suffice (GE Smith, Ltd v Smith; Smith v Solnik [1952] NZLR 470; Boardman 
v Phipps [1966] 3 All ER 721 [HL] at 737I, 743F-I, 748E-F, 756I). The director who stands in 
a fiduciary position and acquires for themselves is deemed to have acquired for the enterprise, 
once proof of a breach of a fiduciary duty is adduced, it is therefore of no relevance that they 
acted honestly and reasonably. 
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It must be noted that, as far as companies are concerned, fiduciary duties are not limited to 
directors. In Boardman v Phipps [1966] 3 All ER 721 (HL), an employee was held liable to 
account to his former employer for secret profits made by him in breach of his fiduciary duties 
towards his employer. In Hodgkinson v Simms [1994] 3 SCR 377 (SCC) and (1995) 117 DLR 
(4th) 161, the Supreme Court of Canada held an accountant liable for breach of his fiduciary 
duties towards his client. 
In Boardman v Phipps (at 482B) cited above, the court approved the ruling in Hodgkinson 
where La Forest J stated that it is the nature of the relationship, not the specific category of 
actor involved that gives rise to the fiduciary duty. Therefore, if fiduciary duties are observed, it 
will be expected that evils, such as corruption, nepotism, racism and the like will not cripple the 
performance of SOEs in the county. 
 
3.11  State Ownership and Corporate Governance 
The OECD holds that across the globe, SOEs face some distinct governance challenges. One 
of the major reasons for the governance problem among SOEs is about “undue hands-on and 
politically motivated ownership” (OECD, 2014:3). In many countries, this has led to the dilution 
of accountability that has been discussed above. The OECD (2014:3) further notes that:  
SOEs are often protected from two major threats that are essential for policing management 
in private sector corporations, i.e. takeover and bankruptcy. More fundamentally, corporate 
governance difficulties derive from the fact that the accountability for the performance of 
SOEs involves a complex chain of agents (management, board, ownership entities, 
ministries, the government), without clearly and easily identifiable, or with remote, 
principals. To structure this complex web of accountabilities in order to ensure efficient 
decisions and good corporate governance is a challenge. 
 
To this end, the OECD recommends that the state should exercise the ownership of SOEs on 
behalf of the general public. Following this there is a need for some careful evaluation by the 
state and a need for disclosure of the objectives of the public policy informing or motivating and 
incentivising state ownership (OECD, 2014:6). These needs should be reviewed on a 
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continuous and regular basis. Furthermore, consistent with the rationale for state ownership, 
“the legal and regulatory framework for SOEs should ensure a level playing field in markets 
where SOEs and private sector companies compete in order to avoid market distortions” 
(TransNamib, 2016:11). 
Furthermore, ownership is very important. Viewed from financial theory, it is understood that 
the goal of an enterprise is to maximise the wealth of the owners for whom it is being operated 
(Gitman, 2009:15). As Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2002:815) reason, it follows that the only 
financial justification for corporate restructuring is if it results in a higher share value. However, 
there are those who support the argument that the value of an enterprise is solely a product of 
its investment opportunities, how an enterprise is financed and who owns it should, therefore, 
have no impact on the value of the enterprise. This is basically a description of the Fisher’s 
Separation Theorem as explained by Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2005:18-19). 
The arguments about privatisation are based on the divergence of opinions with regards to 
ownership by the state, public sector or both, jointly in a partnership. The baseline is that 
ownership change may increase the profit participation of management and/or other 
employees. The creation of positive incentives through a change in ownership structure would 
be expected to increase the value of an enterprise (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Morck, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1988). In general, though, theory suggests that changing the ownership of an enterprise 
should have no impact on its value and, as a result, one should find that share prices do not 
respond to the announcement of BEE transactions (Strydom, Christison & Matias, 2009: 68). 
Corporate restructuring has also been topical in Namibia. It is conceivable that given the great 
expense involved in such corporate restructuring, if the financial benefits of BEE transactions 
(in the form of increased cash flow or lower risk) do not exceed the costs of these expensive 
restructurings, the announcement of such a transaction should lead to a decrease in share 
price at least equal to the net cost of the transaction. If such a transaction is interpreted by the 
market as a signal that management is not pursuing wealth-maximising strategies, the 
decrease in the share price could be even greater. 
The ownership entity should be held accountable to representative bodies, such as parliament, 
and have clearly defined relationships with relevant public bodies, including the state supreme 
audit institutions (OECD, 2014). This means that the relationship of the ownership entity with 
other government bodies should be clearly defined. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
73 
 
A number of state bodies, ministries or administrations may have different roles vis-à-vis the 
same SOEs. In order to increase public confidence in the way the state manages ownership of 
SOEs, it is important that these different roles be clarified and explained to the general public. 
For instance, the ownership entity should maintain cooperation and continuous dialogue with 
the state supreme audit institutions responsible for auditing the SOEs. It should support the 
work of the state audit institution and take appropriate measures in response to audit findings, 
following in this regard the INTOSAI Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts 
(OECD, 2014:17). 
The ownership entity should be held clearly accountable for the way it carries out the state 
ownership function. Its accountability should be, directly or indirectly, to bodies representing the 
interests of its shareholders.  
 
3.12 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Despite their different perspectives on rationale, role and expectations of SOEs, there is overall 
consensus and consistency that SOEs, in whatever form, should result in the improvement of 
efficiency, effective service delivery, better governance practices, transparency, value for 
money, as well as independence and clear responsibility of the board of directors. Thus, 
stakeholder expectations require continuous oversight of SOE performance. 
Therefore, performance management and monitoring is an indispensable tool to enable 
shareholders, directors, internal and external stakeholders, as well as public policy makers to 
evidence and track SOEs’ performance. Such tools assess not only if an intervention (for 
example initiatives, projects, programmes and policies) is improving the general well-being of 
SOEs and the community it serves but also how much improvement is sustainable and 
effective. 
It is evident from the literature that the society has begun questioning how efficient SOEs are 
in delivering the services for which they were created. It should be noted that although the 
studies on the performance of SOEs worldwide and in Africa have been around for some time, 
the spectacular failure in governance of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the recent financial 
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crisis that was fuelled by excessive risk-taking, has put the question of SOEs right at the centre 
of all economic and social debates. 
Similarly, and even more so, the significance of leadership has become even more apparent in 
the twenty-first century because of unprecedented changes in the world economy triggered by 
the financial crises and the ever-present reality of limited resources. 
Because of the above factors, the trust in SOEs’ leadership becomes a critical factor. If this 
trust is eroded, as is the case with most SOEs, both short- and long-term performance will be 
affected, resulting in productivity challenges and viability pressures on SOEs’ leadership and 
management. The call for effective business decisions, strengthening the role of SOEs’ leaders 
and implementing effective governance has now resurfaced, forcing researchers to look at the 
fundamental response to these challenges. 
Finally, the theories and arguments discussed in this chapter provide a foundation for the 
discussions that follows. The next chapter provides an overview of the legal framework 
governing SOEs and its overall impact on their performance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
TRANSPORT-ORIENTED STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN NAMIBIA: A POLICY, 
LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL CURRENT REALITY PERSPECTIVE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter examined the literature available on the topic under discussion. The aim 
was to develop a strong theoretical appreciation of SOE performance. Building on that 
foundation, this chapter explains the legal framework under which state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) operate in Namibia, specifically those in the transport sector. It begins by giving a 
general overview and concludes with the institutional perspective on policy directives and 
related legal instruments. 
Given that the main aim of this study was to examine the performance of SOEs in Namibia’s 
transport sector, it was necessary to establish the legal environment under which they operate. 
Accordingly, five (5) SOEs covering all the four modes of transport are covered (selected), 
namely Air Namibia and Namibia Airport Company (NAC) under aviation, Namport under 
maritime, the Roads Authority under road, and TransNamib under railways.  
The chapter is broadly structured as follows: 
● Policy framework governing SOEs; 
● The new framework; 
● The researcher’s observations of the new framework;   
● The researcher’s recommended performance framework; and 
● Summary of conclusions and contributions. 
 
The next section takes a closer look at the previous governance framework. 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
76 
 
4.2 Policy Framework Governing SOEs in Namibia 
Namibia has a number of SOEs in the transport sector. They include Namibia Airport Company 
(NAC) responsible for the maintenance of Namibian airports, Namibian Ports Authority 
(Namport) responsible for the management of Namibian ports, Trans Namib (TransNamib) 
responsible for the operations of Namibian railways, and the Roads Authority (RA) responsible 
for maintenance of Namibian roads. Until 2005, the policy framework governing the transport 
sector was the White Paper on Transport Policy of 1995. It is important, however, to appreciate 
the broader context that led to the emergence, growth and in some cases stagnation of SOEs 
in Namibia before delving specifically into transport sector SOEs. 
As in most other post-colonial African countries, at independence in 1990 Namibian SOEs 
were, rightly or not, seen as useful vehicles for achieving certain national development 
objectives – primarily economic growth, employment creation, addressing inequality, and 
poverty reduction. With the limited reach of the private sector (owing to its colonial roots), the 
post-colonial state had few options outside of using state enterprises to implement its agenda.  
In the transport sector, the White Paper on Transport Policy set out clear objectives that were 
in line with the basic objectives of the GRN, namely to revive and sustain economic growth, 
create employment opportunities, alleviate poverty, reduce inequalities in incomes and promote 
efficient use of scarce resources. A related objective was to ensure safe, effective and efficient 
transport services of all modes. SOEs in the transport sector were therefore established to 
realise these, among other objectives. 
The constitutive legislation for each of the SOEs is discussed below. The objects and 
mandates, as well as the operational frameworks of these transport sector SOEs are also 
explained. It suffices here to underscore factors highlighted in the literature on performance of 
SOEs already reviewed that will help contextualise, illuminate and deepen subsequent 
discussions. Firstly, the [state] ownership-control-governance nexus is critical to understanding 
the SOE performance conundrum that this research addresses. Secondly, the notion that SOEs 
can, given the right environment, economically outperform private firms has had the effect of 
slowing, if not stalling, the process of SOE reforms, especially privatisation. Thirdly, monitoring 
SOE performance has been fraught with problems. Finally, there is a broad consensus in 
government premised on the resource-based theory and corporate governance argument that 
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the economic performance of SOEs is likely to improve when they leverage broad-based 
(competitive and political) capabilities.  
Different forms of ownership, from sole state to wholly private enterprises (as well as everything 
in between) have permeated debate on SOEs in Namibia since independence. More 
importantly, the debate has been predominantly around issues of performance of SOEs, with 
ownership, control and governance seen as causal or explanatory factors. At the same time, 
until very recently the debate on privatisation has been characterised by ambiguity and lack of 
an enabling policy and legislative framework. In fact, the current Namibian president (then 
Minister of Trade and Industry) warned in 2009 that privatisation is a sensitive topic to discuss 
in Namibia (Geingob, 2009:11).  
It should be noted that insofar as the concept of privatisation in Namibia is concerned, debate 
oscillates between the pros and cons of privatising SOEs. As a result, policy makers have 
tended to fall back to commercialisation as the pathway to inject desperately needed 
improvements into SOE performance, with very little to show for it. Equally, the capacity of the 
principal to effectively monitor performance of SOEs has been lacklustre due to a combination 
of institutional and capacity constraints. Lastly, the persistence of low performance by SOEs 
described in the following sections suggests the need to pay greater attention to the possibility 
that SOE CEOs operate under conditions defined by contradictory goals and perverse 
incentives. 
As property rights theory suggests, state ownership and control of SOEs has been linked to 
broader questions of efficiency. Financial losses leading to unsustainable government bail outs, 
low or declining productivity as evidenced by decline in dividend from SOEs (as a percentage 
of revenue, dividends from SOEs were at 1.8% of state revenue during the 2009/10 financial 
year, compared to a meagre 0.2% during the 2016/17 financial year) and poor quality of service 
have served as fuel to calls on government to divesture from non-performing SOEs. Such calls 
have hitherto dominated policy debates on SOEs, not least in the transport sector. Again, in 
line with the conceptualisation of the role of managers of SOEs as agents, most vitriol for poor 
performance has been directed at managers of SOEs who, unlike their counterparts in the 
private sector, are perceived as not suffering the economic consequences of their decisions. 
Their principals – politicians, bureaucrats and government officials – have not been spared 
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either from attack given their presumed complicity seen mainly arising from their self-interested 
behaviour that is out of sync with efficiency maximisation goals in SOEs. 
At the policy level, much of the concern and discussions have been about the responsibility of 
the board of directors of the various SOEs, especially those characterised as performing poorly. 
Specifically, the concern has been around questions of accountability of the board of directors 
and board effectiveness (Cadbury, 2002). A related concern has been on ‘corporate 
governance’, resulting in calls for improved governance across the board (Masawi, 2001). Such 
claims have not been sufficiently tested empirically in the context of Namibia’s transport sector 
SOEs, hence this study. Although slow and far in-between, policy response to the above noted 
concerns has tended to conform to globally known best practices. But slow response to such 
initiatives, as well as the performance crises that continues to dog the SOEs has provided 
additional impetus for additional analysis and quest for alternative solutions. Some responses 
have been partial and half-hearted at best and contradictory at worst. Hopefully, recent and on-
going efforts at reforming SOEs will, in spite of their shortcomings, succeed in addressing most 
of the challenges confronting SOEs that were discussed previously in Section 2.3. 
With the above background in mind (and a clear choice for commercialisation as opposed to 
privatisation), it can be concluded that despite the measly performance of SOEs, the Namibian 
government is not prepared to privatise fully. This could be because of equity considerations 
and not wanting to sell off the nation’s assets. Instead, the government encourages PPPs, 
which in some quarters are seen as what the government claims to not want to do, i.e. selling 
off national assets to the elite and foreigners. A closer look will now be taken at the current legal 
and institutional arrangements governing SOEs in Namibia. 
 
4.3 The Legal Framework of SOEs in Namibia 
4.3.1 The constitutional framework 
Good corporate governance does not exist in a vacuum. This is a concept that has now been 
defined in a net of regulatory frameworks originating from the Namibian Constitution through 
the relevant statutes to policies ending with rules and policies made by various SOEs on their 
own. Before going into specific principles and concepts, it is important to mention that the 
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Namibian Constitution, especially Chapter 3, i.e. the Bill of Rights, imposes considerable 
substantive obligations upon the administration of any public and even private entity, including 
the individuals running such an entity. This is especially seen in the provisions of Article 5, 
which shows that both individuals and corporate bodies in the public sector are bound by it and 
extends the application of the Bill of Rights to private actors wherever it may apply to them. 
Furthermore, and very important, is the point that the Namibian Constitution establishes the 
Office of the Auditor-General whose responsibility is to audit and report on the financial affairs 
of all ministries and government agencies, including the financial affairs of all SOEs. On a 
comparative note, the Namibian Constitution does not make specific rules regarding the 
administration of public entities. In other words, it is unlike the South African Constitution which 
has specific provisions for public governance, including governance of public enterprises or 
SOEs as they are referred to in this study. Chapter 10 of the South African Constitution entitled 
‘Public Administration’, sets out the values and principles that must govern public 
administration4 and states that these principles apply to administration in every sphere of 
government, organs of state and public enterprises. This chapter also establishes a Public 
Service Commission to promote the values of public administration.   
Moreover, Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution establishes the office of the Public 
Protector whose primary task is to investigate and report on conduct in public administration, 
which is alleged, to be improper.5 This office is akin to the Namibian Ombudsman but its 
mandate and powers are much broader. These include investigating and making decisions on 
what remedial action should be taken when a fault has been identified in the running of an SOE.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Section 195 of the South African Constitution (1) provides that:  
“Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following principles: 
(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained. 
(b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted. 
(c) Public administration must be development-oriented. 
(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias. 
(e) People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making. 
(f) Public administration must be accountable. 
(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information. 
(h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated. 
(i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, 
objectivity, fairness and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation.” 
5 Section 182(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
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4.3.2 Governing acts and institutional arrangements 
4.3.2.1 The Public Enterprises Governance Act No. 2 of 2006 (as amended)6 
This is the main Act that regulates SOEs in Namibia. It is comprehensive in its coverage but, 
as will be shown below, it is not enough as the establishment or regulation of SOEs under it is 
not likely to result in the high performance of SOEs in the country. 
Factors such as overburdening SOEs with excessive or overvalued assets, undercapitalisation, 
and setting up SOEs in ways that favour the ministry or department from which its assets are 
being transferred rather than on commercial drives (as well as in the best interest of the new 
SOE, its customers and its owners) need to be carefully evaluated before the regulatory 
framework and generally the forces behind the establishment of SOEs can be expected to 
impact on their performance (Asian Development Bank, 2011). Accordingly, it must be in the 
best interest of the new SOE, its customers and its owners (the government). Examples that 
illustrate this phenomenon that are cited in the literature include Tonga Airports Limited and 
Tonga Post Limited. Next, we consider some salient features of the Act relevant to the 
performance of SOEs. 
 
4.3.2.2 The SOE Council 
In 2001, the Namibian government published the Governance Framework for State-Owned 
Enterprises in Namibia. After a long period of reflection and consultation, and the publication of 
this framework, the legislature passed the State-Owned Enterprise Governance, 2006 (Act No. 
2 of 2006) following the publication of a report on the previous five years. The Act was 
promulgated to set the parameters by which SOEs would be governed. As its preamble states, 
the main objective of the Act is to achieve or ensure efficient governance of SOEs and the 
monitoring of their performances. Furthermore, it was enacted for the restructuring of SOEs, to 
establish the State-Owned Enterprises Governance Council (hereafter referred to as the 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that this Act replaced the State-Owned Enterprises Act of 2006. For example Section 14 of Public 
Enterprises Governance Amendment, 2015, (Act No. 8 of 2015) amended section 50 of the principle Act by changing the 
short title from State-owned Enterprises to the Public Enterprises Governance Act, 2006 of the previous Act. It should further 
be noted that the change is rather cosmetic and doesn’t go sufficient enough to address the challenges of SOEs. 
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Council) and define its powers, duties and functions, and to make provision for incidental 
matters. 
In terms of Section 2 of the said Act, the Council (now replaced by and called the Ministry of 
Public Enterprises7) functions as a committee of Cabinet and performs the functions assigned 
to it by the Act under the supervision, and subject to the approval, of the Cabinet. Section 3 of 
the Act constitutes the members of the Council who are the prime minister, who is the 
chairperson of the Council, the minister responsible for finance, the minister responsible for 
trade and industry, the attorney-general and the director-general of planning. It should be noted, 
however, that in the current government there is a new Ministry, the Ministry of Public 
Enterprises, which was created specifically for the SOEs. It can be argued that the Act is 
deficient to the extent that it does not mention the membership of the minister (former Council) 
responsible for SOEs. It is imperative that such a minister be included. 
Section 4(1) of the Act outlines the functions and duties of the State-Owned Enterprises 
Council, namely: 
● “To establish generally accepted common principles of corporate governance and good 
practice governing State-owned Enterprises;  
● To develop common policy frameworks for the operations of State-owned Enterprises, 
including policy on issues relating to human resources, assets and finance; 
● To determine criteria for the performance measurement and evaluation of State-owned 
Enterprises, and develop appropriate means for monitoring their performance;  
● To make determinations in relation to the number of members to be appointed to the 
boards of State-owned Enterprises and advise portfolio ministers on the appointment of 
such members in accordance with sections to facilitate the provision of programmes for 
the training and development of members of the boards and management staff of State-
owned Enterprises on corporate governance and efficient management practices; 
To receive and consider for approval submissions made by State-owned Enterprises on 
the annual distribution of profits and the declaration of dividends.” 
 
                                                 
7 Section 2 (c) of Public Enterprises Governance Amendment, 2015, (Act No. 8 of 2015), replaces term State-owned enterprise 
with public enterprise. 
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These roles of the Council are described as ‘elegant’ by the South African Presidential Review 
Committee (2012:16), which states that: 
It is our submission that this is the most elegant area of Namibian legislation. Firstly, that 
Act defines a Portfolio Minister as the Minister responsible for the administration of the law 
governing the establishment and functions of the State-owned Enterprise, and a Minister 
holding the shares and exercising the rights attached to the shares in the company on 
behalf of the State. The import of this definition is that there is more than one Portfolio 
Minister, but the Boards that they appoint and the oversight thereof are harmonised as 
there is a council that sits and develops such standards. This ensures consistency in 
governance practices, including Board appointments, etc. Therefore, Portfolio Ministers, in 
overseeing SOEs, do so uniformly. 
 
However, the Committee noted that the inelegant part of this Act is that none of the members 
of this governance council are non-politicians. There is no representation of the business 
community in this Council who could have brought a perspective outside government, 
especially in best practices in corporate governance. This weakness remains even if it is clear 
that the Act details procedures for the appointment of SOE boards (Section 14 and 15 of the 
Act). Board appointments are gazetted (Section 6[7]). It is not clear whether this process has 
been followed in the ten years since the promulgation of the Act. This might be similar to South 
Africa. In South Africa, although some SOE-founding Acts call for the gazetting of board 
appointments, such a practice is not commonly applied. In most cases, once Cabinet has 
approved appointments, the process ends.  
The Act codifies the entering into a performance agreement between the CEO, his/her senior 
management and the board.8 A proper reading of Section 22(2) of the Act shows that 
government officials are allowed to sit on SOE boards. The South African Presidential SOE 
Review Committee (2012:17) sees this as a weakness in the Namibian Act and comparatively 
submits that: 
                                                 
8 Section 21 of the Act. In South Africa this is a fragmented practice. In most cases the board has no say in how the SOE 
executives are appointed (except the CEO). In some instances, even the board plays no role in the recruitment and appointment 
of the CEO. 
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The appointment of Government officials in SOE Boards, over and above eroding or 
compromising the independence of the Boards, owing to their fiduciary duty to the 
shareholder (as opposed to the entity), also brings about a complication of remuneration. 
This matter is unresolved in South Africa, as was evident in the PRC’s visit to the North 
West Province where it became apparent that some Government officials get remunerated 
for sitting on Boards of SOEs despite being salaried Government Employees, e.g. the 
North-West Park Board. 
 
Indeed, there is a problem with the appointment of government officials on SOE Boards, over 
and above eroding or compromising the independence of the board, and the fact that they owe 
their fiduciary duty to the shareholders (as opposed to the entity) also brings about a 
complication of remuneration. 
Part V of the Act gives effect to the shareholders’ powers in relation to SOEs.9 Section 29, in 
particular, ensures accountability by stating that “If the Council, after consultation with the 
portfolio minister, considers it necessary or desirable for any reason, the Council may by notice 
in the Gazette direct that a special investigation be conducted in relation to any matter 
concerning the business, trade, dealings, affairs, assets or liabilities of a State-owned 
Enterprise as may be specified in the notice.” The Act lists SOEs under two schedules but not 
the subsidiaries. Even in its definition of SOEs or SOCs, those definitions exclude/make no 
reference to subsidiaries.10 The Council is further mandated to lay down directives in relation 
to: 
● Governance agreements to be entered into by a portfolio minister with the board of an 
SOE; 
● Performance agreements to be entered into between a portfolio minister and the 
individual members of a board of an SOE and between such a board and its CEO and 
other senior management staff; 
● The remuneration levels of board members, CEOs and other senior management staff of 
SOEs;  
                                                 
9 Part V. 
10 See schedule 1; Section 1. 
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● Benefits for employees of SOEs generally;  
● The number of members to be appointed to the boards of SOEs and advising the portfolio 
ministers on the appointment of such members in accordance with sections 14 and 15; 
● The furnishing of a portfolio minister with any comments it may wish to make in relation 
to an annual budget of an SOE submitted to that minister for approval and provided to 
the Council for its information and comment; 
● The facilitation of the provision of programmes for the training and development of 
members of the boards and management staff of SOEs on corporate governance and 
efficient management practices; and 
● The receipt and consideration for approval submissions made by SOEs on the annual 
distribution of profits and the declaration of dividends in terms of Section 2511. 
 
In addition, the Council is also enjoined to submit to Cabinet for decision any proposed 
restructuring plan prepared and approved by the Council in relation to any SOE identified by 
Cabinet for restructuring and to perform any other function entrusted to the Council by or under 
the Act or any other law. 
Indeed, the introduction of the SOE Act 2006, (No. 2 of 2006) was not without challenges.12 
There are advantages and disadvantages of this Act.13 According to Murangi (2006, as cited 
by Kangueehi, 2007), since the SOEG Act came into effect in 2006, the full implementation of 
the Act has been a daunting task for government. A lack of guidelines, directives and 
regulations resulted in the Act being amended and Cabinet placed a moratorium on board fees 
and executive management of SOEs until the Act became fully operational (2008). These 
concerns arose mainly because there was no one specific Ministry enforcing the Act at the time 
when it was promulgated.  
Perhaps the greatest injury to the common law was committed when the State-Owned 
Enterprises Governance Act was promulgated, possibly in the belief that it advances the purport 
of Article 40(a) of the Constitution. Instead, a Minister of Public Entities could have sufficed. 
                                                 
11 State-Owned Enterprise Governance, 2006 (Act No. 2 of 2006) 
12 In Murangi’s presentation to the OECD titled “State Owned Enterprises Governance of 2006(as amended). 
13Advantages: Overarching legislation; watchdog; uniformed way of doing things; easy to monitor; performance can be rewarded or not rewarded. 
Disadvantages: Increased Pressure on SOEGC; blame culture from the SOEs. 
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The function of the State-Owned Enterprise Governance Council and its secretariat remains a 
convenient mystery.  
Furthermore, the Act is silent on the issue of non-compliance. This is similar to the submissions 
by Mubwandarikwa (2013) who argued that: 
However, up to date, the State-owned Enterprises Governance Act is not fully functional. 
The Act stipulates, inter alia, that the Council is to establish generally accepted common 
principles of corporate governance and good practice governing State-owned Enterprises. 
The Council further sets out to develop common policy frameworks for the operations of 
state-owned enterprises, including policy on issues relating to human resources and asset 
performance. 
Mubwandarikwa (2013:33) 
 
Therefore, there is a need for the development of standards and/or benchmarks for the 
performance measurement and evaluation of SOEs, as well as the appropriate means for 
monitoring and evaluating their performance. This means that despite the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act No 2 of 2006 having been promulgated, there is a slow process of good 
governance of public enterprises as long as there are no rules and regulations put in place. The 
Act could also relate to the topic of privatisation, as considered in detail above, as the view 
exists that “[t]he essence of this law was to pave the way for the sale of equity to the private 
sector as part of SOE restructuring” (Mubwandarikwa, 2013:33; LaRRI, 2003). 
 
4.3.2.3 Disclosure and related corporate governance rules 
A normal rule of engagement in corporate governance in terms of Section 6(1) of the Act is that 
a Council member or portfolio minister who has a direct or indirect personal or financial interest 
in any matter being discussed at a meeting of the Council must disclose the nature of that 
interest and must not attend the rest of that meeting or participate in any deliberations or 
decision of the Council in relation to the matter, except if the Council determines otherwise, and 
subject to any conditions the Council may determine. Such a disclosure should be recorded in 
the minutes of the meeting.  
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The Act contains a punitive measure for non-disclosure, with Section 6(3) stipulating that a 
person who fails to disclose personal interest as required by the Act commits an offence and is 
liable to conviction and to a fine not exceeding N$20,000 or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding two years. This raises the question as to whether this punishment, especially the 
fine, is deterrent enough. The Act does not go on to stipulate whether such a person is 
disqualified from being a member of the Council after paying the fine. Since all members of the 
Council are members of Cabinet appointed by the president into their ministerial positions, the 
question remains whether such a person also loses their ministerial position, especially when 
they pay a fine and are immediately free. It is an open question as to what effects this omission 
has on SOEs’ credibility and performance in the transport sector. 
The Act goes on to bind other staff members of the secretariat to the Council. Section 12(1)(a) 
prohibits a member of the secretariat of the Council or any consultant engaged by the Council 
from publishing or communicating or in any other way disclosing any information relating to the 
affairs of any SOE or a member of the board of an SOE or a person being considered or 
recommended as a candidate for appointment as such a member, that has come to such 
person’s knowledge, in the performance of any function in connection with the functions of the 
Council. This also applies in situations where one gains information as a result of such a 
person’s attendance at a Meeting of the Council or a Committee of the Council, as Section 
12(1)(b) stipulates. 
It may appear as if this provision negatively affects the principles of disclosure of information 
for good corporate governance as analysed above. However, in terms of Section 12(2)(a), the 
restrictions in Section 12 do not apply to information disclosed for the purpose of the proper 
administration or enforcement of the Act or the performance of the functions of the Council, for 
the proper administration of justice in terms of Section 12(2)(b) or at the request of any member 
of the Council or any other person authorised in writing by a member of the Council in terms of 
Section 12(2)(c). Therefore, the right to disclose in order to enhance principles of good 
corporate governance still exists, albeit within the parameters as set out by the Act. 
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4.3.2.4 Governance agreements 
In terms of Section 17(1), within one month of being constituted, the portfolio minister must, 
with due regard to any directives laid down by the Council under the Act in terms of Section 4, 
enter into a written governance agreement with the board of an SOE in relation to, inter alia: 
● The State’s expectations in respect of the SOE’s scope of business, efficiency and 
financial performance and achievement of objectives; 
● The portfolio minister’s obligations in relation to any function conferred or imposed by the 
establishing Act of the SOE; 
● The principles to be followed by the SOE for business planning (17[1][c]);  
● The measures that are necessary to protect the financial soundness of the SOE;  
● Key performance indicators in terms of which the SOE’s performance will be evaluated; 
● The structure of the business and financial plan; 
● The principles to be followed at the end of each financial year in respect of any surplus 
in the accounts of the SOE; and 
● Any other matter relating to the performance of the SOE’s functions under any law. 
 
A copy of the governance agreement must be open for inspection by the public at the head 
office of the SOE. Some of these agreements have already been signed and made public. For 
example, Namibia Ports Authority (Namport), an SOE which is responsible for the development 
and maintenance of Namibian ports, entered into a five-year governance agreement with its 
portfolio minister on 20 May 2010, which outlines the roles, responsibilities and obligations of 
the portfolio minister and the authority respectively (Namport, 2012). As Shifidi (2014:46) 
reports, the authority’s progress towards achieving its objectives and strategies was evaluated 
utilising key performance indicators set out in the said agreement, which is open for inspection 
at the authority’s head office during business hours. In terms of the Governance Agreement, 
Namport has committed to the principles of good corporate governance as contained in the 
King III Report (Namport, 2012).  
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4.4 Legislation of Specific Transport Sector SOEs 
4.4.1 National Transport Services Holding Company Act (No. 28 of 1998) 
This Act provides for the incorporation of a holding company to undertake transport services. 
Since both the private and the public sector undertake transport services in the country, only 
those parts that deal with the public (SOEs) are relevant to this study. The Act replaces the 
National Transport Corporation Act, 1987 (No. 21 of 1987). The Act came into force on 1 
January 1999. However, sections 5-13 and 15-19 came into force only on the date of transfer 
of services to the holding company, which was 1 April 1999 (GN 51/1999, GG 2075). 
One interesting aspect of this Act is that in terms of its regulations, anything done under the 
National Transport Corporation Act (No. 21 of 1987) that could have been done under a 
corresponding provision of the new Act remains valid. Therefore, if any ‘wrong’ actions were 
taken, they remain valid unless successfully challenged. As a result, the performance of current 
SOEs may be hampered because of historical reasons. Such arguments are reflected in the 
writings by some authors and even in the media (Kakujaha-Matundu, 2009:61; Grobler, 2009; 
Melber, 2009; McClune, 2004). Thus, the trend that the laws follow is viewed as a perpetuation 
of the old system in disguise but nevertheless for corporate and bureaucratic expediency. This 
means that a legal and administrative vacuum can be avoided. 
It is interesting to also point out that although Section 6 talks about performance agreements, 
the time frame in which the performance agreements are expected to be submitted is quite long 
for the line minister to take appropriate action in case remedial actions are required. The section 
states that “[T]he Holding Company shall, subject to Section (2), but not later than two months 
before the commencement of every third financial year and in accordance with such procedures 
as the shareholding Minister may determine, submit to the Minister a draft performance 
agreement” (Section 6[1)]). 
 
4.4.2 Roads Authority Act, 1999 (No. 17 of 1999) 
This Act provides for the incorporation of the Roads Authority Company to manage the national 
road network of the country. Considering its function, the RA plays an important part in the 
transport network of the country and indeed the economy. It should be noted that management 
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of the network also includes, as contemplated in Section 16(1) (a), planning, design, 
construction and maintenance of roads. 
One interesting aspect of this Act is that most of these functions, except planning, are usually 
outsourced to the private sector, therefore the company remains more focused on the 
monitoring aspect of the management of the road network. One aspect of the Act that may have 
both legal and administrative issues is the aspect of alternate directors. According to Section 8 
of the Act, the minister may appoint for each director (board member), a person as alternate 
director when the substantive director is absent. It is the author’s opinion that such a situation 
may erode accountability and responsibility, as the alternate directors may be allowed to come 
and endorse the decisions that were already taken by substantive members without proper 
appreciation of the background to the decision. Similarly, it may also frustrate management to 
explain issues to the alternate director that were already explained to the substantive director. 
The issues of the performance agreement, which the Act refers to as a performance statement, 
are outlined in Section 18 of the Act. Similar issues that were observed in the National Transport 
Service Holding Act, 1998 above, are observed in the Roads Authority Act, 1999. 
 
4.4.3 Namibian Ports Authority Act, 1994 (No. 2 of 1994) 
This Act is important to the topic under investigation insofar as it provides for the establishment 
of the Namibian Ports Authority to undertake the management and control of ports and 
lighthouses in the country. Considering these functions, the Namibian Ports Authority plays an 
important role in maritime and indeed in transport activities in general. It should be noted that 
the function of the organisation also includes, as contemplated in Section 3(1)(a), port 
management, lighthouse operation and navigational aids in Namibia and its territorial water. It 
is the opinion of the author that these are important objects that could easily be eroded due to 
specialisation of the organisation. 
One other interesting aspect of this Act is that Section 21(1) gives the monopoly of constructing, 
developing and operating any port to the Namibian Ports Authority. This is in contrast with the 
free market concept as contemplated in the Constitution. It further does not allow for the 
Namibian Ports Authority to be competitive through innovative performance as it is the only 
player. It is interesting to observe that the Namibian Ports Authority Act does not refer to the 
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issues of the performance agreement, which the other two acts above explicitly mentioned. This 
is only done through the State-Owned Enterprises Act. 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Performance monitoring is a tool that enables policy makers and decision makers alike to track 
performance. It assesses not only if an intervention (for example initiatives, projects, 
programmes and policies) is improving the general well-being of society but also how much 
improvement, by what means and how it could attain the result more effectively. It is evident 
from this chapter that the current legal and institutional framework has not assisted SOEs’ 
performance and propelled the efficient service delivery for which they were created.  
Because of the above factors, the government has enacted laws to address performance and 
productivity challenges of SOEs in the country. The call for effective business decisions, 
strengthening the role of SOEs’ leaders and implementing effective governance has now 
resurfaced, forcing researchers to consider the fundamental response to these challenges .It 
became apparent in the literature review that only excellence in governance will help overcome 
the current crisis of confidence in leadership with the reaching of a tipping point whereby 
corporate governance drives corporate strategy rather than the inverse. The question, however, 
is whether the current regulatory framework supports these ambitions. It is the researcher’s 
contention that this is not the case. Taking the amendment of the previous Act (State-Owned 
Enterprises Act of 2006) as an example, the new Act (Public Enterprises Governance Act, 2006) 
is simply a cosmetic exercise, wherein the Ministry replaces the Council. This is not enough to 
address the challenges of SOEs. 
More general, although studies on the performance of SOEs worldwide and in Africa have been 
around for some time, the spectacular failure in governance in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
and the recent financial crisis which was fuelled by excessive risk-taking, has put the question 
of SOEs right at the centre of all economic and social debates. Similarly, and even more so, 
the significance of legislation has become more apparent in the twenty-first century because of 
unprecedented changes in the world economy triggered by the financial crises and the ever-
present reality of limited resources.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
THE PERFORMANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN NAMIBIA: A RESEARCH-
BASED ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the findings and results of the performance of the transport 
sector SOEs in Namibia. Findings from both secondary and primary data are analysed and 
presented. Results of the analyses of audited financial reports of SOEs are first presented 
followed by results of questionnaire-based and direct interviews.  
The above findings are then juxtaposed with theories and empirical results of corporate 
governance literature to create a deeper understanding of the level of the performance of the 
SOEs under investigation. The chapter reveals that the major causes of poor performance of 
the transport sector SOEs in Namibia include poor financial management practices, a deficient 
management information system, non-adherence to key performance indicators, incompetent 
management policies, and weak corporate governance ethics. 
Lastly, the chapter identifies variables responsible for the performance of the five (5) transport 
sector SOEs. All the factors highlighted in the analysis provide information on, and highlight 
specific issues of, the performance of the selected SOEs. In summary, the chapter is structured 
as follows: 
● Presentation of results of financial analysis of transport sector SOEs 
● Summary of the data from discussions and interviews;  
● Actual performance and challenges of selected SOEs;  
● Revisiting the theories of SOE performance; and 
● Conclusion. 
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5.2 Results of Financial Analysis 
The efficiency and (financial) performance of transport SOEs was measured in three ways: 
1) using return on assets ratio (ROA), which measures how effectively a SOE can earn 
a return on its investment in assets; 
2) via return on equity ratio (ROE), which is a profitability ration that measure how 
efficiently a SOE can use the money from shareholders to generate profits and grow the 
company and  
3) operating profit margin (OPM), or operating margin ratio which is a profitability ratio 
that measures what percentage of total revenues is made up by operating income. In 
other words, the operating margin ratio demonstrates how much revenues are left over 
after all the variables or operating costs have been paid.  
 
These three internationally recognised efficiency (or operational performance) measures – 
ROA, ROE and OPM, were used to assess the level of efficiency (i.e. operational performance) 
of SOEs in the transport sector in order to meet one of the research objectives, namely “to 
assess and objectively determine the level of performance (in terms of governance, efficiency 
and productivity) of Namibian SOEs in the transport sector”.   
ROA, often called the return on total assets, measures the net income produced by total assets 
during a period by comparing net income to the average total assets. In other words, the return 
on assets ratio measures how efficiently a company can manage its assets to produce profits 
during a period. On the other hand, return on equity (ROE) measures how efficiently an SOE 
can use the money from shareholders (primarily government) to provide services sustainably. 
Unlike other return on investment ratios, ROE measures performance of SOE from the 
investor’s point of view - not the SOE. In other words, this ratio calculates how much money is 
made based on the investors’ investment in the SOE, not the SOE’s investment in assets or 
something else.  
Furthermore, the operating margin ratio, also known as the operating profit margin (OPM) 
measures what percentage of total revenues is made up by operating income. In other words, 
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the operating margin ratio demonstrates how much revenues are left over after all the variables 
or operating costs have been paid. 
Lastly, it should be noted that not all the SOEs under investigation are profit driven. However, 
the concept of OPM is still relevant and applicable in this regard.  
 
5.2.1 Air Namibia 
5.2.1.1 Rate of return on assets 
As a measure of profitability (i.e., per dollar profit earned relative to assets), Air Namibia’s three 
year (2012-2014) ROA average of -42 is indicative of the level of the SOE’s performance in 
terms of net income generated relative to its assets - primarily planes - the core revenue earner 
for Air Namibia. While the trajectory of the ROA has been positive, increasing from -129.9 in 
2012 to +19.61 in 2014 (Figure 5.1), more recent data was not available at the time of the study 
to enable an assessment of the sustainability of such upward trend. However, recent media 
reports and the continual bailouts as indicated in the Minister’s Budget speech for 2017/18 (see 
figure 5.4), suggest that the airlines problems are far from over.  
 
Figure 5. 1: Return on Assets Ratio for Air Namibia, 2012-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations from Air Namibia’s Financial Statements (2012 & 2014) 
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In support of the above finding (ROA), Respondent 7 indicated that the airline was optimally 
utilising its equipment (aircrafts) and that it expected a positive trajectory if other stakeholders, 
especially the tourism sector play their part. However, this view was contradicted by 
Respondent 3 who indicated that the airline’s equipment were more on the ground (making 
money for airports) and not in the air to make money for Air Namibia and the Government. To 
corroborate that position, the Respondent cited the airline’s biggest aircrafts (the two A330) 
which are always parked for the whole day in Germany and Namibia and only fly at night each 
and every day of the year.  
However, according to Respondent 8, the airline is busy with market studies on how best to 
utilise, not only the A330 but also the A319. The Respondent cited the current negotiations to 
fly to Durban via Gaborone and the Legos via Accra as examples where their airline intends to 
begin utilising their aircrafts optimally.  
 
5.2.1.2 Return on equity 
The return on equity ratio (ROE) is a profitability ratio that measures the ability of a firm to 
generate profits from its shareholder’s investments in the company. In 2012 and 2013, Air 
Namibia’s ROE was -18.35 and -5.07, respectively. A slight improvement was reported in 2014 
with a positive ROE of approximately 8% (Figure 5.2). This finding demonstrates Air Namibia’s 
level of performance in terms of profit generation in relation to shareholder investments since 
ROE ratio shows how much profit each dollar of the common stockholders’ equity generates. 
Investors want to see a high return on equity ratio because this indicates that the company is 
using its investors’ funds effectively. Higher ratios are almost always better than lower ratios. 
Ideally, ROE of one firm should be compared to that of others in the industry. However, such a 
comparison could not be done considering the structure of Namibia’s air industry where Air 
Namibia is the largest carrier.  
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Figure 5. 2: Return on Equity for Air Namibia, 2012-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations from Air Namibia’s Financial Statements (2012 & 2014) 
 
The above finding was corroborated by the views of industry stakeholders derived from 
interviewing key informants. According to Respondent 2, the government had supported Air 
Namibia financially and otherwise. The Respondent indicated that, annually the airline receives 
more than other SOEs in the sector in the hope that it will soon break even and begin to 
generate profit. The Respondent further indicated that the government has negotiated several 
Bilateral Air Services Agreements (BASA) with several countries to allow the airline to fly to 
different destinations and thereby make profit.  All such efforts, according to the Respondent, 
have yet to result in something significant   
 
5.2.1.3 Operating profit margin 
The operating profit margin (OPM), also known as operating margin ratio, is a profitability ratio 
that measures what percentage of total revenues is made up by operating income. This ratio is 
important to both creditors and investors because it helps to show how strong and profitable a 
company’s operations are. The operating margin ratio demonstrates how much revenue is left 
after all the variables or operating costs have been paid. Conversely, this ratio shows what 
proportion of revenue is available to cover non-operating costs like interest expenses. 
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Figure 5. 3: Operating Profit Margin, Air Namibia 2012-14 
 
Source: Own calculations from Air Namibia’s Financial Statements (2012 & 2014) 
 
As Figure 5.3 shows, Air Namibia had a negative operating margin in 2012 and 2013. 
Performance improved in the following year (2014) judging by the OPM of approximately 21%. 
Because of its relatively weak profitability, the Government of the Republic of Namibia has had 
to step in to financially rescue the airline severally. For example, according to Air Namibia’s 
Financial Report (2014), the SOE had received N$2.4 billion from the Ministry of Finance since 
2012 as bailout.  
 
5.2.1.4 General observations on Air Namibia 
The projected transfers to the company shown in Figure 5.4 below suggest that Air Namibia is 
unable to break even and will continue to be a burden to the state for years to come. It is 
important to note that until 1998, Air Namibia fell under TransNamib Holdings. The breakaway 
from the latter, which was an ailing SOE, did not bring any change to the financial woes of the 
airline. It is, thus, not surprising why some senior management officials (Respondent 7 and 8) 
of Air Namibia do not view (own admission) their SOE as performing well. Furthermore, 
interviews conducted with political and senior government officials (Respondent 1,2 and 4) 
show that the SOE is rated as a poor performer. One of the reasons given for this assessment 
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is a poor attitude towards regulatory compliance from top to bottom. Poor financial management 
only serves to worsen the situation, placing the SOEs in an unending downward spiral.  
The forgoing explains why the airline will continue to receive government bailout for the 
foreseeable future. For example, in the Budget Statement for 2016/2017 read by the Minister 
of Finance in Parliament, Air Namibia was to be allocated N$1, 48 billion in the next three years. 
In the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework for 2017/18-2019/20, it is estimated that the 
struggling airline will be allocated N$486,137,300 for the 2016/17 Financial Year, 
N$493,926,380 for the 2018/19 Financial Year, and N$497,755,750 for the 2019/20 Financial 
Year. 
 
Figure 5.4: Air Namibia Estimated Transfers from Government 2017-2020 
Source: Republic of Namibia (Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2017/18-2019/20) 
 
Furthermore, the airline has serious compliance issue. For example, it has not been compliant 
with the legal requirement (of the SOE Act) to prepare up-to-date Annual Reports. In fact, its 
last Annual Report was produced ten (10) years ago, which is contrary to Section 26(1) of the 
Public Enterprises Governance Act, 2015, which requires all SOEs to submit Annual Reports 
not later than six months after the end of a financial year. Such an attitude (according to 
Respondent 5) has resulted in the airline forgetting to renew its Foreign Operating Permit (FOP) 
that ended in a cancellation of one of its flights from German that was destined to Windhoek, 
Namibia. This was not only an embarrassment but also resulted in serious financial loses as 
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the airline had to reroute some of the passengers with different airlines and had to book some 
of the affected passengers in expensive hotels at the airline’s own cost. 
Concerns have also been raised regarding the migration of public service attitude and culture, 
as instead of inculcating a culture that is cost sensitive, this makes it impossible to trim 
operational expenses that are unsustainable. Air Namibia, for example, migrated with the 
government attitude (according to Respondent 5) towards a subsistence and travel reward 
system. Its crews are paid exorbitant allowances and this makes Air Namibia the only airline in 
the world that maintains this unsustainable practice, whilst most other airlines cover full board 
to keep excesses to the barest minimum and they invest in product-differentiating strategies to 
maintain customer satisfaction, market leadership and a service culture. 
Political interference also seems to be an issue at Air Namibia. According to Respondent 5, 
there are some concerns that decisions on which routes Air Namibia should fly have been 
politically motivated. For example, burdening Air Namibia with politically motivated routes, such 
as the Harare-Windhoek route has created a culture of expectation for subsidies. It is noted 
that for the sake of profitability, decisions must be based on returns and the decisions must be 
taken by executives even if the SOEs are subsidised. Political interference in the appointment 
of management has also resulted in poor performance (Respondent 5).  
 
5.2.1.5 Challenges and how to address them 
In terms of the foregoing, the general efficiency of Air Namibia has been rated as average or 
fair. This is because the airline’s profit margins are very thin compared to other airlines both 
regionally and globally. However, there are numerous opportunities for airlines that pride 
themselves on quality and investment in people and aircraft as their only assets to make an 
impact in the global arena. Thus, Air Namibia cannot be expected to become a prominent player 
because of the inward-looking approach of the Ministry responsible for transport and that of the 
Ministry responsible for SOEs to shield Air Namibia from competing fairly. This approach has 
distorted the market forces of supply and demand and made it very unattractive for other private 
investors to enter the market (Respondent 6). A recent example is the Fly Africa venture. As a 
result, South African carriers carry more passengers on routes and they compete head on with 
Air Namibia as the only player serving all routes against South Africa’s designated air carriers. 
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This denies users the choice of better and improved offerings, limits the possibility of increased 
connectivity and forces consumers to pay high prices. 
Furthermore, the small amount of revenue made by Air Namibia is not well managed, and their 
financial management is generally rated as poor. The overvalued executive conditions of 
employment without clear performance expectations have cost the airline over the years. 
Moreover, this has been eroded by the imbalance between assets with regard to the skill sets 
of competently qualified individuals, not to mention the absence of a performance culture that 
is even-handed and based on meritocracy. These problems boil down to the consumer service 
which is classified as average or fair. The appointing authority’s choice of board members 
should reflect their expectation to see financial improvement. 
This financial expectation cannot be realised when board members have no proven track 
records. This situation also means that the shareholder ends up with self-inflicted wounds. 
Boards must be appointed because they have something to offer and they must know what to 
expect from executives and how to monitor market excellence. This is rarely the case with all 
board appointments in the transport sector and the Department of Transport is viewed by many 
(as reflected in the interviews) as poorly staffed with an unequal distribution of the skill sets and 
competencies to advise the minister to play an effective economic and safety oversight role. 
 
5.2.2 Namibia Airports Company 
5.2.2.1 Rate of return on assets 
NAC’s three year (2013/4-2015/16) ROA average of 2.75 is indicative of the level of the SOE’s 
performance in terms of net income generated relative to its assets - primarily landing fees 
(charges), which are the main income for the NAC. While the trajectory of the ROA has been 
mixed, the increase from 2.38 in 2013/14 to 6.05 in 2015/16 (Figure 5.4), looks promising if 
such a positive upward trend is sustained.  
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Figure 5. 5: Return on Assets Ratio for NAC, 2013/14-2015/16 
 
Source: Own calculations from NAC’s Financial Statements (2013/14 & 2015/16) 
 
In support of the above finding (ROA), Respondent 16 indicated that NAC was looking at ways 
for further optimally utilising its assets, especially its commercial assets. The Respondent 
indicated that NAC can generate additional revenues through commercial facilities such as car 
rentals, parking, restaurants, duty free and lease of hangar/workshop. 
 
5.2.2.2 Return on equity 
The return on equity ratio (ROE) ratio reveals a similar trajectory as the ROA. In 2013/14 and 
2015/16, NAC’s ROE was 3.08 and 0.51 respectively. This finding demonstrates NAC’s level 
of performance in terms of profit generation in relation to shareholder investments since ROE 
ratio shows how much profit each dollar of the common stockholders’ equity generates.  
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Figure 5. 6: Return on Equity for NAC, 2012/13-2015/16 
 
Source: Own calculations from NAC’s Financial Statements (2012/13 & 2015/16) 
 
The above finding was corroborated with the views of industry stakeholders derived from 
interviewing key informants. According to Respondent 15, the government had supported NAC 
financially and otherwise. The Respondent however complained that its sister company has 
been reluctant to pay for services rendered. According to the Respondent, the outstanding 
millions if paid to them would change the financial situation of the company.  
 
5.2.2.3 Operating profit margin 
As Figure 5.3 below shows, NAC had an average negative operating margin in 2013/14 and 
2015/16. A positive performance was only recorded in 2013 which was approximately 6.33%. 
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 Figure 5. 7: Operating Profit Margin, NAC (2012/3-15/16) 
 
Source: Own calculations from NAC’s Financial Statements (2012/13 & 2015/16) 
 
NAC’s relatively weak profitability has meant that it cannot maintain most of its airports.  The 
Government has had to step in to finance some airports. The company also relies on annual 
government transfers. For example, NAC will continue to receive state funding for its 
operations. In the Budget Statement for 2016/2017, the Minister of Finance announced that the 
SOE would receive another N$242,954,570 over the next three years. The SOE would be 
allocated N$74,708,700 for the 2016/17 financial year, N$80,406,620 for the 2018/19 financial 
year, and N$87,839,250 for the 2019/20 financial year (as reflected in Figure 5.12 below). 
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Figure 5.8: NAC Estimate Transfers from Government 2017-2020 
 
Source: Republic of Namibia (Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 2017/18-2019/2020) 
 
5.2.2.4 General observation NAC 
Most of the concerns raised about the performance of Air Namibia can easily be generalised to 
the NAC as well, as the airline accounts for 60% market share of landing fees (charges), which 
are the main income for the NAC. Furthermore, Air Namibia depends on the work of NAC for 
its profitability. For example, unsafe airports may affect travellers’ decision to choose Namibia 
as a destination or as a transit point. The two companies are thus interdependent and the 
events affecting Air Namibia may be very similar to those affecting NAC. However, the latter 
has certain peculiarities. For example, NAC can generate additional revenues through 
commercial facilities (car rentals parking, restaurants, duty free etc. and the lease of 
hangar/workshop [where repairing of aircrafts take place], monthly lease of the fuel company 
(including the fuel throughput) at airports under its domain.  
According to the NAC Financial Report (2014/15), the organisation’s performance was marked 
by mixed financial performance. This Report indicates that revenue was not in line with 
expectations, reflecting a growth of only 7% to a record high of N$233 million compared to 
N$217 million in the previous year (NAC Annual Report 2014/15). According to NAC, 
aeronautical revue accounted for 67% of total revenue with the balance of the revenue coming 
from non-core business activities such as rent, parking and advertising. All in all, NAC’s total 
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asset base increased from N$2,183,058,054 to N$2,742,074,131, which is a 26% increase 
(NAC Annual Report 2014/15). 
Poor meritocracy also affects NAC. Politically motivated decisions (through negotiated Bilateral 
Air Services Agreements) regarding who should be allowed to compete with Air Namibia have 
also impacted the performance of NAC. The same point applies with regards to which routes 
Air Namibia should fly. The result is that a culture of expectation of subsidies has been created. 
It is noted (and supported by respondents 4 and 7), that for the sake of profitability, decisions 
must be based on returns and taken by executives even if SOEs are subsidised. 
This equally applies to NAC which has to support airports that are not economically viable. The 
cost structure (business model) has not changed. For example, Hosea Kutako International 
Airport’s gross subsidies exceed that of all other NAC-managed airports because of the 
Cabinet’s decision to restrict aircraft with a weight higher than 5,700 kg, which has equally 
constrained NAC from optimally employing Eros Airport as a potentially viable profit centre. This 
decision displaces decisions about quality and the ability to make choices on different offerings 
that generally in a functional free market must be left with the board and not with the 
Government. 
While NAC is charged with ensuring the safety of travellers, concerns were raised about a lack 
of a safety culture within NAC, as observed by Respondent 3. This is because the attitude at 
board and Executive level is that of being politically correct and not understanding the business 
environment within which these entities (SOEs) must compete and operate. Contracts are 
carelessly and improperly negotiated, poorly administrated and poorly managed. The high staff 
turnover of executives has compromised continuity and stifled progress because every new 
appointment paved the way for new executives, with each wanting to do things their own way 
(Respondent 3). 
 
5.2.2.5 Challenges and how to address them 
The challenge of maintaining airports comes with increased expenditure, lack of human 
resources and related technical issues. The officials at NAC (respondent 15 and 16) believe 
that the commercialisation of NAC, as well as the Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication Project 2000 (commonly referred to as MWTC 2000) created entities focused 
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more on the end product and not necessary on the culture and attitude necessary to succeed. 
This means that very little groundwork went into the psychological preparation of the individuals 
who were transformed almost overnight into highly paid employees and executives with regards 
to the sacrifices necessary to make their SOE financially sustainable and to deliver on their 
mandate. 
A lack of service excellence at NAC compromises economic performances, especially when 
the wrong people are appointed based on considerations other than merit to fill significant 
positions. Standards in civil aviation are not optional but a lack of a business approach and a 
maintenance culture makes it almost impossible to strictly enforce compliance. This should not 
be the case in an industry that understands that safety compliance is a prerequisite for profit 
and rent seeking. 
According to Respondent 7, in light of the foregoing, the officials feel that there is a need to 
attract a critical mass of qualified, experienced and competent professionals, and structures 
that are more responsive to the market forces of a fast-changing business environment. The 
appointment of board members and executives must also be based on merit. This should be a 
rigorous and special process.  
NAC officials also see the need to empower the board and executives to take business 
decisions based on demand and supply. The Government’s objective, however, remains solely 
that of creating an enabling environment. The European Union’s approach to subsidies, which 
are encouraged but must adhere to the Market Economic Investor Principle, should be 
considered. This appears to have created an enabling environment for the public and private 
sectors to co-exist without denying the public the right to choose from different economic 
alternatives to satisfy their multiple demands and needs.  
There are also challenges of political side-lining of the executive of NAC. It was reported that 
the decision by the NAC board to award a N$150 million contract to an Egyptian businessman 
was done without consulting management, as required by the rules. There was a court order 
that the tender should be reconsidered by the NAC, but it seems this was not followed. Hence, 
it is clear that the politicians, for whatever reason, decided to side-line the executive of NAC 
(Immanuel & Kahiurika, 2016:3). If indeed the media report is correct, then there are serious 
problems between senior government officials and executives of SOEs in general, as this is 
possibly not an isolated case. This also relates to the issue of corruption.  
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Although there are corruption allegations against the current (2016) board of NAC, it seems 
that this board enjoys the support of the Minister of Works and Transport. The said minister is 
satisfied with NAC’s performance, yet the minister responsible for SOEs is dissatisfied and 
wants the board dissolved (Windhoek Observer, 2016). This contradiction or standoff affects 
the performance of the SOE.  
 
5.2.3 Namibian Ports Authority 
5.2.3.1 Rate of return on assets 
In terms of capitalisation, the Namibian Ports Authority’s (Namport) asset base is valued at 
N$5.6 billion (2015), or N$5.6 million per employee. An analysis of Namport’s Annual Report 
(2015) shows that the SOE’s rate of return on assets declined from 8% to 4% between 2011/12 
and 2013/2014 respectively, before edging up to 5% in 2014/15 (see Figure 5.4 below). The 
decline in ROA in and of itself is not necessarily bad given that the SOE increased its asset 
base over the period. 
As a profitability ratio that measures the rate of return on resources owned by the organisation, 
Namport’s ROA demonstrates the level of performance of the SOE in terms of net income 
generated by its assets. A five year 7% average return on assets means that Namport was able 
to utilise its resources well in generating income. This observation is supported by the results 
of interviews conducted with Respondents 1, 2, 6, 9 and 11. They indicated that the 
organisation’s performance was very impressive. In fact, it’s the only SOE in the transport sector 
that had managed to declare dividends to its shareholders, the government.  
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Figure 5. 9: Return on Assets for Namport (2010/11-2014/15) 
 
Source: Own compilation from Namport Group Annual Report (2014/15) 
 
5.2.3.2 Return on equity 
The return on equity (ROE) ratio reveals a similar trajectory as the ROA. As expected, Namport 
achieved an average ROE of approximately 12% between 2010/11 and 2014/15 (Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5. 10: Return on Equity for Namport (2010/11-2014/15) 
  
Source: Own compilation from Namport Group Annual Report (2014/15) 
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The ROE shows the level of profit that each dollar invested in the SOE generated. The general 
healthy performance in terms of Namport profitability is further corroborated by the level of 
operating margin ratio, also known as operating profit margin.  
 
5.2.2.3 Operating margin profit 
As seen in Figure 5.6 below, Namport maintained an operating profit margin of approximately 
23% during the period 2010/11-2014/15. Naturally, investors want to see a high return on equity 
ratio because this indicates that the SOE is using its investors’ funds effectively. They would 
equally be in favour of a high OPM result as this shows that the company is making enough 
money from its ongoing operations to pay for its variable costs as well as its fixed costs. This 
could explain why Namport continues to receive funding for investment from its main 
shareholder – the State. For example, in the Budget Statement for 2016/2017, the Minister of 
Finance announced an allocation of approximately N$1.1 billion to the profitable SOE in the 
next three financial years to expand some of its critical infrastructure. 
 
Figure 5. 11: Operating Margin Profit for Namport (2010/11-2014/15) 
 
Source: Namport Group Annual Report (2015) 
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5.2.3.4 General observation on NamPort 
As already noted above, the performance of NamPort has been fairly good. It has not had 
record losses like the other SOEs in the transport sector. Namport has been one of the top-
performing SOEs for many years in terms of profitability and infrastructure development. It has 
a healthy balance sheet and a good local and international credit rating. The reasons for 
Namport’s good performance are, amongst others, sound management systems and structures 
with a strong performance-focused culture (Respondent 11). 
According to Namport’s Annual Report (2014/15), the organisation’s total assets exceeded N$5 
billion, with a turnover of N$917 million. This makes Namport the best-performing organisation 
in the transport sector. The organisation’s national long-term Fitch rating has also gone up from 
AA- to A+ (Namport Annual Report, 2014/15:21). The organisation also achieved the syncrolift 
and handled 290 vessels during the reporting period compared with 273 vessels in 2014. 
Namport has seen a surge of consignments to be transported to and from the port over the 
years. Thus, it has consistently performed well in terms of volume growth and cargo-handling 
efficiency, which has put it in favourable positions on the global indexes related to ports 
infrastructure and shipping liner connectivity. Furthermore, Namport boasts an efficient auditing 
system which has enabled them to manage their resources very well. However, for the 2015/16 
financial year, Namport had to use their reserves as some of the funds promised by the 
government, which is the SOE’s major stakeholder, was not transferred to the port operator, 
hence they faced some difficulties. 
Regarding financial performance, Namport will also receive state funding. In the Budget 
Statement for 2016/2017, the Minister of Finance announced that the SOEs would get another 
N$1,142,972,000 in the next three years. The SOEs would be allocated N$38,177,000 for the 
2016/17 financial year, N$40,119,000 for 2018/19 financial year, and N$36,676,000 for the 
2019/20 financial year (as reflected in Figure 5.12 below). 
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Figure 5.12: Namport Estimated Transfers from Government - 2017-2020 
 
Source: Republic of Namibia (Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 2017/18-2019/2020) 
 
According to Respondent 6, the above transfers should be seen in light of the infrastructure 
developments that the SOE is undertaking and not as bail outs. Namport has been able to 
identify and invest in critical infrastructure projects with the view to achieving the national 
developmental objective of positioning Namibia as a regional logistics hub, and the port of 
Walvis Bay as the gateway to Southern Africa. Namport has embarked on the following strategic 
maritime infrastructure projects: 
1. Port of Walvis Bay new container terminal;  
2. Port of Walvis Bay SADC gateway;  
3. Walvis Bay waterfront and marina development;  
4. Deepwater port area at Angra Point; and 
5. Port of Angra Fria. 
The above scenario (transfers) can suggest that government transfers are not for bail outs but 
also to reward performing entities to further their mandates. 
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5.2.3.5 Challenges and how to address them 
Respondent 12 reported that there are certainly challenges regarding management staff in 
Namport, but that the board and shareholders know of the reporting channels and their 
respective roles. Furthermore, there is a lack of enough resources to run certain projects, thus 
the government is urged to avail the necessary funding for certain projects that are beyond the 
SOE’s resources but are necessary for the development of the country. 
Similarly, there appears to be a lack of coordination of projects and their implementation since 
Namport is not the only SOE dealing with cargo movement from the ports – all transport SOEs 
are involved in one way or another. There is, thus, a need for joint planning amongst these 
transport sector SOEs. This will ensure that all of them may know what is happening in other 
organisations and coordinate projects or share ideas on implementation as these SOEs are 
interdependent. 
The ports operator, however, complains about the lack of resources to run the rail system more 
efficiently (Respondent 11). There is also a problem of staffing. It appears that there is not 
enough experienced technical human resource capital to run the company more efficiently while 
at the same time labour expenses are increasing. Thus, Namport needs to keep an eye on its 
labour costs which have grown to more than half of its operating expenditure. 
In a similar vein, it appears that the mandate of Namport is too wide. The officials at Namport 
submit that if Namport is to deliver on its mandate successfully, there is a need to separate the 
authority from operations. This could be done by creating a port-operating company that 
focuses on managing the business part of the equation. Oversight, policy and infrastructure 
planning and related issues would then reside with the authority. 
Another challenge is the overreliance on road transport infrastructure to transport local and 
transit cargo. This does not only place a burden on the roads, but also presents a business and 
economic risk to positioning and sustaining Namibia as a regional logistics hub as there are no 
reliable alternatives to road transport. This, as is shown in the concerns of TransNamib 
discussed below, affects the volume of goods transported by TransNamib and thus the SOE’s 
low profit levels. As a result, there is a need to ensure that port infrastructure development and 
marketing take place in tandem with rail and road development in order to balance the use of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
112 
 
the transport modes, promote intermodals and create effective rail and road transport 
connections with Namibia’s neighbouring countries. 
Another more complex challenge faced by Namport is climate change. A study commissioned 
by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism on climate change suggests that by 2030, Walvis 
Bay will be the most-affected coastal town, especially the areas at the seashore interface 
including port infrastructure. The study suggests that the sea will encroach and severely affect 
current port facilities and seawater will flow over quay walls, making it impossible for ships to 
come alongside them. Greater focus and specific studies are required in order to implement 
adaption measures to address this serious phenomenon. 
 
5.2.4 Roads Authority 
5.2.4.1 Return on assets 
The computed return on assets ratio for the Roads Authority covering the period 2012-2014 is 
shown in Figure 5.7 below. The ROA ratio increased from 1.3% in 2012 to 4.45% in 2013, 
before dropping to a paltry 0.1% in 2014. The financial performance of the RA has to be seen 
within the context of the SOE’s functional responsibility, which is to manage the national road 
network. In that regard, as an indicator of how profitable RA is relative to its total assets, the 
ROA ratio for 2014 shows that the SOE was able to earn more income relative to investment in 
2013, and therefore performed better relative to 2012 and in 2014. In the latter, RA earned one-
tenth of a percent in profit on the resources that it owned.  
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Figure 5. 13: Return on Assets for the Roads Authority (2012-2014) 
 
Source: Compiled from Roads Authority Annual Report (2015) 
 
5.2.4.2: Return on equity 
Figure 5. 14: Return on Equity for the Roads Authority (2014-2014) 
 
Source: Compiled from Roads Authority Annual Report (2015) 
 
Whereas the underlying logic of the ROE is to gauge the profit-generating efficiency of an 
organisation, and therefore it’s competitive advantage, the spike in 2013 up from a low of 44.2% 
is all the more confounding given that the ratio plummeted in the following year to 5.5% (Figure 
5.8).  
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5.2.4.3 Operating profit margin 
According to available data analysed in this study, less than 1½ percent of RA’s revenue (0.43% 
in 2012, 1.33% in 2013, and 0.13% in 2014) is left over, after deducting direct costs and 
overhead, and other indirect costs such as interest (see Figure 5.9 below). More than 
measuring the pricing strategy, these numbers show the level of RA’s operating efficiency. 
Intuitively, a high or increasing OPM is preferred because if the operating margin is increasing, 
the company is earning more per dollar of output. In the case of RA, the data points are too few 
to draw a trend line.  
 
Figure 5. 15: Operating Profit Margin for the Roads Authority (2012-2014) 
 
Source: Compiled from Roads Authority Annual Report (2015) 
 
5.2.4.4 General observation on RA 
In discussing the performance of RA, one needs to have regard to the reasons it was 
established. The Roads Authority (RA) was created by the Roads Authority Act (No. 17 of 
1999). This Act gives RA the mandate to manage the national road network of Namibia in terms 
of sections 16 to 18 of the said Act, with a view to achieving a safe and efficient road sector. 
Currently, the proclaimed road network falling under the RA comprises about 45,000 km (all the 
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proclaimed roads excluding the farm roads category), ownership of which continues to be 
vested in the government of Namibia. 
The Roads Authority has played a pivotal role in road safety in Namibia. Although there has 
been a large increase in road traffic accidents, Namibia’s road network has been ranked among 
the safest, most efficient and sustainable, and it is the envy of many countries (Respondent 
14). This shows that, in general, the SOE is managing to execute its mandate. According to the 
Roads Authority Annual Report (2015/16), the organisation achieved an overall performance of 
76.6% (i.e. a strategic score of 3.83 out of 5). It extended the road network with 141 km of 
gravel roads (compared to the target of 90 km), while 230 km of road were upgraded to bitumen 
standards as opposed to the 100-kilometre target (Roads Authority Annual Report, 2015/6:10). 
However, the  
RA admits in the same annual report that there is a lack of adequate funding and slow progress 
in the efficient utilisation of small and medium enterprise (SME) contractors. 
Apart from government subvention, the RA’s main income source is from revenue collections 
through cross-border, domestic (e.g. permits and application) and abnormal loads. The annual 
report reflects a decline of those key revenues from N$19.24 million in 2013/14 to about 
N$14.21 million in 2015/16, which might suggest inefficiency in revenue collections. 
It should be noted that through partnerships with construction companies locally, from across 
the region and globally, the RA has managed to handle multimillion-dollar construction 
contracts. According to Respondent 13, one of the biggest projects started in 2016 is the TR1/6 
from Windhoek to Okahandja, section 4A, which is being upgraded to a dual carriageway 
freeway standard. The road from Windhoek to Okahandja is about 80 km long and it is said that 
it will create more than 250 local jobs: 
It is an objective of this project to provide the opportunity for technology transfer and 
capacity building for Namibian small-scale contractors; as well as to employ as many 
labourers as possible from the local communities. It is explicit in the contractual 
requirements, that 15 percent of the total value of the work is subcontracted to Namibian 
small and medium enterprises. 
(Shikongo, 2014) 
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Another project is the envisaged phase 1 of the road from Windhoek to the Hosea Kutako 
International Airport. The third big project is the first phase of the MR44 from Swakopmund to 
Henties Bay, which is to be upgraded to a bitumen-standard road. Several other projects are 
being handled across the country. 
In keeping up with global technological advancements, the RA introduced a Road Referencing 
System (RRS). The RRS is a computerised location-referencing system for the road network 
of Namibia. It is already fully operational and has proven itself in the management of the 
approximately 48,000-kilometre national road network. It is also operated as a subsystem of 
the RA’s Integrated Road Management System (IRMS) in 2016. This is a unique initiative that 
took Namibia to the forefront of a road asset management system’s development and 
implementation. 
Financially, the officials working at the RA are satisfied with the way funds are being handled. 
However, one concern is that some projects are delayed because the Ministry of Works and 
Transport does not disburse the necessary funds in time (Respondent 14). Furthermore, the 
RA’s financial obligations seem to be well met. For example, the RA is required to prepare a 
five-year budget in consultation with various stakeholders, based on justifiable and 
economically optimal operational levels in constructing, rehabilitating and maintaining the road 
network. All of this is done together with the rendering of other transport-related activities. 
It should be noted that the RA’s budget is submitted to the Road Fund Administration (RFA), 
the third entity, formed during the restructuring process during the late 1990s (GRN, 2000). 
After further rationalisation of the optimal budget, especially with due regard to the implications 
on the charging instruments, the RFA accepts and finances the budget with funds collected 
through the various road user levies, charges and fees. This process of accepting and financing 
the budget has been successfully implemented. The only problem is the bureaucratic speed 
which is generally slow. 
It also appears that the RA has managed to submit the Performance Statement of the Authority 
to the minister and this has enabled successive ministers to assess the performance of the RA. 
Furthermore, from the annual reports it is discernible that the RA maintains updated statistical 
and operational information on the performance of its service providers. There has been a 
general efficiency gain, especially in road maintenance operations (Respondent 10). 
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5.2.4.5 Challenges and how to overcome them 
Just like any other country in the developing world, and a young country for that matter, there 
are always problems of old inherited infrastructure. Old roads will always present a problem in 
the sense of calls for maintenance, including resurfacing of old bitumen roads which is an 
expensive process. There are also new roads to be opened, as new access should be created 
to reach the remote areas. In relation to this, Runji (2003:12) says: 
There are other immediate challenges that RA faces which include the success in hiring 
competent personnel especially in the technical fields, the full establishment of customised 
operational policies and guidelines, and the entrenchment of corporate culture in the 
workforce. The issue of the proper role of politics and hence corporate governance could 
also present a special challenge. 
 
The official at the RA also aired the same sentiments (Respondent 9). However, as Runji 
(2003:12) submits, the RA will continuously be required to demonstrate in measurable terms, 
to its client, i.e. the road user, that the reform process has real and achievable benefits to the 
economy. Runji (2003:12) notes that in terms of the expectations of the reform process, “[s]uch 
expectations will have a strong influence on the way the Authority performs its business, 
including the continuous effort to justify its policies regarding the management of the road 
network”.  
In the medium to long term, as the effects of globalisation set in, the RA may be expected to 
rationalise the network’s level of service in an effort to meet more internationally driven 
standards and needs. Structural adjustment within the local economy, in response to a more 
competitive international market, could place special demands on road transportation 
infrastructure. This is a challenge that the RA still experiences hence the dualisation of roads 
and the implementation of the Road Referencing System (RRS) as a measure to keep up with 
the globalised world. It is expected that the RA will continue on this trend. 
There are also concerns of political interference which affects the operations of the RA. First of 
all, the top management is overstaffed, thus it is encouraged that it be trimmed and some 
members be deployed elsewhere where they will be more useful. Secondly, politically motivated 
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appointments should be avoided as they may compromise independence of thought and 
performance in general. 
Not least is also recognition that the poor performance in rail transport has unfortunately also 
paved the way for road transport operators to transport significant volumes of rail-friendly cargo 
on the already strained road network, at a higher cost to importers, exporters, consumers and 
taxpayers. There is therefore a need for a movement towards a more balanced transport 
industry structure. In this sense, the better TransNamib performs, the better this is for the RA 
and other Road transport SOEs. 
 
5.2.5 TransNamib 
5.2.5.1 Rate of return on assets 
TransNamib’s four year (2012-2015) ROA average of -4.25 is indicative of the level of the SOE’s 
performance in terms of net income generated relative to its assets. While the trajectory of the 
ROA has been negative, positive results were recorded in 2015, which is a promising sign if 
the positive upward trend is sustained.  
.  
Figure 5. 16: Return on Assets Ratio for TransNamib, 2012-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations from TransNamib’s Financial Statements (2013 - 2015) 
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Commenting on the above finding (ROA), Respondent 9 indicated that the organisation would 
do better if it outsources the management of some of its assets and only focusses on the 
locomotives. The Respondent also indicated that because of the age of most of its locomotives, 
their objectives of optimally utilising their assets are limited.  
 
5.2.5.2 Return on equity 
Between the 2012/13 to 2014/15 period, the return on equity ratio (ROE) of TransNamib was, 
on average negative. This means that the organisation was unable to generate profits from its 
shareholders’ investments. In fact, the shareholder which is the government had to step in to 
rescue the organisation. 
 
Figure 5. 17: Return on Equity for TransNamib, 2012-2015 
 
Source: Own calculations from TransNamib’s Financial Statements (2012 - 2015) 
 
The above finding was corroborated with the views of industry stakeholders derived from 
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for TransNamib’s operation but also the salaries of its employees. The Respondent further 
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organisation to generate its own revenues), were diverted to salaries and bonuses.  
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5.2.5.3 Operating profit margin 
As Figure 5.3 below shows, TransNamib had a negative operating margin from 2012/13 to 
2014/15, and only recorded a positive margin in 2014/15. Again, because of its relatively weak 
profitability, the Government of the Republic of Namibia has had to step in to financially rescue 
the SOE on severally occasions. 
 
Figure 5. 18: Operating Profit Margin for TransNamib (2012-15) 
 
Source: Own calculations from TransNamib’s Financial Statements (2011 -2015) 
 
As the Figure above shows, TransNamib had an average negative operating margin from 2012 
and 2015. A positive performance was only recorded in 2014/15 which was approximately 
40.03%. This according to Respondent 10 is the sign that the organisation is able to sustain 
itself if recapitalised. The Respondent indicated that because the government managed to 
assist it in funding the lease of the locomotives from TransNamib to the neighbouring South 
Africa, the organisation was able to move more volumes on rail.   
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5.2.5.4 General observation on TransNamib  
As indicated in the previous chapters, TransNamib operates all rail systems in the country. It is 
clear that it holds a monopoly as there is no private operator in this industry. Yet, it has not been 
performing too well. One visible example is the dramatic decrease in the volume of cargo 
transported by rail as reflected in the Figure below. Unlike in the past, goods like fuel and 
cement are now being transported by road. Therefore, TransNamib now only has a market 
share of about 20% of total freight volume. 
From the figure above, it’s clear that the SOE has subsequently been plagued by poor financial 
performance over many years. According to Respondent 9, the organisation is technically 
insolvent because of many years of incompetent appointments, government interference in its 
governance and management appointments, and dilapidated infrastructure, amongst other 
issues.  
 
Figure 5.19: Railway Volumes 
 
 Source: TransNamib (2016) 
 
With regards to financial performance, TransNamib will, as expected, continue to be a burden 
to the state. In the Budget Statement for 2016/2017, the Minister of Finance announced that 
TransNamib would get another N$650,345,000 million in the next three years. Namibia’s SOEs 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
M
il
li
o
n
s
T
O
N
S
Years
RAIL VOLUMES (Tonnes)
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
122 
 
will be allocated N$220,245,000 million for the 2017/18 financial year, N$212, 892,000 million 
for the 2018/19 financial year and N$217,208,000 million for the 2019/20 financial year (as 
reflected in Figure 5.15 below). 
 
Figure 5.20: Government Estimated Transfer to TransNamib 2017-2020 
 
Source: Republic of Namibia (Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 2017/18-2019/2020 
 
According to TransNamib’s Financial Report (2013), the organisation revenue (own revenue 
generated from its operations) decreased by 6.7% from N$565 million to N$527 million, while 
operating costs increased by 10% from N$474 million to N$522 million, which caused the net 
loss to increase from N$67 million to N$183 million. The company admits that with this trend, 
its share of the transport market will in all likeliness continue to decline unless dramatic 
interventions take place (TransNamib Financial Report, 2013:10). 
The position of TransNamib is informed partly by historical factors. The movement of goods by 
rail has not been impressive. This is due to less investment in the railway network over the last 
40 years. If one compares investment in road transport to that of rail transport, road transport 
receives much more funding (Respondent 10). Officials at TransNamib blame this largely on 
political interference as they say that they cannot be efficient if the Ministry and politicians keep 
interfering in what needs to be done in the company. This becomes ironic, as the rail operator 
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depends on the central government, which is the primary shareholder to pay for salaries and 
avoid overcommitting its balance sheet to finance infrastructure. 
TransNamib does not also have business performance indicators such as cost per kilometre 
for the conveyance of goods (Respondent 9). This makes it difficult to monitor and evaluate its 
own performance. As a result, the rail operator has registered losses hence admitting that they 
have been performing poorly as per the generally observable indicators. 
 
5.2.5.5 Challenges and how to address them 
TransNamib is facing a variety of challenges as the above-mentioned shortcomings show. As 
a result, the company considers it important for the government to give mandates to SOEs with 
capital to implement projects and fulfil those mandates. Furthermore, the government and 
TransNamib should consider separating the tourism business and the bulk movement of goods. 
This will allow the government to pay for non-profitable activities that they want to promote. 
There is a challenge with reporting to the ministry responsible for transport and at the same 
time reporting to the ministry responsible for SOEs. This issue creates unnecessary 
bureaucracy and potential conflicts as there may be different opinions on things that have to be 
done. It is even more difficult for staff members as they need to report to the board and to two 
ministries. TransNamib notes that this situation should be addressed. 
According to TransNamib, the government should allow SOEs to operate as a business at a 
profitable level. It appears that there is no motivation for officials to see to it that their company 
makes profit from its operations. One of the reasons for this is a lack of clear mandates for 
SOEs and, more importantly, because there is a need to recapitalise them and then demand 
results. It appears this is seldom done, which is why monitoring and evaluation is a non-existent 
practice at TransNamib. As a result, there is a need for the development of clear performance 
indicators to track performance on a quarterly basis and rectify problems before it is too late. In 
the process, there is also a need to avoid political interference. 
Furthermore, TransNamib follows the traditional incremental budgeting system for its 
operations. Budgetary control is exercised through the financial review, which is an 
appropriation account reporting deviations between the budget and the actual expenditure. In 
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the absence of key performance indicators, a meaningful input-output budget model cannot be 
implemented. Furthermore, the management accounting system is obsolete when no 
mechanism exists to differentiate between fixed and variable costs of an operation or activity. 
Resultantly, the cost of important business activities such as train operations cannot be 
determined. These practices have serious financial implications. 
 
5.3 Evaluation 
5.3.1 General observations 
The bulk of SOEs are not performing satisfactorily in many areas, especially in regard to 
profitability and wealth generation (a sustainable business model) for the investor 
(government). The financial performance of SOEs since 2001 has been mostly disappointing, 
with the government expenditure and lending to SOEs growing in leaps and bounds. The major 
causes of these losses have been identified as bad financial management practices, a deficient 
management information system, non-adherence to key performance indicators and 
incompetent management policies. 
The non-performance or unsatisfactory performance of three out of five SOEs covered in this 
study is historical. In fact, it is one of the reasons why the government decided to create a 
ministry that specifically looks into the issues of SOEs in Namibia. The idea, according to 
Kahiurika (2003), was envisaged more than a decade ago. It is reported that the financial 
performance of SOEs since 1993 has been disappointing in most instances, with government 
expenditure on, and lending to, SOEs increasing significantly (OECD, 2001:25; Gaes, 2009). 
Furthermore, government expenditure and lending showed a significant shift away from capital 
transfers to SOEs towards increased lending and spending on salaries and wages. Many SOEs 
experience high levels of debt as well as declining levels of capital productivity growth, 
development and poverty eradication (Gaes, 2009:10). 
Namibian SOEs have proved to contribute very little to the national output. Comparatively, it 
has been established that in 1997 it was estimated that SOEs contributed 2.3% towards 
national output and 2% towards total employment – relatively low percentages compared to 
their contribution in African countries such as South Africa (14.9%), Zimbabwe (11.3%) and 
Malawi (4.3%) (OECD, 2001:25). The Namibian situation compares with situations in first-world 
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economies such as the United Kingdom (3.4%), stronger South American economies such as 
Argentina (1.3%) and developing Southeast Asia countries such as the Philippines (2.2%). 
However, given their significant role in the national physical and logistical infrastructure, SOE 
operations fulfil a strategic function in the national economy in terms of economic development 
(Gaes, 2009:10). 
Furthermore, SOEs in the transport sector, with the exception of Namport, are not getting good 
publicity due to bad performance, malpractices and bad corporate governance in general. They 
are deeply implicated in most fiscal problems because of their inefficiency, political interference, 
losses, budgetary burdens and provision of poor products and services including bad 
prioritisation. This is not unique to Namibia. Just as in other countries in Africa, they achieve 
non-commercial objectives occasionally, which are used to justify their poor economic 
performance (Nellis, 1991). 
Depending on what they were created for, i.e. if they were created to increase shareholder 
value, most of them have failed and continue to do so. Most have instead turned the 
shareholder into a lax majority shareholder, i.e. unable to demand dividends due to the poor 
financial performance. None of the SOEs (e.g. Air Namibia, TransNamib, the RCC and NAC) 
have to date declared any dividends, but they keep requiring additional funding from the state. 
State aid should be targeted and controlled to avoid stifling competition and discouraging 
private sector participation. This means that the terms and conditions of state aid to SOEs must 
always be discreet and likened to what would be considered acceptable if it were a private 
investor operating under normal market conditions. Subsidies are nowadays given to SOEs 
that should be able to fund their own operational expenses, least to mention being unable to 
pay their own salaries, yet overvaluing executives that are unable to turn the tide. 
 
5.4 Revisiting the Theories of SOE Performance 
Empirical studies and theories have been fundamental in trying to explain the performance of 
SOEs. This study examined the fundamental drivers of SOEs’ performance in Namibia by 
testing various theories such as the agency theory, public choice theory, stewardship theory, 
the stakeholder theory and the resource-based theory. A brief look will now be taken at each. 
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According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory has often been used to examine and 
explain governance relationships between the owners of the companies and those entrusted 
with the responsibilities of managing them. Robert (1998) explains the complexity of this 
relationship (agent and principal relations). Robert (1998) indicates that the problem that 
typically arises is when the agent fails to balance their own interests with those of the owners, 
which is why the board of directors is often expected to play an oversight role, keeping in mind 
the interest of the principal. The agency theory, therefore, according to Robert (1998), makes 
the argument that shareholder interests require protection by separating the roles of the board 
from those of management. 
Contrary to agency theory, in stewardship theory, Wicaksono (2009) argues that managers are 
good stewards of the firm, and they want to perform well and cooperate with all stakeholders 
towards the common goal of attaining the firm’s overall objectives. This view is supported by 
Yang et al. (2009), who find that in the modern world, the relationship between the board and 
the CEO is no longer one of a supervisor and supervisee but rather one of cooperative 
engagement. 
The stakeholder theory, in turn, is underpinned by the assumption that values are necessarily 
and explicitly part of doing business. This theory puts pressure on management to articulate 
the manner in which they want to conduct business. Under this theory, Freeman (1994) argues 
that organisational behaviour and performance are predicted and explained on the basis of the 
organisation’s stakeholders, their values, their relative influence on decisions and the 
organisational situation. 
The public choice theory makes the assumption that political leadership has some concern for 
the interest of others. Such concerns, according to Shaw (2008), are limited as their primary 
interests are their own. A key underpinning of public choice theory is the lack of incentives by 
voters to monitor the actions of the government and politicians in general. This lack of 
incentives, according to Anthony (1957), is often blamed on a rational ignorance on the part of 
the voters and, thus, weakens the incentive for good management in public interest. 
Finally, resource-based theory sees organisations as bundles of resources that, depending on 
how they are uniquely combined, produce different results. According to Hamel and Prahalad 
(1994), these combinations are critical as they make one firm perform better than others. 
Consistent with such a proposition, Grant (1991) holds the view that a firm’s resources are its 
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primary source of good performance. With the above background in mind and the findings 
presented, it is opportune to consider the drivers of performance related to the five SOEs under 
investigation. 
 
5.5 Drivers of SOEs’ Poor Performance – The Analysis 
5.5.1 General 
It is rather complex to generalise the causes for the poor performance of SOEs in this study. 
Some are enterprise-specific and some cut across problems of the government in general. 
Therefore, one cannot propound one theory to explain all causes or provide solutions for these 
based on one model. According to Bozec, Breton and Cote (2002), there is a quest in the 
academic literature as well as in policy endeavours to explain that SOE performance has not 
yielded much consensus, given the inability of certain theories to adequately explain SOE 
performance. Whilst empirical evidence exists on how well or poor SOEs have performed over 
the years, what remains largely unresolved, at least in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, is a 
comprehensive test of which factors drive good SOE performance. 
Whilst various countries have, in concert with the agency theory, embarked on performance 
contracts in an effort to improve SOE efficiency, these efforts have failed fundamentally 
because such attempts have underestimated the implications of other competing theories that 
explain organisational performance. According to Shirley (2008), Chile is a good example 
showing the contradictions among the competing organisational performance theories. In that 
country, whilst the exemplary efficiency of SOEs was brought about in compliance with the 
tenets of the agency theory, the provisions of the stewardship theory were rather undermined. 
Conversely, good performance was ensured through restrained political influence, with boards 
being held more accountable, a scenario supported under the public choice theory. However, 
socioeconomic dimensions coming with the existence of SOEs were ignored, thereby giving 
much less attention to the needs and interests of various stakeholders (Shirley, 2008:18).  
Mwaura (2007) suggests that SOEs’ poor performance can be blamed on the boards and 
attributes their inability to resolve the agent-principal problem to the existence of multiple 
agents, as discussed earlier. Mwaura (2007), however, warns against attempting to resolve the 
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agency problem purely by giving the boards autonomy because boards are appointed by the 
political leadership to facilitate political mileage through directives not necessarily in the best 
interest of the SOE’s performance (Mwaura, 2007). 
 
5.5.2 Off-the-mark policymaking, shareholding and regulation practices 
All five SOEs have boards and an executive management team or something in that line under 
the leadership of the CEO. The CEO and his/her team ensure that the SOE succeeds in 
achieving its strategic objectives. The board of directors is regulated by statutes that apply to 
each SOE. Generally, however, they are responsible for the preparation and fair representation 
of the company’s financial statements that must be prepared in accordance with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards. The work of the board of directors focuses on 
strategic issues, business orientation, financing and reporting thereof. 
However, not everything happens according to what it should be in terms of the applicable laws 
and international business practices. The data above shows many discrepancies. In general, 
the review of board practices reflected the following weaknesses: 
 
● A lack of consistently applied criteria and processes in the recruitment and appointment 
of boards of directors. 
● Board members are not sufficiently exposed to training and development programmes. 
● Fundamental policy contradictions are often left unresolved, leading to contradictions, 
overlaps in mandate and lack of coordinated projects among transport SOEs. 
● Many boards do not maintain an appropriate balance in terms of, for example, executive 
vs. non-executive directors, public vs. private sector representatives, and the distribution 
of skills. 
● Policymakers often misunderstand the role for, and strategies to achieve, market-based 
competition to deliver desired policy outcomes out of the businesses of SOEs. 
● Regulatory accountability is limited, hence laxity in operations and patronise 
accompanied unaccounted heavy benefits, which become a burden to the SOEs. 
● Regulatory independence and capacity is compromised by the nature of appointments. 
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● Risks of conflicts of interest exist where individuals are serving on the boards of both 
holding and subsidiary boards in the same group of companies. 
● Senior government officials often undermine the separation of powers established for the 
effective functioning of policy formulation, SOE operations and corporate governance. 
● Some individuals such as ex officio state representatives having to serve on multiple SOE 
boards are subject to onerous responsibilities. 
● Some SOEs such as TransNamib are often under-resourced, lack internal checks, 
overspend and ask for more, revealing a lack of enough financial accountability. 
● The finalisation of policy and regulatory frameworks for SOEs has often been subject to 
inordinate delays. 
● The mandates and objectives given to SOEs are often too broad and lack monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms, let alone internal checks. 
 
The above-mentioned are just a summation of some of the shortcomings affecting the 
performance of SOEs. The boards play a significant role in shaping the corporate governance 
structure and culture within the SOEs. Their failure or disturbance affects the whole SOE. This 
explains why research has proven that corporate performance management in the Namibian 
SOE context is suffering through among other factors, a lack of effective performance 
management interaction between the government as the owner, and SOEs, largely due to a 
lack of capacity and information at the owner level to effectively take part in this process.  
 
The general practices listed above are not unique to Namibia. In South Africa, which is very 
much similar to Namibia in its framework, Van Basten (2007) produced a concept research 
paper entitled ‘Economic Regulation of SA’s public utilities’. One of its key findings relates to 
the respective roles of policymaking, shareholding and regulation performed by the state: 
Government has not found a definite solution to its multiple roles as shareholder and 
policymaker, or reconciled this with the state’s decisions to allocate economic regulatory 
functions to an independent regulator. Current role confusion potentially limits the 
effectiveness of this governance system. A Regulator needs to have a clear and 
unambiguous mandate in order to fulfil it effectively. The regulator also needs to be provided 
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with the tools to fulfil its mandate. This can entail as per sector analysis of the multiple roles 
of different entities and recommendations on how the roles can be ring fenced practically. 
(Van Basten, 2007:40) 
 
The report also highlights the “[g]overnment’s seemingly indecisiveness on certain policy 
issues” which tends to hamper performance in key SOEs. The issue of an independent 
regulator came up during the discussions with Respondent 2. According Respondent 2, this 
body will help improve the performance of SOEs in Namibia. For this outcome to be achieved, 
strong organisational allegiance (SOE) as opposed to political obligation should be the criteria 
for appointment to such a body warned Respondent 2. 
 
5.5.3 General lack of adherence to good corporate governance principles 
The World Bank Report (2000 describes corporate governance as concerned with holding the 
balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals”. In 
this sense, the corporate governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of 
resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim 
is to align as nearly as possible the interest of individuals, companies and society. Therefore, 
a lack of satisfaction on the part of the shareholder and recipients of the services and goods is 
a signal of corporate failure. 
As indicated earlier, most SOEs have generally failed to meet the expectations of their creators 
and funders. Generally, in Africa, SOEs are deeply implicated in most fiscal problems of African 
governments because of their inefficiency, losses, budgetary burdens and provision of poor 
products and services. Governments end up considering privatising SOEs as a way of making 
them more efficient and profitable and easing the tax payers of the burden of always bailing 
them out (Louw, 1999; Mwaura, 2007:34). Occasionally, they achieve some non-commercial 
objectives which are used to justify their poor economic performance. This can be related to 
the experiences of Air Namibia and TransNamib. 
The government of Namibia has been the primary stakeholder/shareholder in all the SOEs in 
the country. When a loss is made by an SOE, it is willing to and always does bail out those that 
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are making loses. This has not brought about the much-needed change to these SOEs. In fact, 
it has further downgraded the principles of transparency and accountability, which are, as 
shown in the previous chapters, the cornerstones of good corporate governance. This 
downgrade has further come with a loss of confidence by the public in the ever-mal-performing 
SOEs, including loss of morale by disgruntled officials working for those SOEs, whether at 
management or lower level (Respondent 1). 
As transparency comes with trust, “[i]t is hard to overstate the importance of reputation in a 
market economy. Rules cannot substitute for character” (Greenspan, 2003:23 This explains 
why travellers end up not using their own airline, Air Namibia, and why those with cargo at the 
port will prefer road transport over TransNamib, even though rail transport is much cheaper. It 
is true that when markets lose confidence in the integrity of information provided by a firm, i.e. 
when they can no longer trust the firm, the negative effects are likely to be dramatic. This is 
particularly the case for financial institutions for which the loss of reputation can mean the failure 
of the company. 
Nellis (1986) observes that there were some SOEs in Africa that performed adequately, at least 
for a time, and sometimes very well by the most stringent of standards. Namport is such an 
SOE that has thrived to maintain good reports and financial stability or efficiency and profitability 
in general. However, the good performers were heavily outnumbered by the bad in any SOE 
group of companies in most developing countries. For example, a 1985 survey of the transport 
sector SOEs’ performance in 18 Francophone African countries found that only one-fifth 
generated revenue sufficient to cover operating costs, depreciation and financial charges 
(World Bank, 1985:36). Another fifth covered variable costs plus depreciation but not finance 
charges. A further 40% covered only operating costs, while the final fifth did not even cover 
these (World Bank, 1985:36). In a great number of African countries, the financial burden posed 
by poorly performing SOEs, particularly those in infrastructure, caused macro-fiscal problems. 
The responses from the officials in the SOEs covered by this study had the confidence to show 
their problems but were not as willing to reveal the causes. This is a recurrent problem in a 
research of this nature. According to Nellis (1988), many studies point to the fundamental 
problems of SOEs, of which the main ones are multiple and conflicting objectives of SOEs, 
especially those in the infrastructure and manufacturing sectors. Government owners decreed 
that their SOEs operate in a commercial, efficient and profitable manner, but at the same time 
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insisted that they provide goods and services at prices less than cost-covering levels, serve as 
generators of employment, receive their inputs from state-sanctioned suppliers and choose 
location based on political rather than commercial criteria (Nellis, 1988:28). 
Nellis (1988) argues that the mixing of social and commercial goals inevitably led to political 
interference in SOEs’ operational decisions to the detriment of managerial autonomy, 
commercial performance and economic efficiency. These decisions further resulted in issues 
such as poor initial investment decisions and inadequate capitalisation. With respect to the 
latter, few African governments were able to endow their SOEs with proper levels of initial and 
working capital, forcing them to rely heavily on debt to finance basic operations. Other issues 
have been identified by IFIs. These issues include collection deficiencies, poor reporting 
systems, deficient boards of directors and other shortcomings, such as SOE managers being 
untrained and who owed their posts to political connections rather than technical skills. Thus, 
weak management was as much caused by the dysfunctional general system, as it was a cause 
of it. These issues have resulted in huge losses by SOEs, which have to be covered either 
through direct transfers from the budget or through indirect subsidies. 
 
5.5.4 Corruption and political interference 
It has been instilled in the minds of some interested in issues surrounding the poor performance 
of SOEs in Namibia that “[p]olitics protects poor performers” (Smit, 2011:1). This is because, 
as reported, the process of appointing senior managers at Namibian SOEs has become 
politicised to the extent where political patronage has created a culture that protects poor 
performers and those engaged in corruption from exposure as their political ties outweigh the 
need for accountability. This is a damning report by the media in 2011, which to a great extent 
reflects the reasons why there has been a record of poor performance culture, not only among 
transport sector SOEs but also others that are not covered in this study (Smit, 2011:1). 
There have been official reports too on the same aspect by independent bodies. The Institute 
for Public Policy Research (IPPR, 2011) investigated corruption, transparency and 
accountability at the senior management level of SOEs and identified trends plaguing the SOE 
sector and made a number of recommendations to improve the governance of SOEs (Smit, 
2011:1). With regards to the performance of the SOE sector as a whole, the IPPR regarded it 
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as having been plagued by a perception of poor management, non-accountability and generally 
non-transparent practices, with political interference an ever-present reality (IPPR, 2011). 
There are also internal interferences, for example between the board and management, which 
can stifle performance. At Air Namibia, there has been a lot of drama, leading the former CEO 
to say: “This eternal turf war between the board and management, in my view, is responsible 
for the woes of Air Namibia” (Kahiurika, 2015:6). 
Widespread poor management and mismanagement in the SOE sector is an indication that the 
sector is operating in an environment that suffers from poor and under-regulation and lax 
oversight, which by extension can be argued creates the perfect climate for corruption. (IPPR, 
2011). To this end, it is reported that between 2008 and 2009, SOEs accounted for 22% of the 
117 cases of alleged corruption that were recorded. 
The IPPR identifies political patronage, moral hazard and a culture of secrecy and poor record-
keeping as issues related to corruption in the SOE sector. In the first instance, a reality of 
Namibia’s SOE and government appointment processes is that senior management positions 
have been politicised from the start as the ruling Swapo Party has sought to impose itself on 
state processes (IPPR, 2011). According to the IPPR, the situation is that political, and in some 
cases personal affiliation and connectedness “ha[ve] consistently trumped experience, skills 
and expertise when it has come to the appointment of SOE[s] managing directors or CEOs. As 
a result, political protection and interference lower the probability of detecting and punishing 
corruption and heighten the risk of corruption taking place. Moral hazard is the practice whereby 
one party takes a risk or decision for which, should it backfire, another party would bear the 
cost. Moral hazard has become a defining characteristic of the SOE sector in Namibia, as the 
taxpayer, through government, is consistently and continuously called on to bail out a host of 
SOEs long plagued by bad decision-making, weak management, poor planning and lax 
financial controls (IPPR, 2011). 
These allegations have hardly brought about changes to date. They are reflected in the 
responses in the interviews (Respondents 1 and 2). It is evident that a culture of secrecy 
prevails, which is characterised by poor record keeping and financial reporting. Such a culture 
is also closely linked to political patronage “because SOE managers, who because of their 
political affiliation – and thus performance and accountability do not come into it – arguably 
enjoy the benefits of an environment marked by altogether lax oversight, do not feel pressed to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
134 
 
adhere to financial reporting standards” (Smit, 2011:1). These concerns are genuine because, 
as Witherell (2003) notes, this: 
Involves the role that market discipline and transparency – the subjects of this roundtable 
– can and should play in strengthening corporate governance. The ways that the corporate 
governance system and practices, in turn, affect the functioning of markets must also be 
important considerations for policy. These relationships operate within the regulatory and 
legal framework, which should be designed to support the corrective forces of markets and 
enhance incentive structures. After further developing these concepts, I will discuss some 
of the supporting empirical evidence and the insights arising from recent experience. These 
are leading to an improved understanding of what constitutes ‘good corporate governance’ 
and how market forces can contribute to the achievement of such governance. I will close 
with some remarks on the need for continued international dialogue on these issues. 
 
The IPPR regards the government’s slow response to the governance shortcomings and 
challenges experienced by parastatals as the result of a legislative and regulatory environment 
which remains inadequately circumscribed (IPPR, 2011). According to the IPPR (2011), this 
state of affairs suggests that the State is an active participant in the undermining of governance 
at public entities with a mandated and significant public service delivery task, and by extension 
an accomplice in corrupt activities and practices and mismanagement. 
 
5.5.5 Poor asset and risk management systems 
A proper asset and risk management system is crucial for the successful operation of any 
business. It becomes even more important in large organisations such as SOEs whose assets 
are distributed across the country and whose businesses span across the country’s borders. 
The improper management of assets at TransNamib could be one of the factors contributing to 
the loss of revenue and efficiency. There appears to be no proper system existing to monitor 
and evaluate the maintenance and replacement schedule of various items of assets. For 
example, locomotives and carriages are allowed to wear out due to poor maintenance up to a 
point where they cannot remain operational. The resultant effect is a substantial and gradual 
decline in TransNamib’s earnings. Customers are pushed to road transport as a result of the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
135 
 
state of the locomotives or the risk involved in using the rail system. This explains why the 
officials say that cargo has substantially reduced over years. All of this inevitably leads to 
gradual losses, some of which have already been recorded. 
Related to the above-mentioned is the risk management system, which is also not well 
considered in most of the SOEs under scrutiny in this study. Air Namibia, for example, has a 
problem of opting for non-profitable routes, such as the Namibia-China trip that they based on 
political reasons and is a burden for the airline. The risk was taken for convenience and 
expediency but it leads to losses in the end. There was no proper risk analysis or, if there was, 
political interference trumped it. To this end, it must be noted that shareholder intervention must 
be targeted (i.e. shareholder intervention must be limited to investment or operational aid to 
airports without discouraging the entrepreneurial drive within SOEs and in a mature system aid 
aimed at encouraging the development of new routes) because the objective is to improve 
connectivity and increase shareholder value. 
The NAC has the problem of not doing their upgrades and maintenance works on time. The 
nation was informed that certain aircraft (A330 and larger) could not land in Namibia anymore 
because there is a risk (lack of fire tracks) for the safety of international travellers. This led to 
the downgrading of the airport, meaning loss in parking and other charges the NAC would have 
received apart from other losses to the country (such as extra costs because Air Namibia had 
to pay to pick up passengers from Gaborone in Botswana using their A319). 
It is noted that organisations should have a proper risk management strategy in place to 
address critical risk issues in a timely manner. At the NAC, the responsibility of risk assessment 
and strategy formulation lies with the board comprising of civil servants with limited knowledge 
of airline operations. This explains why an official who was interviewed complained about 
meritocracy by saying: 
The interference of Politics and the choice of Executives and Board Members based on 
tribal, political and race without merit has excluded the best and talented nationals from 
playing a transformational role to the economic well-being of SOEs. 
(Respondent 1) 
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Besides, these civil servants may be transferred too frequently on political and administrative 
grounds. The NAC has suffered from this recently with corruption charges hanging on all 
members of the board. The matter has been a hot issue in cabinet with ministers divided on the 
issue (Informante, 2016:1). This means that some improvement in the recruitment procedures 
and introduction of a performance-based salary structure may significantly improve the 
productivity of the workforce. This may also reduce cases of wilful corruption by the officials, 
whereby the attention becomes the personalities involved and not the main goal of the SOE. 
These lax ways of dealing with problems may dig a deeper hole of losses for the SOE. Air 
Namibia is an example where nothing seems to be happening to rescue the airline. One 
politician was quoted as saying: 
 
The company has not done anything to make sure it climbs out of its problems. They have 
had about five turnaround strategies, which never seem to work out. They have in fact not 
done anything to make sure they work out. I think if they enter into agreements with other 
successful airlines, they can learn from them and become profitable. 
(Kahiurika, 2015:6) 
 
The economic objective or social objective of each SOE must be very clear, namely the 
relentless search for the best-qualified men and women to be appointed and empowered to 
manage the resources entrusted to them. Similarly, the regulatory mechanism must be equally 
empowered and resourced to play a meaningful oversight role that will enable the ministers 
involved to account to the public. The wrangle between the two ministers unfortunately can 
cripple the progress of some transport sector SOEs. 
 
5.5.6 Poor internal control systems 
The internal control systems of an SOE may determine its overall performance standards and 
what system the organisation needs to maintain. TransNamib appears to be lacking an efficient 
system. It appears the rail company inherited a good system from the South African system 
and generally the TransNamib business was small. TransNamib has had some challenges that 
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include economic viability and long-term survival associated with operating losses and 
escalating debt. According to Dierks (2006), managerial governance lies at the root of the 
situation where the management support systems and internal controls disintegrated in the 
past. 
Over time, the complexity of business operations, increases in the volume of transactions and 
non-adherence to these controls have led to the controls gradually losing their utility and 
efficacy. This has been the trend in rail systems that were inherited from the colonial masters 
(Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, 2012). From the responses outlined above, 
it can be observed in many instances that there has been failure of internal control. The officials 
do not even do internal checks to see the cost of fuel that they use (Respondent 2). 
There are many other issues that may be prevalent. These may include procurements at 
inflated rates, pilferage of inventory from the stores, embezzlement of earnings from railway 
stations, passengers travelling without tickets, stealing of oil from the locomotives and stores, 
and employees claiming overtime without performing actual work. Without speculation, and 
given the information gathered, these issues may be contributing to the decline of business at 
TransNamib. The effect is a substantial increase in annual financial losses. A study of past 
annual reports corroborates these findings. It is therefore credible to say that there is a need to 
create these mechanisms and ensure that there are benchmarks and monitoring and 
evaluation. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
The results of the analysis shows that nearly all transport SOEs perform poorly in terms of 
return on assets, return on equity, and operating margin ratio. This finding is not entirely 
unexpected given the “public goods” characteristics of the infrastructure and services provided 
by transport SOEs, which generally leads to market failures. These assertions were also 
confirmed by other studies on governance of SOEs in Namibia (Hekandjo et al., 2014). 
Another problem in geographically extensive and sparsely populated countries such as Namibia 
is low density, which means that the unit cost of providing transport services and related 
infrastructure tends to be relatively high. Given the revenue model or structure that SOEs 
typically pursue (i.e., economic efficiency prices cannot cover the costs and ensure profitability), 
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it is not surprising that they struggle to remain financially sustainable due to misalignment 
between their costs structure, investment requirement and capital structure. As the result of the 
financial analysis shows, transport SOEs tend to be inefficient in terms of return on assets, 
return on equity, as well as operating profit margin. This level of performance means that 
transport SOEs such as those covered in this research require general tax revenue to remain 
afloat (refer to government transfers or bailout to SOEs).  
Moreover, the issue that may be of interest to the study is the consistency in the relationship 
between poor performance of those institutions and their non-compliance with agreed 
governance principles. For example, poor performing SOEs such as TransNamib and Air 
Namibia have failed to comply with the governance arrangements that compel them (according 
Section 17[1] of the SOE Act), as indicated earlier, to enter into performance agreements with 
the minister. In turn, those SOEs performing well, such as Namport and the RA have complied 
with the said provision. 
 
Similarly, the above assertion and trend can be observed in the overall non-compliance to the 
Public Enterprises Governance Act of 2006, such as the governance agreement with the board, 
section performance agreement (Section 18 [1] and Section 19[1], which deals with annual and 
business plans) with the SOE Act. Again, poor-performing SOEs such as TransNamib and Air 
Namibia have poor compliance attitudes as opposed to the performing SOEs. In a nutshell, the 
findings of this study suggest that the reform process has failed, mainly because of non-
compliance with corporate governance, poor capitalisation of SOEs and a lack of skills in this 
organisation. Although this chapter was not focused on providing recommendations, it has 
identified some areas where certain recommendations can be made. 
 
In conclusion, the foregoing analysis shows that, aside from one SOE, all transport sector SOEs 
investigated have not been performing according to their owner’s expectations. While there 
have been efforts to make these SOEs more profitable and efficient, such initiatives are either 
inadequate or ineffective and will not realise the intended objectives unless the top 
management of these enterprises is hired on a competitive basis, given more autonomy and 
the government commits not only to design performance contracts that set realistic standards, 
but also enforce them strictly. Still, there is a need to streamline the multiple regulations that 
govern SOEs and reform the corporate regulatory framework similar to those of the private 
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sector in order to raise standards of corporate governance. This will ensure that the services 
they provide are managed prudently, resulting in higher productivity. 
The following chapter builds on the above proposal, leading up to the last chapter with complete 
conclusions and recommendations. A model was also developed on how to improve the 
performance of SOEs in Namibia and globally where applicable.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  
A NEW APPROACH TO THE PERFORMANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN 
NAMIBIA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter proposes a performance model (Figure 6.2) that can be used to enhance 
Namibia’s state-owned enterprises performance in the transport sector. It builds on the analysis 
presented in previous Chapters. After reviewing the existing framework, the focus then shifts to 
the new proposed model. Given the findings of the study presented in Chapter Five, it is 
reasonable to suggest that past and present efforts aimed at improving the performance of 
SOEs in the country have had little positive effect. Taking the gap (desired/ideal vs. the current 
reality) into account, the study goes on to propose a new model to improve the performance of 
SOEs in the country. 
The chapter is structured broadly as follows: The first part presents a critique of previous and 
current framework. The second part discusses the proposed framework/model intended to 
assist in enhancing the performance of transport sector SOEs.  
 
6.2 Previous Framework 
Performance monitoring in Namibia is currently done under governance contracts between 
SOEs and the line ministry represented by the board and the minister respectively in 
accordance with the State-Owned Enterprises Governance Act, 2006 (as amended by the 
Public Enterprises Governance Amendment Act, 2015). There are three important source 
documents used to monitor the performance of SOEs. These are the governance agreement 
(GA), performance contract (PC) and key performance indicator (KPI) sheet. The GA is signed 
by the relevant minister and the board Chairperson on behalf of the relevant ministry and the 
respective SOE, while the PC is signed by the relevant minister and individual board members. 
However, these processes have not been effective, hence the on-going reform process. 
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The KPI sheet is an attachment to the GA, reflecting the performance levels of the specific 
SOE. Figure 6.1 below summarises the flow of the process relating to reporting and the 
evaluation of SOE performance. 
 
Figure 6.1: PA Process Flow 
 
Source: MWT (2012) 
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6.3 The New Framework 
 
After 16 months of research, benchmarking and consultations, the Ministry of Public 
Enterprises (MPE) has identified the most suitable Governance Model for our current 
condition. 
(Jooste, 2016) 
 
This was a striking point from the statement of the Minister of Public Enterprises when he 
introduced the new governance model for public enterprises that he termed the ‘Hybrid 
Governance System’. 
In 2015, the Public Enterprises Governance Amendment Act effectively did away with the State-
Owned Enterprises Governance Council, replacing it with the newly created Ministry of Public 
Enterprises. With this legal amendment in place and as part of his appointment condition, the 
Minister of Public Enterprises and his team came up with a reform drive that is considered 
below. 
The first step entailed research, benchmarking and consultations, a process that took 
approximately 16 months. This process entailed, amongst other things, understanding and 
appreciating the current governance and previous governance models (Respondent 1). But the 
history of the governance model in Namibia began immediately after independence when SOEs 
in the country were completely decentralised. Under the decentralised model, line ministries 
were responsible for all functions (governance and operational oversight to be specific) related 
to SOEs under their jurisdictions. 
The “decentralised model” was then followed by the “dual governance model” that was a result 
of a remuneration survey rather than governance reform. Be that as it may, it resulted in a 
governance system where line ministries (or portfolio ministries), together with the State-Owned 
Enterprises Governance Council, were both responsible for SOEs’ oversight in the country. 
Under this dual governance model, the Prime Minister served as the Chair of the Council. 
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With the creation of the Ministry of Public Enterprises, however, a new governance system that 
the Minister of Public Enterprises termed the ‘Hybrid Governance Model for Namibia Public 
Enterprises’ was introduced in 2016. This new governance model divided SOEs into three 
categories, namely commercial, non-commercial and financial. Below is the new classification 
of Public Enterprises as per the new governance model. 
 
Table 6.1: New Classification of SOEs 
Commercial Enterprises Financial Institutions and 
Extra-budgetary Funds 
Non-Commercial Enterprises 
• Air Namibia  
• Epangelo Mining  
• Henties Bay Waterfront  
• Lüderitz Waterfront  
• Namcor 
• Namibia Airports Company 
• Namibia Industrial Development 
Agency  
• Namibia Institute of Pathology  
• Namibia Ports Authority  
• Namibia Wildlife Resorts  
• Nampost  
• NamPower  
• National Fishing Corporation  
• Roads Authority  
• Roads Contractor Company  
• TransNamib Holdings  
• Zambezi Waterfront  
• National Fishing Corporation 
• Banks  
• Road Fund Administration  
• Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 
• Communications Regulatory 
Authority of Namibia  
• Electricity Control Board  
• Namibia Fish Consumption 
Promotion Trust  
• Namibia Press Agency  
• Namibia Statistics Agency  
• Namibia Training Authority  
• National Art Gallery  
• National Commission on 
Research, Science & Technology  
• NBC  
• UNAM  
• Accreditation Board of Namibia  
• Diamond Board of Namibia  
• Fisheries Observer Agency  
• Karakul Board  
• Meat Board  
• Namibia Agronomic Board  
Source: Jooste (2016) 
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According to the new model, as explained by Jooste (2016), SOEs were to be divided as 
follows: 
● Commercial public enterprises -  entities wholly or partially owned and/or controlled by 
the state which, guided by market principles, are to provide a product or render a service 
in the interest of the public and have the potential to generate a sustainable profit while 
promoting economic growth and fulfilling its mandate; 
 
● Non-commercial public enterprises entities of non-financial nature (these are more 
regulatory); and 
● Financial institutions and extra-budgetary funds – i.e., public enterprises of financial 
nature. 
 
Similarly, under this new governance arrangement, commercial public enterprises would report 
directly to the Public Enterprises Ministry, while non-commercial public enterprises are to report 
directly to line ministries, whilst financial institutions and extra-budgetary funds public 
enterprises shall report to the Ministry of Finance. Finally, a reward system linked to 
performance management was proposed.  
As noted by Respondent 1 during interview, “it is envisaged that the performance management 
system with real KPIs will be an integral part of the SOEs’ governance together with an 
incentivised remuneration system”. In the respondent’s perspective, “this (i.e., the new SOE 
governance model) is a commendable exercise that will ensure that SOEs are not seen as 
rewarding failure as has been the case for some time now. The past system has allowed 
executives to receive bonuses when SOEs were not making any profit and even when some 
were on a lifeline from government in the form of bailouts”. This perspective is reflective of the 
Ministry of Public Enterprises’ (MPE) position on having identified the most suitable governance 
model for SOEs in Namibia. However, this study unearthed the following outstanding 
challenges. 
● Firstly, there is a potential conflict in reporting. It is envisaged that non-commercial public 
enterprises shall report to the line ministry but will still adhere to issued principles of 
corporate governance and reporting remuneration guidelines. This could be considered 
a dual system from which the public enterprises are actually trying to move away. 
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● Secondly, the definition of commercial and non-commercial public enterprises is 
ambiguous. For example, the Roads Authority is responsible for road management but 
is classified as a commercial public enterprise while it does not have the potential to 
generate a sustained profit. 
● Lastly, the issue of capacity is not addressed. Some fields will require highly specialised 
and skilled personnel in order to effectively supervise these technical institutions. These 
skills and capacity are not in the government and neither can the government 
remuneration packages attract them from the private sector. 
 
The preceding analyses in the previous chapters have partly shown that SOEs’ poor 
performance can be blamed not only on their boards, but this is also attributable to their own 
inability to resolve the agent-principal problem due to the existence of multiple agents as 
discussed earlier. Robert (1998) explains the complexity of this relationship (agent-principal 
relations) between the state and the board or management of the SOE. The author warns 
against attempting to resolve the agency problem purely by giving the board more autonomy 
because boards are appointed by politicians to facilitate political mileage through directives not 
necessarily in the best interest of SOE’s performance. 
In addition, poor performance by boards of SOEs has been attributed to the existence of 
multiple agents (Brumby & Hyndman, 1998:38-41). Unlike a private enterprise which has a 
single principal (shareholders) and agent (managers), an SOE is governed by multiple agents, 
namely managers and the state or public officials. Even allowing for some degree of variability 
between SOEs, the analyses and findings of board practices show the following general 
weaknesses: 
● Lack of consistently applied criteria and processes in the recruitment and appointment 
of boards of directors. 
● Board members are not sufficiently exposed to training and development programmes. 
● Fundamental policy contradictions are often left unresolved, leading to contradictions, 
overlaps in mandate and lack of coordinated projects among transport SOEs. 
● Many boards do not maintain an appropriate balance in terms of, for example executive 
vs. non-executive directors, public vs. private sector representatives, and the distribution 
of skills. 
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● Policymakers often misunderstand the role for, and strategies to achieve market-based 
competition to deliver desired policy outcomes out of the businesses of SOEs. 
● Regulatory accountability is limited hence laxity in operations and patronage 
accompanied by unaccounted heavy benefits is a burden to the SOEs. 
● Regulatory independence and capacity is compromised by the nature of appointments. 
● Risks of conflicts of interest exist where individuals are serving in the boards of both 
holding and subsidiary boards in the same group of companies. 
● Senior government officials often undermine the separation of powers established for 
the effective functioning of policy formulation, SOE operations and corporate 
governance. 
● Some individuals serving as ex officio state representatives serve on multiple SOE 
boards subjecting them to onerous responsibilities. 
● Some SOEs such as TransNamib are under-resourced, lack internal checks and 
balances, and overspend and ask for more, which reveals a lack of enough financial 
accountability. 
● The finalisation of policy and regulatory frameworks for SOEs has often been subject to 
inordinate delays. 
● The mandates and objectives given to SOEs are often too broad and lack monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms, let alone internal checks. 
 
The above summarises the shortcomings affecting the performance of SOEs covered in this 
study. Clearly, not all the responsibility for the underperformance of SOEs can be adduced to 
shortcomings of the various boards of directors. While the board is the ultimate entity 
answerable for SOE performance, the causes of poor performance may emanate from sources 
beyond the immediate control of the board.  
 
6.5 Synthesis: Towards an Alternative Performance Model/Framework 
The weaknesses responsible for the poor performance of transport sector SOEs presented 
above can further be distilled into three key factors, namely governance, resources, and 
regulatory oversight. These are discussed in the context of the recommended performance 
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model presented below. While it cannot be denied that there might be other factors also 
influencing SOEs performance, this study submits that the three elements – governance, 
resources, and regulatory oversight – are at the core of the state of performance of the studied 
SOEs. The model (Figure 6.2) proposes a solution to the poor performance of transport sector 
SOEs in Namibia by identifying three pathways of moving from low SOE performance to high 
SOE performance. The proposed model not only addresses identified performance deficiencies 
in SOEs, it also bridges the value deficit faced by SOEs, thereby enabling high and sustained 
performance in state owned enterprises. Figure 6.2 below depicts the relationship between the 
three performance-enabling elements in bridging the gap between low SOE performance and 
high SOE performance. 
 
Figure 6.2: Recommended Performance Model 
 
Source: Author’s construct 
 
“Governance” plays an important role in steering an organisation. It is important to note that 
the boards of directors are at the core of governance in an organisation. The board is the body 
that will shape, renew and modernise the governance structures. Therefore, it is important for 
such a body (directors) to be accountable, efficient, ethical, independent and transparent, as 
per the OECD and King’s Report V principles. These fundamental governance principles go to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
148 
 
the heart of performance of any organisation. The Greek word, as explained by the Centre for 
Corporate Governance in Africa (2012), ‘kybernete’ refers to a helmsman or steersman helping 
a ship to reach its destination (performance) without running into troubled waters 
(conformance).14 
Confirming the foregoing, and as observed in the findings, SOEs such as Namport, with good 
internal governance performed well while the opposite is true for SOEs such as TransNamib, 
with weak internal governance. It can accordingly be concluded that there is a direct between 
governance and performance of SOEs. This shows that SOEs that are managed better have a 
better operational performance. This view is also supported by other researchers such as 
Brown and Caylor (2004)15.  
Furthermore, governance, according to Gregory and Simms (1999)16, also increases the firms’ 
responsiveness to the needs of society and results in improving long-term performance.  It can 
thus be said that SOEs will do well to ensure proper adherence to governance principles (both 
internal and external). 
Secondly, Resources - The study suggests that SOEs require better resources to perform 
optimally.  Resources, both human and financial, play an important part in the performance of 
any organisation, including SOEs. They assist in the payment of services (the finance aspect) 
and implementing organisational policy, strategies and activities (the human resources aspect). 
From the viewpoint of the resource-based theory, resources influence the extent and direction 
of the performance of the organisation. For example, even a well-performing SOE such as 
Namport’s, performance was affected negatively when the government failed to provide 
sufficient capital for its capital projects. Furthermore, it also complained about the lack of 
qualified staff as one factor hampering its performance. Similarly, TransNamib has also 
attributed its troubles to a lack of capitalisation. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the government (as the shareholder) will do well to 
recapitalise these institutions so that they can perform optimally. However, due diligence should 
be done to avoid mismanagement. Most SOEs have had misdirected resources, especially 
                                                 
14 Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa. 2012. Rating Corporate Governance of SOEs: Moving towards improved performance. Stellenbosch University 
through its Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa and the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Cape Town, Bellville. 
15 Brown, LD and Caylor, M.L. 2004. Working Paper, Georgia State University 
16 Gregory H.R and Simms M.F .1999. Corporate governance: What it is and why it matters. Paper presented to 9 International 
Anti-corruption conference. Kuala Lumpur 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
149 
 
financial resources, resulting in their poor performance. Furthermore, the poor appointment of 
human capital has resulted in poor performance of these SOEs as indicated in the earlier 
chapters. 
Finally, regulatory oversight has a direct impact on performance. Almost all SOEs under 
investigation indicated that the lack of an oversight function or a weak oversight function (from 
both government and the boards) has resulted in poor performance. Taking Air Namibia (which 
is one of the relatively poor performing SOE) as an example, the government has been pumping 
millions (subventions and bail outs) to this SOE but yet the government failed to demand annual 
reports for the last 10 years. This is in clear violation of both the SOE and the Companies Act 
and yet no penalties have been meted out to the said SOEs. One would have expected the 
government as a principal shareholder to act, even with some basic threat of consequences, to 
such non-compliance and violation of the laws. The government will do well if it ensures proper 
oversight of the boards, which, in turn, will then efficiently manage these institutions (SOEs). 
Hence, it can be concluded that the absence of oversight or weak oversight contributes to the 
poor performance of SOEs in the country. This view is in line with the OECD’s Recommendation 
of Council on Regulatory and Governance Policy (2012), which argues that good regulatory 
outcomes depend on more than well-designed rules and regulations. SOEs need strict 
supervision to adhere to the reasons for why they were created. Furthermore, the role of an 
independent regulator as discussed in Chapter 5 could be helpful in improving SOEs’ 
performance. It is not enough for the government to design laws and policies. Instead, the 
government should ensure that these laws and policies are implemented through the 
government’s regulatory oversight function. Putting SOEs on autopilot will not assist nor 
guarantee their performance. 
In a nutshell, the model indicates that governance, resources and regulatory oversight have 
key effects on SOEs’ performance. Similarly, the model/framework indicates that there is a 
direct relationship between the above elements (governance, resources and regulatory 
oversight) and SOE performance. For example, if governance is improved, performance will 
improve. The reverse is also true. Poor governance will result in the poor performance for these 
SOEs. This is also true for the other two elements (resources and regulatory oversight) 
discussed above. All in all, the model shows that by altering any of these elements, this can 
alter the performance of the SOE. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
150 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
The implementation of interventions in SOEs has become a major preoccupation of 
governments. This is due, among other reasons, to SOEs’ poor performance. However, most 
of these interventions have simply not worked because of a lack of evidence-based 
interventions (EBIs) in the practice settings. The adoption of interventions can pose challenges 
simply because this involves change. Change is a delicate process that can be effective and 
sustained only if it is properly facilitated and managed. As this research shows, only a well-
facilitated reform will result in good performance of SOEs. This should include attitudinal, 
organisational (both oversight and internal) and legislative reforms. 
It is evident from the literature that society has begun questioning how efficient SOEs are in 
delivering the services for which they were created. It should be noted that although studies on 
the performance of SOEs worldwide and in Africa have been around for some time, the 
spectacular failure in governance in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the recent financial 
crisis which was fuelled by excessive risk-taking, has put the question of SOEs right at the 
centre of all economic and social debates. Similarly, and even more so, the significance of 
leadership has even become more apparent in the twenty-first century because of 
unprecedented changes in the world economy, triggered by financial crises and the ever-
present reality of limited resources. 
This study developed a model to address the persistent problem of poor performance by 
transport sector SOEs. The proposed model offers a solution to the performance problems of 
SOEs by identifying three pathways (i.e. “performance-enablers”) to address the core problem 
of poor SOE performance. The proposed model not only addresses SOE performance deficit, 
it also establishes a strong foundation for sustained high performance by SOEs in the transport 
sector. The next chapter provides a summary of the findings and conclusion, leading up to 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the main arguments and research findings within the framework of 
the research problem and objectives identified in Chapter 1. The primary objective of this 
research was to analyse the performance of SOEs in the transport sector. The aim was to 
highlight factors that have contributed to the performance of selected SOEs in the transport 
sector. 
SOEs are viewed, at least in theory, as having the potential to provide certain goods and 
services that would otherwise not be made available through the market, thereby propelling 
rapid economic growth. This notion has been a key driver for governments to commercialise 
some of their departments. However, this picture has been far from ideal in the Namibian case 
if one considers the resource inputs to these SOEs versus their performance and the general 
public outcry regarding their poor performance and limitations. This study confirmed this view, 
i.e. that transport sector SOEs in the country are performing poorly. 
Given the issues discussed in Chapter 5, the major task of this chapter is to identify the core 
answers to the research questions and, on that basis, to make appropriate conclusions and 
recommendations. This final chapter further provides pragmatic approaches to address the 
pressing challenges faced by SOEs in the transport sector. 
The chapter starts with general reflections on the contents of the previous chapters before going 
on to provide some insights into the reasons for the findings. The reflection below will help the 
reader understand the overall conclusions. The conclusions show the challenges and their 
solutions, as well as recommendations for enhanced performance of SOEs. 
It should be noted that, there are recommendations that touch on several challenges identified 
in this study. These are accordingly spread over the chapter and discussed contextually. For 
example, some recommendations may be based on short-term while others are based on long-
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term solutions to the challenges identified, but there has not been an effort to differentiate 
between these. The reason for this approach is that it would be for the managers and 
policymakers to find an appropriate method or approach for the reform of each and every SOE 
in its context, as there is no uniform turnaround strategy for all SOEs. Ultimately, this 
dissertation aims to provide direction in addressing the challenges faced by at least the selected 
transport sector SOEs. 
It must be further noted that one cannot propound one theory to explain all the possible 
solutions for all the identified problems. In other words, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to 
the challenges faced by SOEs in Namibia, not even to those in one sector such as transport. 
The quest in the academic literature as well as in policy endeavours to explain SOE 
performance has not yielded much consensus, given the inability of certain theories to 
adequately explain SOE performance. Whilst empirical evidence exists on how well or how 
poorly SOEs have performed over the years, what remains largely unresolved, at least in the 
context of the selected SOEs, and which may be generalised to other SOEs in Namibia and 
the rest of Africa, is a comprehensive test of factors responsible for driving SOE performance. 
Put simply, this chapter presents the key arguments and conclusions that became apparent 
during the analysis of the performance levels of the selected entities. The chapter is structured 
broadly as follows: 
● Chapter summary of the research;  
● Summary of the research findings; 
● Summary of conclusion and contributions; and 
● Suggestions for further research. 
 
A summary will now be provided of each chapter of this study. 
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7.2 Chapter Summary  
Chapter 1 highlighted various steps that the GRN has taken over the years in order to try and 
address poor performance of SOEs. In order to make a contribution to this important policy 
area, this study set out to investigate the performance of selected SOEs in the transport sector 
by answering the following questions: 
● What has been the performance of SOEs? 
● What are the major challenges of SOEs in realising the mandates they were created for? 
● Are there accountability mechanisms to address these challenges? 
● Are stakeholders and their interests being addressed (satisfied) by these SOEs? and 
● What mechanisms can be put in place to promote, improve and enhance the performance 
of SOEs? 
 
Chapter 2 provides some of the major and salient issues relating to SOEs in Namibia. It gives 
a descriptive overview of the context and challenges faced by SOEs in the country. The context 
aspect describes the history and rationale of establishing SOEs in the country, while the 
challenges aspect covers the performance issues and difficulties with which SOEs are faced. 
The chapter deliberately decided to discuss the two aspects (context and challenges) so as to 
set the tune for the preceding chapters. It set the usual questions pertaining to the where 
(context) and why (challenges) aspects with which the SOEs must deal with year in and year 
out. 
The chapter suggests that the commercialisation policy was adopted by the Namibian 
government on the recommendation of WASCOM without due or sufficient regard to the 
economic and social (i.e. skills) realities of the country. This chapter basically sets the trajectory 
of the dissertation and guides the thinking of the dissertation in a systematic and coherent way 
from the general to the particular. 
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical and empirical literature. The available literature is of high 
quality and relevant to the research questions as it informs the Namibian SOEs’ economic, 
governance and legal framework and other related issues under investigation in this study. 
Further, historical literature shows that, studies on the performance of SOEs worldwide and in 
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Africa have been around for some time. In fact, some of this literature dates back as far as the 
early 1950s and gained momentum throughout sub-Saharan Africa by the 1980s. 
Chapter 4 breaks down the policy and legal framework and several theoretical and practical 
aspects relevant to the governing of SOEs in Namibia. The chapter also considers the gaps in 
existing legal instruments, as well as probable implications on SOE performance. It further, 
covers the environment and models governing SOEs and contextualises to Namibia. It must be 
noted that the observations made in this chapter make it clear that reforms are possible at any 
time in the corporate world and so too are reforms in public enterprises but such changes are 
sometimes not supported by the necessary legal and environmental framework. 
Chapter 5 deals with one of the cornerstones of this study, namely the presentation of empirical 
data collected through interviews and questionnaire surveys on the performance of selected 
SOEs in the transport sector. This chapter provides a synopsis of the performance of SOEs in 
Namibia. An analysis of audited financial reports on the respective SOEs is also presented. The 
key finding is that most SOEs investigated have been rated as fair to below average in terms 
efficiency. The other key finding is that, political interference in these SOEs has created a 
culture of expectation of subsidies because their profit margins are very thin when compared 
to others both regionally and globally. 
Beside the above key findings, there are numerous opportunities for these Namibian SOEs, 
which pride themselves on quality and investment in their operations, to make an impact on the 
global arena. The chapter however, makes it apparent that they (SOEs) cannot be seen 
becoming a prominent player because of the inward-looking approach. 
Chapter 6 contains a proposal of an innovative model that could be used to enhance the 
performance of SOEs in Namibia’s transport sector. It builds on the previous chapter by doing 
a gap analysis. The chapter concentrates mainly on the old framework and then moves to the 
new proposed one. The question that this chapter ends with is whether these approaches have 
helped improve the performance of SOEs in the country. With the gap (desired/ideal and the 
current reality) taken into account, the author proposes a new model that can help to improve 
performance of SOEs in the country.  
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All in all, the chapter intends to come up with a simple but useful innovative model to assist the 
performance of SOEs in the transport sector. The model is easy, contains sufficient details and 
can easily be understood. 
Last but not least, answers to key research questions are provided in Chapter 7, alongside 
recommendations based on conclusions reached from the analyses and findings on the 
previous chapters. The recommendations are meant to be pragmatic approaches to address 
the pressing challenges faced by selected SOEs in the transport sector. In addition, 
recommendations for further research are also provided at the end of the chapter. A closer look 
will now be taken at the summary of the research findings. 
 
7.3 Summary of the Research Findings 
Overall, the results (as reflected in Chapter 5) showed that most SOEs (except Namport) are 
far from being economically efficient, suggesting a preponderance of wastefulness, political 
interference and irrational fee structures in state-owned enterprises (Kwon & Kim, 2017). Four 
out of five (80%) of Namibia’s transport sector SOEs showed low capability in terms of utilising 
resources to generate income as measured by return on assets ratio. In addition, the generally 
low and negative operating margins observed in most SOEs are indicative of their poor 
performance and level of economic [in]efficiency. These findings were amply corroborated 
through interviews and documentary evidence.  
It should be noted that there have been several attempts to try and address the persistent poor 
performance in state-owned enterprises. These include, for example, the various policy and 
legislative initiatives discussed under Section 6.2. Despite their good intentions, previous 
measures aimed and reforming the SOE sector have not borne fruit and the problem of poorly 
performing SOEs has remained, especially in the transport sector. However, after careful 
analyses of both quantitative and qualitative data, the study was able to isolate a number of 
factors contributing to this impasse (refer to Section 6.4). These were further distilled to three 
key factors, namely governance, resources and regulatory oversight. These three factors are 
then used to design a new framework for SOE performance management (Figure 6.2), which 
entails using governance, resources and regulatory oversight as pathways (or enabling 
elements) to bridge the gap between low and high SOE performance.   
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7.3.1 Responsibility sharing for the performance of SOEs 
The analyses in Chapter 5 above suggest that SOEs’ poor performance can be attributed in 
part to their boards and in part to the agent-principal problem. The ‘agency’ problem raised a 
number of challenges due to the complexity of this relationship between the state and the board 
or management of SOEs. Efforts, including attempts to resolve the agent-principal problem by 
giving the board more autonomy have not borne fruit. 
Evidence provided in the preceding Chapters shows that transport sector SOEs’ performance 
is generally poor with the exception of Namport, and to a lesser extent, the RA. Such poor 
performance is mainly attributed to the poor board performance. In turn, the poor performance 
of the boards of directors of parastatals has been attributed to the existence of multiple agents 
(Brumby & Hyndman, 1998:38-41). It is noted that, unlike a private enterprise, which has a 
single principal (shareholders) and agent (managers), an SOE is governed by multiple agents, 
namely managers and the state or public officials. In the Namibia case, this situation is further 
complicated by having multiple public officials from different ministries over and above the 
boards. 
However, responsibility for failure of SOEs should not be entirely on the shoulders of the board 
of directors. While the board is duty bound to answer to some failures, it should be borne in 
mind that, the causes for poor performance may emanate from sources beyond the board’s 
control. The question of who bares what responsibility therefore becomes an important part of 
the governance architecture that must be gotten right.  
 
7.3.2 Accountability mechanisms to address SOE performance challenges 
The NamCode spells out a number of accountability mechanisms, which, if followed, may 
improve the performance of SOEs. The philosophy of the NamCode revolves around leadership 
and corporate citizenship with a sustainability goal (NamCode, Principle C1-1). To facilitate an 
understanding of the thought process, debate and changes, the NamCode provides that, good 
governance is essentially about effective leadership. Accordingly, Leaders should rise to the 
challenges of modern governance. Such leadership is characterised by the ethical values of 
responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency, and based on moral duties that ﬁnd 
expression in the concept of ubuntu or humaneness.  
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In general, the NamCode, like other codes elsewhere and in particular the King Reports of 
South Africa on which it is based, ‘apply or explain’ the basis of accountability and show the 
practical execution of the principles embodied therein.: 
However, and in spite of the government’s majority ownership of the SOEs studied here, the 
shareholder (government) often cannot influence or monitor management and lacks access to 
information, with the cost of overcoming these hurdles being considerable. Monitoring corporate 
governance characteristics, such as fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency 
faces many obstacles and challenges. While the shareholder wants rights to be upheld (e.g. 
prices set to reflect social marginal cost)), they cannot be certain that they will be. However, 
being passive or apathetic is not an option (Naidoo, 2003). 
While the NamCode is not legally binding, it nonetheless sets the standards derived from the 
common law and the statutes, which already exist. As a result, it supplements the law, which 
incorporates the best practices of governance principles.  For example, the concept of fiduciary 
duties is further cemented as part of the corporate governance principles and a cardinal concept 
when considering accountability. 
 
7.3.3 Improving internal governance 
The findings (Chapter 5) of the study showed that there is a clear deficiency in the effectiveness 
of the internal management mechanisms of the SOEs studied. This needs to be improved. It 
seems Namport has improved on its own without much state involvement. In order to improve 
internal management mechanisms, one has to deal with the three segments on which internal 
corporate governance mechanisms are centred – the board of directors, executive 
management and independent control functions – each with its own set of vital and unique 
responsibilities (Namport, 2014). In many systems, the activities of the three segments are 
reinforced by codes of conduct that are intended to promote proper behaviour. 
If the corporate responsibilities associated with these functions are too vague and diffused, 
subject to too much interpretation, or not diligently followed, the governance process is 
vulnerable. If they are too rigid and onerous, enforcement costs mount up, shareholder returns 
decline and actions centred primarily on form (rather than substance) may result. Banks (2005) 
argues that internal systems must achieve an appropriate balance of flexibility and rigour. 
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Naidoo (2002) states that, internal governance is based on specific mechanisms and actions 
taken by individual firms to enforce control and accountability. These can vary according to 
enterprise, industry and country, but, broadly speaking, include: 
● Establishing a capable and unbiased board of directors; 
● Creating appropriate responsibilities and norms within the ranks of executive 
management; 
● Developing independent control groups, including finance/accounting, legal, risk 
management and internal audits; and 
● Creating and promulgating a code of conduct. 
(Naidoo, 2002) 
 
Such internal governance mechanisms stand a good chance of succeeding in transforming 
corporate governance if buttressed by external mechanisms. 
In Namibia, the board of directors and senior executives should be held to certain standards in 
order to enforce proper accountability. These standards revolve around attention to business, 
fidelity to cooperate interest and exercise of reasonable business judgment. Theoretically, if 
these are upheld, shareholders and other stakeholders should be protected. In summary, the 
board of directors, having considered the nature and requirements of stakeholders, defines the 
purpose, mission and ethical values of the SOE, creates an appropriate business and risk 
strategy, discharges duties to management, ensures proper controls are in place, monitors 
management through use of various mechanisms and makes adjustments as necessary. 
 
7.3.4 Supplementing internal governance 
In order to improve corporate governance in the Namibian SOEs covered in this study, there 
is a need to supplement the internal governance processes mentioned above. Supplementing 
internal governance processes are external forces that establish overarching frameworks that 
define, or operate with internal mechanisms. According to Dimsdale and Prevezer (1994), key 
forces include establishing appropriate regulatory oversight, among others. 
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Dimsdale and Prevezer (1994) note that corporate governance is concerned with the way in 
which corporations are governed, in particular, the relationship between the management of an 
enterprise and its shareholders.  On its part, the OECD (1999) hints at a wider network of 
relationships, while maintaining the emphasis on the relationship between shareholder and 
director, defining corporate governance as “[a] set of relationships between an enterprise’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”.  
Timothy (2007:89) posits that, “[c]orporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the enterprise are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined”. This incentivises the corporate governance process, 
which is one important aspect for better performance of corporate institutions such as the SOEs 
selected for this study. This remains relevant as it is evident that good corporate governance 
also includes external issues and should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the enterprise. Shareholders 
should also facilitate effective monitoring; thereby encouraging firms to use resources more 
efficiently.  
The introduction of other stakeholders raises the question of where exactly the shareholders’ 
interests rank in terms of directors’ priorities, notwithstanding the emphasis subsequently 
placed on the primacy of shareholders’ interests in what the OECD (1999) perceives as good 
corporate governance. The OECD (1999:102) to some extent answers this question in its 
remarks on the role of stakeholders. The corporate governance framework should recognise 
the rights of stakeholders as established by law and encourage active cooperation between 
corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
Two observations can be made on the OECD’s perception on the role of the corporation. First, 
it is assumed that the corporation serves purely as an agency for wealth maximisation for all 
concerned. The shareholders’ interests are assumed to be synonymous with those of the 
enterprise (objectives that are in the interests of the enterprise and shareholders) and the role 
and interests of stakeholders are narrowly defined in terms of economic activity (wealth, jobs, 
and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises). Second, stakeholders are carefully 
defined in close legal terms and only rights protected by law, whether through contract or by 
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statute, should be respected. Broader, non-statutory or non-contractual relationships are not 
considered in this framework. 
In the Namibian context, the first observation above relating to the OECD’s conception of 
corporate governance has a great deal of merit. Organisations do indeed exist to maximise 
economic efficiency. The use of agency theory and legalism in the OECD’s principles to define 
a range of stakeholders also has advantages over the very specific agency approach adopted 
in the United Kingdom, for example. The UK approach privileges the shareholder’s interest to 
a degree not justified in classical agency theory, in which an agency relationship is defined as 
a contract under which one or more persons (the principals[s]) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990:138-153). 
 
7.3.5 SOEs ability to meet stakeholders’ interests 
Fox (2005:98) argues that “[s]ince corporate governance is instituted to protect shareholders 
and ensure shareholder value maximization, a direct relationship can be plotted in determining 
the impact of corporate governance to firm performance”. This has to be considered in the 
context of the variables as reflected in Table 7.1 below, which have many features similar to 
both the conceptual model applied in this study, as well as the proposed SOE performance 
framework. 
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Table 7.1: Diagrammatic representation of the independent and dependent variables 
 Independent Variables      Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Argyris (2002) 
 
7.4 Summary of Conclusions 
An analysis of the performance of SOEs in Namibia has revealed that SOEs do not 
necessarily underperform simply because they are state-owned but more importantly, 
their underperformance in linked to the way they are managed. Various attempts have 
been made to inject improved performance into SOEs via commercialisation. It should be noted 
however, several pertinent questions to the commercialisation policy in Namibia remain 
unanswered. This policy (commercialisation) was adopted by government on the 
SOE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1. Auditing 
2. Auditing work available  
3. Investigating fraud  
4. Ensuring protection of shareholders’ 
interest.  
5. Accountability 
6. Review of supporting documentation  
7. Internal control  
8. Financial transparency and information 
disclosure.  
9. Separation of ownership 
10. Board of directors  
11. Shareholders  
12. Managers.  
 
SOE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
13. Proper funds management 
14. Expenditure control 
15. Operating income 
16. Margin growth rates 
17. Debt level 
18. Quality of service delivery. 
 
EXTRANEOUS VARIABLES AFFECTING 
SOEs 
19. Unemployment level 
20. Inflation 
21. Changes in interest rates. 
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recommendation of WASCOM without due regard to the skills base, as well as the economic 
and social reality existing in the country. Questions regarding who will administer these entities, 
at what cost, and what governance model will be employed were either ignored or not given 
enough thought. These factors cannot be ignored as they will in one way or the other affect the 
implementation of the policy. 
Currently, the implementing or assigned ministries of the commercialisation policy (those 
supervising SOEs) are being affected because of, for example, a lack of skills, limited 
information on SOEs’ operations and political interference in SOEs. These challenges can be 
summarised into three main thematic areas/categories (as discussed in Chapter 6 above), 
namely governance, resources and regulatory oversight. Such realities, if not properly 
addressed, will undermine the envisaged and intended outcomes of the policy, hence the 
recommendations below. 
 
7.5 General Mechanisms to Promote, Improve and Enhance the Performance of 
SOEs – Recommendations 
In the final analysis, and based on both findings and the literature review, it can be concluded 
that SOEs are underperforming and the mechanisms below could be helpful to change their 
status quo. 
 
7.5.1 Improving board roles in various ways 
The previous chapters have indicated some interventions that government initiated in previous 
years in order to try and improve the performance of SOEs. These interventions are no stranger 
to corporate governance theory; thus their failures have found explanation in several research 
pieces. The way forward can be derived from various case studies, from across Africa and the 
world at large.  
When studying the interventions or mechanisms that may be employed to improve SOE 
performance, it should be noted that two broadly defined theories coexist in the corporate 
governance literature. One stresses the discipline of the market, claiming that, the threat of 
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hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts in firms was sufficient to ensure full efficiency. The 
other stresses that, where managers neglect to invest in those projects that add value to the 
firm and its shareholders but divert recourses to their own benefit, the financial markets act to 
restore good governance. 
A number of mechanisms have been suggested such as removing senior managers in poorly 
performing firms (Palepu, 1986; Morck, Shleifer & Vishney, 1988; 1989), demanding cash flow 
payments in the form of debt service (Jensen, 1986) and linking executive compensation to 
performance, including equity and options (Jensen, 1986). Matama (2005), in a study on 
corporate governance and financial performance of selected commercial banks, observed a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. 
Masibo (2005), in a research on board governance and firm performance of selected state-
owned corporations and in listed organisations on the Uganda Securities Exchange, observed 
a positive direct and indirect link between board governance and firm performance through 
board effectiveness. Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, (2005) conducted empirical research on 
corporate governance and firm performance from an international perspective and obtained 
conflicting results on the link between corporate governance and firm performance. 
Higgs (2003) suggests that the board as the central institution of governance defines the level 
and depth of enterprise corporate practices. Higgs (2003) further argues that how well the board 
performs its roles determines the state of corporate governance in the organisation (Higgs, 
2003). Gavin and Geoffrey (2004:67) state that, “the relationship between corporate 
governance and enterprise performance cannot be limited to board roles, as corporate 
governance is broader than just board roles”. 
From the above-mentioned literature, it would seem that the two authors’ differing views are an 
extension of each other’s arguments. Combining the two authors’ positions (Higgs, 2003 and 
that of Gavin and Geoffrey, 2004) would suggest that, board roles have a positive impact on 
corporate governance but there are other variables that are internal and external to the 
organisation that may also have an impact on corporate governance. It is thus recommended 
to improve the roles of boards and increasing their independence. It is therefore suggested that, 
Government interference (or intervention) should remain on the oversight level only. 
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7.5.2 Ensuring adherence to king principles as embodied in the King Reports and the 
NamCode 
Subject to any limitation in the enterprise’s memorandum of incorporation, the board may 
establish committees to assist in the execution of its functions in specific areas. As a minimum, 
the Companies Act, 2008 requires an enterprise to have an audit committee appointed by 
enterprise shareholders. The audit committee is appointed to focus on financial issues that are 
vital to the enterprise, to assure the integrity of reporting, to ensure that management develops 
and maintains an appropriate system of internal controls and to monitor the effectiveness of 
those controls on an on-going basis. 
In addition, the King III Report (2009) recommends that companies consider appointing a risk 
management committee (to assist the board with the risk management function for which it is 
responsible), a nomination committee (to ensure the appropriate constitution of the board, to 
oversee the board evaluation process and to plan succession) and a remuneration committee 
(to ensure that issues of remuneration are dealt with on a sufficiently arm’s length, market-
related basis and that the enterprise’s ability to motivate and retain its key executives and 
directors is not compromised).  
The King III Report (2009) further suggests that board committees should be formally 
constituted with written terms of reference and clearly agreed upon reporting lines to the board. 
On the other hand, the NamCode posits that:  
By issuing integrated reports, a company increases the trust and conﬁdence of its 
stakeholders and the legitimacy of its operations. It can increase the enterprise’s business 
opportunities and improve its risk management. By issuing an integrated report internally, 
a company evaluates its ethics, fundamental values, and governance, and externally 
improves the trust and conﬁdence which stakeholders have in it.  
 
In the NamCode, as in King III, it recommends integrated sustainability performance and 
integrated reporting to enable stakeholders to make a more informed assessment of the 
economic value of an enterprise. The integrated report, which is used throughout the NamCode 
should have sufﬁcient information to record how the enterprise has both positively and 
negatively impacted on the economic life of the community in which it operated during the year 
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under review, often categorised as environmental, social and governance issues (ESG). 
Further, it should report how the board believes it can improve the positive aspects and 
eradicate or ameliorate the negative aspects, in the coming year (Namibian Stock Exchange & 
First National Bank Holdings, 2016:11). 
With the greatly increased accountability of board of directors under the Companies Act (2008) 
and the King III Report (2009), well-constituted board Committees (including additional skills 
where appropriate) could prove to be invaluable allies in the governance of the enterprise. 
According to the King III Report (2009), other committees may be constituted with defined 
powers delegated to them by the board, for instance to discharge specific mandates such as to 
investigate the enterprise’s risk profile and human resource issues. 
The King III Report (2009) further suggests that, in terms of corporate governance and financial 
performance of locally listed companies, board Committees should, as a rule, preferably be 
made up of a majority of, and chaired by, independent non-executive directors with executive 
directors and functional managers as invitees without voting rights. The concern of corporate 
governance has been with both accountability of the board of directors and the effectiveness of 
the board (Cadbury, 2002). These notions give rise to the idea of listing on the NSE. The listing 
may not be the panacea. The preceding chapters have unravelled information that shows that 
in order to ensure the effectiveness of the board, there should be an inclusion of a sufficient 
number of non-executive directors who could bring objectivity to the board’s judgment. Thus, 
non-executive directors should be in the majority (Cadbury, 2000; Cadbury, 2002). 
According to Masawi (2001), private and public companies in Namibia are yet to make 
significant improvements in corporate governance and find consensus between management 
and board of directors, amidst growing calls for improved governance. Such improvements will 
depend on whether SOEs are listed or not and whether NamCode becomes the gold standard 
of corporate governance in Namibia or not. This is the position as it can be noted that political 
appointments dominate SOEs, a situation that is compromising efficiency. 
The worst institutions in terms of adopting sound and well-crafted corporate governance 
policies in Namibia are the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). “[…] [T]hey lack clear demarcation 
between the duties of the appointing officer, the management and the board” (Masawi, 2001:2). 
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It is clear from the preceding chapters that most companies from both the private and public 
sectors have adopted the King Code III as the benchmark for implementing good corporate 
governance policies and also aligned themselves with the international monitoring trends. King 
Code III is the latest corporate governance policy promoted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) 
in a bid to enhance management and operational structures for both public and private 
companies in the country and has been taken up by about 60% of the companies operating in 
the country (Cadbury, 2002). 
Thus, it can be concluded that in Namibia there is a need for the extensive education of board 
members and senior managers of companies to align their operations with good corporate 
governance policies (Cadbury, 2002). Furthermore, government most strengthen its oversight 
function. This study has showed that, it is not enough for government to design laws and 
policies, appoint board members etc. Instead, the government should ensure that these laws 
and policies are implemented through government’s regulatory oversight function. Hence an 
independent regulator for SOEs is suggested. Such a body should have the necessary capacity 
in terms of skills and the necessary credentials to manage SOEs.  
 
7.5.3 Applying best practice principles to Namibian SOEs 
Namibia established the State-Owned Enterprise Governance Council, previously known as 
the Corporate Governance Agency, which came into existence after the enactment of the 
enabling act, i.e. the State-Owned Enterprises Governance Act of 2006. The Act provides for 
the efficient governance of SOEs and the monitoring of their performances to make provision 
for the restructuring of SOEs, to establish the State-Owned Enterprises Governance Council 
and define its powers, duties and functions, and to make provision for incidental matters. 
Namibia uses legitimate accounting and auditing principles that are internationally practised in 
the public and private sectors (Oertel, 2004). Efficient and effective institutions are indeed 
understood to be essential prerequisites for establishing and entrenching a culture of 
accountability and transparency in the management of national affairs. As Chapter 4 shows, at 
the level of each enterprise, directors are required, in terms of the enabling legislation or the 
Act creating such an enterprise, to produce financial reports in compliance with the time frame 
required by such an act. For example, the Roads Authority Act (No. 17 of 1999) enjoins the 
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board of directors to maintain adequate accounting records. Directors are also responsible for 
the content and integrity of the annual financial statements and related financial information 
included therein. Furthermore, it is their responsibility to ensure that the annual financial 
statements fairly present the state of affairs of the RA at the end of the financial year and the 
results of its operations and cash flow for the period then ended, in conformity with international 
financial reporting standards. 
Chapter 5 shows that in all five SOEs in the transport sector (covered in this study), there is an 
internal audit department. In general, external auditors are engaged to express an independent 
opinion on the annual financial statements that could have been overlooked by internal auditors 
for one or the other reason (especially that they might be familiar with the environment and 
begins to overlook things – hence the importance oversight functions of external auditors).  
The annual financial statements are prepared in accordance with international financial 
reporting standards and they are based on appropriate accounting policies consistently applied 
and supported by reasonable and prudent judgments and estimates. Directors have to state 
their final responsibility for ensuring this, as per their corporate governance duties. However, 
they do not take absolute responsibility as they note that there is always a margin of error in all 
human endeavours. The Roads Authority board of directors accordingly states: 
The directors acknowledge that they are ultimately responsible for the system of internal 
financial control established by the Roads Authority and place considerable importance on 
maintaining a strong control environment. To enable the directors to meet these 
responsibilities, the board of directors sets standards for internal control aimed at reducing 
the risk of error or loss in a cost-effective manner. The standards include the proper 
delegation of responsibilities within a clearly defined framework, effective accounting 
procedures and adequate segregation of duties to ensure an acceptable level of risk. These 
controls are monitored throughout the Roads Authority and all employees are required to 
maintain the highest ethical standards in ensuring the Roads Authority’s business is 
conducted in a manner that in all reasonable circumstances is above reproach. 
(Namibia Roads Authority, 2013:55) 
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Similar views are found in the annual reports of the Namibia Ports Authority (2013, 2014). 
Generally, in the transport sector, like elsewhere, an international best practice is the focus on 
risk management for identifying, assessing, managing and monitoring all known forms of risk 
across an enterprise. While operating risk cannot be fully eliminated, SOEs should always 
endeavour to minimise this by ensuring that appropriate infrastructure, controls, systems and 
ethical behaviour are applied and managed within predetermined procedures and constraints. 
It seems (at least from this study) that an SOE such as Air Namibia has not applied these 
principles well. 
 
7.5.4 SOEs bailouts to be an exception rather than a norm 
In the final analysis, if the status quo (poor performance) does not improve, the study 
recommends that SOEs should be allowed to close down (collapse) like any other 
business that fails to perform. Bailouts should be an exception rather than the norm. It is not 
acceptable that, while government (and the private sector) has largely succeeded in generating 
positive economic growth since independence, such gains be squandered by SOEs. With 
limited resources at government disposal, it will not be possible nor sustainable to continue 
satisfying SOEs demands without demanding performance and analysing the return on such 
investment (ROI) made in SOEs. 
While it is not the intention of this study to dictate on what choice the government needs to 
make regarding these SOEs, it is clear that tough choices will have to be made if ever the 
government wants to benefits from the gains for which these SOEs were created. It’s not 
disputed that SOEs should play their part toward attaining Vision 2030 and other developmental 
goals. Financial assistance should, however, only be considered in exceptional cases, 
especially if it beyond the SOEs control, i.e. economic shocks and externalities. The study 
further recommends for a criteria or principle to be developed in this regard to avoid selective 
application of financial assistance. 
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7.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
This research was focused on and limited to what was outlined in Chapter 1 and attempted to 
answer the outlined research questions. There are, however, a number of areas that may 
require further research to give more answers to the ever-increasing number of questions. 
These areas relate to the following: 
● Wider research into the performance of each sector’s SOEs and specific reasons for poor 
performance and recommendations to address them; 
● Some comparative analysis of Namibian SOEs in the transport sector and those in the 
SADC region and/or beyond;  
● Critical analyses of the (potential) impact of privatisation and or commercialisation of 
SOEs with specific predictions for Namibia; and 
● Research on data collection and data management of Namibian SOEs, especially 
financial sustainability and cost drivers 
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure 1 
List of Interviewees 
No Name Organisatio
n 
Rank Contact Target Actual 
Political       
1 Hon. Leon Jooste Ministry of 
Public 
Enterprises 
Minister +264 61 
2023600 
  
2 Hon. James 
Sankwasa 
Ministry of 
Works and 
Transport 
Deputy 
Minister 
+264 61 
2023600 
  
Total     2 2 
  Central 
Government 
    
3 Ms E. Simana Ministry of 
Works and 
Transport 
Director 
(Aviation) 
+264 81 
1242735 
  
4 Mr. C. Dziva Ministry of 
Works and 
Transport 
Acting 
Director 
(infrastruct
ure) 
+264 81 
1407770 
  
5 Mr. Nchube Ministry of 
Works and 
Transport 
Director 
(Railways) 
+264 81 
1410749 
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6 Mr. P Auena Ministry of 
Works and 
Transport 
Director 
(Maritime) 
+264 81 
6649188 
  
Total     4 4 
  SOEs     
7 Adv. M Samson Air Namibia CEO +264 81 
1427203 
  
8 Mr. Masule Air Namibia General 
Manager 
+264 81 
1226029 
  
Total     3 2 
       
9 Mr. P. Smith TransNamib Board 
Chairman 
+264 61 
2855700 
  
10 Mr. Mukungu TransNamib Executive 
(Manager) 
+264 61 
2855700 
  
     3 2 
11 Mr. Uirab Namport CEO +264 
811002036 
  
12 Mr Gelderbloem Namport Port 
Engineer 
+264 
811291980 
  
     3 2 
13 Ms R. Hango Roads 
Authority 
Executive 
(Manager) 
+264 
811297979 
  
14 Ms E Zaire Roads 
Authority 
Legal 
Adviser 
+264 
811273880 
  
     3  
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15 Mr. T. EL-Kallawi NAC CEO +26481143
4011 
  
16 Ms T. Sem NAC Strategic 
Executive 
+26481124
6888 
  
Total     2 2 
     20 16 
 Response rate = 77.8 %   
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Annexure 2 
 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT/QUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction 
My name is Cedric Limbo, a PHD student at the University of Stellenbosch, School of Public 
Leadership. My PHD Dissertation is entitled “An Analysis of the Performance of State-
owned Enterprises in Namibia: Case Studies of SOEs in the Transport Sector” 
Instructions/Information 
1. Results of this instruments will not be used for any other purpose except for this study, 
 
2. Be assured that your response will not be shared with any other person except the 
researcher, 
 
3. You are free to participate in this study or withdraw at anytime if you feel uncomfortable, 
 
4. The instrument is divided into four (4) sections, namely; Section A (Biographic Data), 
Section B (Performance of SOEs) and Section C (Challenges Encountered to Address 
their Mandates) and Section D (Mechanisms To Improve Performance).   
 
Kindly indicate (x) the institution you are working for 
Institutio
n 
Airports 
Compan
y 
Air 
Namibia 
RCC RA TransNami
b 
Nampor
t 
Others 
Subsect
or 
Aviation Road Rail Maritim
e 
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Section A: Biographic Data 
1. Gender 
Male   Female  
 
2. What is your position level? 
Below Management   
Management   
Others17  
 
3. Experience - How long (years) have you been working in the (transport) sector? 
0-5 years  
6-15  
Above 15  
 
4. Qualification – Your highest academic Qualification/Professional? 
Below Grade12/STD10  
Grade 12/STD10  
Diploma  
Degree  
                                                 
17 Board Member, Politician, Academic, Sector Expert. 
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Masters  
PHD and Above  
 
Section B: Performance of SOEs 
5. How is the general/overall performance of SOEs in this country? 
Please Check as appropriate                                Classification  
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average/Fair 
 Poor 
 
Justify your answer 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
6. How is the performance of your SOE in relation to others in the transport sector? 
 
Please Check as appropriate                                Classification  
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average/Fair 
 Poor 
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Explain your answer. 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
7. How is the current performance of your organisation, in terms of;  
7.2 Assigned mandate  
Please Check as appropriate                                Classification  
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average/Fair 
 Poor 
 
Justify your answer 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
7.3 Efficiency 
Please Check as appropriate                                Classification  
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average/Fair 
 Poor 
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Justify your answer 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
7.4 Financial management 
Please Check as appropriate                                Classification  
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average/Fair 
 Poor 
 
Justify your answer 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
7.5 Service (Customer) 
 
Please Check as appropriate                                Classification  
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average/Fair 
 Poor 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
215 
 
Justify your answer 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................... 
Section C: Challenges Encountered to Address their Mandates 
8. What are the general challenges SOEs are faced with in achieving their mandates they 
were established for? 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................... 
9. What are the challenges faced by your organisation in achieving its mandates, in terms 
of; 
9.1.  Accountability 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................... 
9.2 Governance 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
216 
 
9.3.  Organisational 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
9.4.  Performance Indicators 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
9.5.  Resources 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
10. How, (in your opinion) can the above challenge (s) be addressed? 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Section D: Mechanisms to Improve Performance 
11.     How do you think the performance in your organisation can be improved – in light of 
the challenges you have just shared with the researcher (please explain) 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
12.   Are you aware of the existing performance tool? 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
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13.  If yes, what does it entail?  
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
14.  Does the current performance tool, in your opinion needs improvement? 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
15. Are there any other ways that your organisation could improve its performance? 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
16. Any other comments (that haven’t been discussed above) that, in your opinion needs to 
be addressed to improve performance of SOEs? 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................... 
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